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Introduction 
“[The South] is exceptional in Western nonfascist civilization since the Enlightenment in that it 
lacks nearly every trace of radical thought. In the South all progressive thinking going further 
than mild liberalism has been practically nonexistent for a century.”1 
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma 
 
 
 Political pundits, TV commentators, and historians have proclaimed that we have entered 
the Age of Obama. What this new age means for America’s race relationships is yet to be 
determined. All would agree, however, that President Obama would not have broken the final 
barrier and became the first African-American president if not for the civil rights generation that 
preceded him. The Civil Rights Movement is rightly lauded as a watershed moment in American 
history. Men and women of all races marched and died together to challenge America to live up 
to its highest ideal of human liberty and equality. Most Americans would point to the Brown 
decision in 1954 and the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955 as the beginning of the modern Civil 
Rights Movement. Few know about an earlier and smaller movement that began in the South to 
enfranchise black voters, to obtain economic opportunity for African Americans, and to abolish 
racial segregation. The most astonishing aspect of this movement was that it was instigated and 
                                                 
1 Myrdal, American Dilemma, 469-70. 
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led by white southern liberals of an interracial organization known as the Southern Conference 
for Human Welfare (SCHW). 
 When the term “southern liberals” is brought up, it often elicits one of two responses: 
“Were there any?” and “Is that an oxymoron?”2 Southern liberalism appears to many, then and 
now, as a strange and rare phenomenon. The South, a region that had fought a bloody war 
defending its slavery and states’ rights, was never known to have a progressive spirit. Southern 
liberals stood out in contrast to the traditions of their region. But in spite of their exceptionalism 
in relation to their region, they reflected the same complicated racial dichotomy that had haunted 
the South since the first African-American slaves landed on its rich soil. In his classic work on 
the subject, In Search of the Silent South (1977), the historian of southern liberals Morton Sosna 
broadly defined white southern liberals as those  
who perceived that there was a serious maladjustment of race 
relations in the South, who recognized that the existing system 
resulted in grave injustices for blacks, and who either actively 
endorsed or engaged in program to aid Southern blacks in their 
fight against lynching, disfranchisement, segregation, and blatant 
discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and law 
enforcement.3 
 
Southern liberals were thus different from most southerners in their acknowledgement that 
southern blacks did not fare well under the present racial and economic systems and that crucial 
changes were needed. Where they displayed diversity is in their views of what should be done, 
how it should be done, and how fast it should be implemented. Southern liberals could therefore 
be broadly divided in two further categories: the advanced liberals and the cautious liberals. 4   
                                                 
2 When the historian of southern liberals, Morton Sosna, was first asked in graduate school whether he would 
include southern liberals in his dissertation about American liberals, he was surprised to learn that there were 
southern liberals to study. See Morton Sosna, In Search of the Silent South: Southern Liberals and the Race Issue 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), ix. 
3 Ibid., viii. 
4 Both terms are adopted from Anthony L. Newberry , Without Urgency or Ardor: The South’s Middle-of-the-Road 
Liberals and Civil Rights, 1945-1950 (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1982), 19-21. 
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All southern liberals emphasized educational, economic, and social improvements. What 
set advanced liberals apart from most cautious liberals was their support for civil rights for all 
Americans, including the end of the segregation of the races, and their strong tie with national 
liberalism. There were variations within advanced liberalism of how fast desegregation should 
occur, but they were in general agreement that it should be on its way out. A hallmark of most of 
the advanced liberals was the influential role Franklin Delano Roosevelt (F.D.R.) and his New 
Deal had on their development and their own staunch support for the president and his programs. 
The Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, in his 1944 groundbreaking study of the 
South, noted that the “New Deal had made liberals accustomed to rather rapid reforms 
and…reforms which have often challenged local prejudices considerably.”5 Advanced liberals 
often advocated direct action by the federal government and southern activists. But they were 
distinct from the radical-left, especially the Communists, in that they did not advocate the 
replacement of the capitalist economic model or seek the overthrow of the United States 
government. Although they did not actively seek out the aid of fellow-travelers or Communist 
elements within the South, they were willing to work with them in order to achieve their goals. 
In many ways advanced liberals acted as a bridge between the cautious liberals and the more 
radical fringes. The Southern Conference for Human Welfare and its leaders, William 
Alexander, James Dombrowski, Virginia Durr, Clark Foreman, Lucy Randolph Mason, and 
Aubrey Williams, exemplified advanced southern liberalism.6 
 Cautious liberals, whose membership included the journalists Virginius Dabney, Ralph 
McGill, and John Temple Graves, and academics like Howard Odum and Guy B. Johnson, 
                                                 
5 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, Vol.1 (New York & 
London: Harper & Brother Publishers, 1944), 471.  
6 Henry Moon called liberals like Clark Foreman and Aubrey Williams the “advanced guard” of southern liberalism. 
See Henry Lee Moon, Balance of Power: The Negro Vote (Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), 191. 
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shared the overall economic and social goals with advanced liberal counterpart, but what set 
them apart was their resistance  to desegregation and their gradualist view of how progress 
should be made. These cautious liberals saw the race problem as only one of many symptoms 
exhibited by the economically ailing South. They reasoned that an overall rise in education and 
the standard of living in the South would automatically lessen the hardships suffered by southern 
blacks, and with time, an equal system of services could be created to fully accommodate the 
needs of southern blacks. These cautious liberals believed segregation was a part of the southern 
folkways—one that might die out naturally in decades or a century if everything else was 
improved—and a vice that needed to be accepted by all if any progress were to come to the 
South. Cautious liberals thus strove to live up to the ideal of “separate but equal.” Their 
adherence to the southern mores, however, distanced them from the black segment that they 
wished to help. They were genuinely surprised when southern blacks rejected their enlightened 
paternalism and became increasingly militant in their demands for economic security and legal 
rights. Although most cautious liberals were initially optimistic about the New Deal, they grew 
to distrust the intruding presence of the federal government. They feared that ill-conceived 
legislation seeking to ameliorate the southern condition would stir the unpleasant memory of 
Reconstruction and adversely affect progress in the South. These cautious liberals were fully 
aware of the violent nature of their South and feared that Dixie’s worst nature would manifest 
itself if the region were pushed too far by the federal government and African Americans. 
Changes, therefore, must be gradual and carefully planned, giving the southern people time to 
adjust to the new situation.7  
                                                 
7 To many cautious liberals, the Reconstruction invoked the image of honorable and decent southerners suffering 
abuses at the hand of Radical Republicans and their ignorant black allies. Reconstruction, with its imposition of the 
national will on the sovereign states, stood as the absolute worst model for advancing the cause of the South and its 
black population. Even after the Brown decision had made school segregation illegal, cautious southern liberals like 
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Unfortunately, despite the works and accomplishments of southern liberals to institute 
racial and economic changes in the South during the pre-Brown era, their work has largely been 
overshadowed by the Civil Rights Movement and the profound impact it had on American 
society. What marred the reputation of southern liberals as a whole was the public advocacy of 
some of the most prominent cautious liberals who, fearing that the South was not ready for the 
rapid pace of progress, adopted a strict segregationist stance. Many African Americans, who saw 
their enormous sacrifices during World War II as their blood payment for freedom, were 
dismayed by the unexpected retreat of respected cautious liberals. Walter White, the President of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), lamented in 1ate 
1942 that “the highest casualty rate of the war to date seems to be that of Southern white 
liberals… [who are] fleeing before the onslaught of the professional Southern bigots.”8 The 
African-American writer and civil rights activist James Baldwin denounced the record of white 
liberals as “a shameful record,” shaped by those who, with a few exceptions, had “been unable to 
                                                                                                                                                             
the influential journalist Gerald Johnson of the Baltimore Evening Sun held firm the conviction that it should be up 
to each state to desegregate at its own pace independent of the federal government or else the disastrous 
Reconstruction would repeat itself. Another highly influential cautious liberal southern journalist, Virginius Dabney 
of the Richmond Times-Dispatch, identified southern liberalism in his book, Liberalism in the South (1932), with 
the Jeffersonian ideal of state rights. Sosna describes resistance toward federal attempts to improve southern race 
relations, with a few exceptions, as a quintessential characteristic of cautious southern liberals. These cautious 
southern liberals paradoxically believed that, in order for progress to succeed in the South, it needed to adhere 
strictly to southern traditions and mores. Anything else would automatically be branded as radical and a threat to the 
southern way of life. At the same time, however, cautious southern liberals demonstrated a confident optimism that 
the South was gradually becoming more progressive. In his book, Dabney insisted that there was “a growing 
awareness on the part of the dominant race that the Negro is not a serf or a helot, but a human being with legitimate 
aspirations…which are slowly being realized…[there is] a growing conviction [on the part of a] substantial body of 
Southerners” that Jim Crow laws were excessively severe. In the end, although southern liberals had one foot 
entrenched in the past, their other foot was lifting them toward an enlightened vision of the South’s future. See John 
T Kneebone, Southern Liberal Journalists and the Issue of Race, 1920-1944 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1985), 53; Vincent Fitzpatrick, Gerald W. Johnson: From Southern Liberal to National Conscience 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 2002), 216; Virginius Dabney, Liberalism in the South (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932), 2, 165-70, 254, 264; Dabney’s quote is in Liberalism in the South, 
427-28; Sosna, In Search, 6. 
8 Walter White, “Decline of Southern Liberals,” Negro Digest 1, no.3 (January 1943): 42. 
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divest themselves of the whole concept of white supremacy.”9 Recent historians of southern 
liberals are equally critical of them in their studies, either for their strict gradualist position and 
tactics or the questionable impact they had on the South. “For all the words they wrote, petitions 
they signed, organizations they launched, and studies they contributed to public discussion,” 
wrote one historian, “this generation of Southern liberals has been rather easy to dismiss.”10 The 
public, rightward retreat of cautious liberals cost them a leading position in the civil rights debate 
at a time when minority rights were advancing toward the forefront of American consciousness. 
Starting from the mid-1940s, African Americans would take it upon themselves to lead the Civil 
Rights Movement, with or without the help of southern liberals. The reputation of southern 
liberals never truly recovered from the conservative retreat of cautious liberals. 
 The damaged reputation of southern liberals in general has eclipsed the groundbreaking 
work of advanced liberals and the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. These individuals 
defied the stereotype of gradualistic and paternalistic white southerners. Founded in 1938 by 
middle-class southern New Dealers as an extension of F.D.R.’s New Deal liberalism, the 
Southern Conference was the spiritual heir to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
progressive, populist spirit of direct activism and close involvement of the government in the 
positive development of the lives of its people. The Southern Conference, living up to its ideal of 
an organization of the people and for the people, opened its door to all comers, regardless of 
                                                 
9 James Baldwin and others, “Liberalism and the Negro: A Round-Table Discussion,” Commentary 37, no.3 (March 
1964): 41. 
10 The quote is from John Michael Matthews, “Virginius Dabney, John Temple Graves, and What Happened to 
Southern Liberalism,” Mississippi Quarterly 45, no.4 (Fall 1992): 405. J. Douglas Smith, in Managing White 
Supremacy: Race, Politics, and Citizenships in Jim Crow Virginia (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2002), argued that white Virginian moderates and cautious liberals sought to maintain their 
supremacy by obtaining “separation by consent” from black Virginians by making paternalistic promises of 
economic improvements, better educational facilities, and some legal protections in the courts as incentives. 
Anthony L. Newberry in his PhD dissertation, “Without Urgency or Ardor,” similarly pointed out “the colossal act 
of self-deception” that moderates and cautious liberals were guilty of when they convinced themselves that southern 
blacks were conservative and generally content with their position as long as their economic situation improved, 
they were secured from the worst of white violence, and they could enjoy a truly equal but separate system of 
accommodations.  
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political stripes, and welcomed in Communists and socialists, CIO and AFL unions, blacks and 
whites. Their founding mission was to empower the poor and the disenfranchised of the South in 
order to create lasting economic and social changes. The Southern Conference not only worked 
on traditional liberal issues like abolishing the poll tax, expanding the economic and social 
programs of the New Deal, and unionizing the South, but it sought to build a working political 
coalition of progressive southerners to oust conservative Democrats from office and to end 
segregation at a time when southern conservative forces were at their strongest and an anti-
segregationist stance was synonymous with communism. As Gunnar Myrdal noted, “The 
recruitment to liberalism in the South is strongly selective in regard to courage.”11 What made 
the men and women of the Southern Conference the epitome of advanced southern liberalism 
was their uncompromising adherence to the ideal of liberal-progressivism despite being viciously 
maligned as Communist and race traitors by southern conservative, reactionaries, and cautious 
liberals. The Southern Conference might have reversed the taint associated with southern 
liberalism and played a large role in the Civil Rights Movement had it not been for their 
untimely demise in 1948, an indirect result of the red-hysteria that was beginning to grip the 
entire nation. The Southern Conference’s unwillingness to retreat from its progressive policy like 
the cautious liberals or to instigate witch-hunts marked it as a pariah within American liberalism 
and a perfect target for conservative Democrats. The end of the Southern Conference was a 
severe blow to advanced liberalism in the South. Its demise left behind a void that no other 
southern liberal organizations were able to fill. 
 The story of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare has been touched upon in 
debatable ways by Thomas Krueger in And Promises to Keep (1967) and Linda Reed in Simple 
Decency and Common Sense (1991). Both authors see the Southern Conference as a break from 
                                                 
11 Myrdal, American Dilemma, 471. 
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the traditional cautious liberals and praised them for trying to make a difference. Krueger tells an 
informative story about the Southern Conference, but his story lacks depth as it does not provide 
adequate analysis of the characteristics of advanced liberalism. Reed judges the Southern 
Conference as too cautious and genteel. Advanced liberals of the SCHW, Reed argues, “wanted 
to remain respectable while also wanted to bring about fundamental economic social and 
political change in the South. The Civil Rights Movement showed that basic reform requires 
unseemly acts by masses of people—boycotts, demonstrating, jailings—which the 
SCHW…neither had the numbers nor the courage to undertake.”12 This thesis will argue against 
Reed’s contention that the men and women of the Southern Conference were not courageous 
enough or did not try to build a mass movement against Jim Crow. This thesis will strive to show 
that the men and women of Southern Conference for Human Welfare took a courageous stand 
against Jim Crow, southern demagogues, and economic inequality at the cost of their own well-
being. They stood in contrast to the image of wavering, cautious liberals at the onset of the Cold 
War. The Southern Conference failed not because it had compromised, but because it refused to 
give in at a time when it was convenient to do so. Its all-or-nothing defense of the liberal ideals, 
therefore, cost it vital funds to maintain its mass mobilization efforts. The story of the Southern 
Conference deserves to be examined again in the light of their courage and idealism. 
                                                 
12 Linda Reed, Simple Decency & Common Sense: The Southern Conference Movement, 1938-1963 (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1991), xxv. 
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Chapter 1: The Road to Birmingham 
 
 
 Joseph Gelders was a handsome man with a strong and sensitive face. His kind blue eyes 
drew others to him. But, as one close friend described Gelders, beneath his charming exterior 
were a fearless courage and a steely honesty. Born and raised in Red Mountain, a fashionable 
and predominantly Jewish neighborhood on the south side of Birmingham, Alabama, Gelder’s 
sheltered world was one of comfort and easy living. His early placid existence belied the 
Herculean task he would undertake in his later life. After a brief stint in the army, a number of 
odd jobs, and a stay at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Gelders returned to the 
University of Alabama in 1929 and, within a short time, earned a B.S. and a Master’s degree in 
physics. Gelders might have continued to live out his unexceptional and “unpolitical” life 
teaching physics at the University of Alabama had it not been for the Great Depression.13  
                                                 
13 Virginia Foster Durr, interview by Bob Hall, Jacquelyn Hall, and Sue Thrasher, March 13-15, 1975, interview G-
0023-2, transcript, Southern Oral History Program Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC, 63 
(hereafter cited as Durr, interview, March 1975); Virginia Foster Durr, interview by Sue Thrasher, October 16, 
1975, interview 0023-3, transcript, Southern Oral History Program Collection, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, NC, 45 (hereafter cited as Durr, interview, October 1975); Thomas Krueger, And Promises to Keep: 
The Southern Conference for Human Welfare, 1938-1948 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967), 4. 
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The Great Depression brought millions of southern men and women to the brink of 
destitution. Gelders was utterly unprepared for the poverty surrounding him. For the first time in 
his life he witnessed a level of starvation and misery deplorable even by southern standards. The 
government, instead of distributing the agricultural surplus to the hungry, was killing livestock 
and leaving fertile land uncultivated in order to raise farm prices.  Determined to find an answer 
to the misery that was draining the life of the southern people, Gelders devoured every 
economics book he could find. Starting with Adam Smith, he read all the economists until he 
finally got to the socialism of Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx. It was a Eureka moment.  Gelders 
reasoned that the Depression was not one “of scarcity—it was a depression of glut.” He blamed 
the unequal distribution of wealth for causing this catastrophic disaster. Believing that only 
revolutionary change could transform the entrenched system, Gelders converted to Marxism 
without ever having met a Marxist in his life.14  
Gelders left the University of Alabama in August of 1935 to join the National Committee 
for the Defense of Political Prisoners, an organization labeled a Communist front.  After a year 
working in New York, Gelders returned to Birmingham as the southern representative of the 
organization. Gelders’s southerner status and family connections in Birmingham did not give 
him protection against violent treatment at the hands of strike breakers. While trying to end the 
inhumane imprisonment of Jack Barton, a secretary of a local Communist party, who was trying 
to organize a union at a local steel mill, Gelders was kidnapped on the night of September 23, 
1936 while walking home from a meeting. Driving him over the mountain and into the woods, 
the men stripped him and proceeded to mercilessly beat him, kicking his stomach and whipping 
his back with a thick leather strap. Taking everything that Gelders had on him, the goons left him 
for dead. But he did not die. Naked, bloody, and severely injured, Gelders dragged his battered 
                                                 
14Durr, interview, Oct., 1975, 33-35. 
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body through the darkness of the Alabama hills to the nearest town for help. When Gelders died 
prematurely in 1950 at the age of 51, the autopsy discovered that his chest had been crushed into 
a mass of battered flesh and bone.15  
The attack on Gelders was not unusual in the world of union busting. The South, despite 
its wealth of natural resources, had little to offer in term of human capital other than its abundant 
cheap labor. “We had such a low opinion of ourselves in those days” the progressive activist 
Virginia Durr recalled, “[Southern industrialists] think that they have to knuckle under to the 
North and tempt them with cheap labor.” And to hold on to their advantage, southern 
industrialists did not hesitate to employ thugs and gave them free reign to maintain “law and 
order” on and off the factory floor. Violent intimidations were employed against attempts of 
unionization. The legal immunity enjoyed by these “special guards” rivaled that of the lynch 
mob. Despite Gelders’s positive identification of two of his three assailants and an independent 
eyewitness account, none of the assailants were ever brought to trial. Instead of being 
discouraged, Gelders refused to cower. He realized, however, that the South could not be 
changed by anyone single agency or individual. Before it could improve economically and 
socially, a systematic revolution was necessary to protect the civil liberty of all southerners. 16  
In early 1938, Gelders shared his idea of a southern conference for civil liberties with the 
famous southern labor activist, Lucy Randolph Mason. After President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
disastrous attempt to pack the Supreme Court in 1937, Lucy Mason, a close friend of Eleanor 
Roosevelt, advised the first lady that poor southerners, despite the fact that their leaders openly 
opposed the President, were the natural and strongest base for F.D.R. in the South. In order to 
create a more progressive South, these poor Southerners needed to be enfranchised. Deterrences 
                                                 
15 Krueger, Promises to Keep, 5; Durr, interview, Oct. 16, 1975, 38; Krueger, Promises to Keep,  3-6. 
16 Durr, interview, Mar. 13-15, 1975, 59, 66-67; Jerold S. Auerbach, “The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil 
Liberties in the New Deal,” The Journal of American History 51, no. 3 (1964): 435-459. 
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like the poll-tax needed to be eliminated.17 Sensing potential in Gelders’s proposal, Lucy Mason 
recommended him to Mrs. Roosevelt, and the First Lady was, in turn, impressed enough by 
Gelders’s idea to arrange a meeting between him and her husband. The President was receptive 
to the idea of a southern conference and a possible campaign to repeal of the poll tax, but he 
asked Gelders to broaden the agenda to include economic reforms. With the President giving his 
approval of the project, Gelders and Miss Mason began to recruit conferees from the most logical 
and accessible source: southern New Dealers, and among them was Clark Foreman who would 
later have the most profound impact on the Southern Conference for Human Welfare.18  
Clark Howell Foreman was born in 1902 in Atlanta, Georgia, to a distinguished family. 
His maternal grandfather, Evan Howell, was the founder and publisher of the Atlanta 
Constitution. His early life was typical of the genteel southern middle class. What shocked 
Foreman into awareness of the plight of southern blacks was the outbreak of racial violence in 
1919. Foreman was in his second year at the University of Georgia when he witnessed for the 
first the time the age-old southern tradition of lynching. The victim, like four-fifth of victims of 
such gruesome deaths, was a black man. The image of the man dangling from the tree while 
being slowly roasted alive by the fire beneath his feet haunted Foreman’s memory for the rest of 
his life.  The mob, not content to let their victim suffer in fiery agony, cut him down and 
proceeded to beat savagely him with their crude instruments before returning him to the fire. 
Foreman was shocked to learn that the black victim was not hauled from his home or picked up 
from a dingy sheriff jail, but was taken from a “mob-proof courthouse.” Foreman realized then 
that there was no such thing as law and order in Dixie—nothing was safe from the murderous 
                                                 
17 Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996), 62. 
18 Clark Foreman, “The Decade of Hope,” Phylon 12, no.2 (1951): 138; Krueger, Promises to Keep, 16-17; Durr, 
interview, Mar., 1975, 80; William Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. 
Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 112.  
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hands of a lynching mob.  The Atlanta papers vehemently denounced the barbarous act. The 
professors of the university loudly condemned the baser element of their society in front of their 
classes. But none of the better elements would raise a finger to stop the crime or to prosecute the 
perpetrators. These intellectuals preferred to express their outrage and indignation in the safe 
confines of the university or on the pages of the newspaper where no illiterate mob could touch 
them.19  
The intense experience transformed Foreman. His faith in the South and God was shaken 
to the core. In his later life, Foreman would describe himself as “an agnostic who believes firmly 
in the Bill of Rights.” To Foreman, no heavenly power nor any southern agent could stand 
against the raw emotion he witnessed that day. The impetus for change would have to come from 
above the Mason-Dixon Line. And, so, soon after graduation, Foreman left the South and went to 
Harvard University and then the London School of Economics. While in London, Foreman 
discovered J. H. Oldham’s Christianity and the Race Problem (1924). The book was a revelation 
to him. In it he learned about the Atlanta-based Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC), an 
organization founded in Atlanta, Georgia, as a response to the rising number of black lynchings 
and race riots during the bloody summer of 1919. The Commission professed to bring the two 
races together to solve the race problems of the South. Inspired by the Commission’s goal, 
Foreman returned to Atlanta, ready to throw himself into interracial work.20  
Foreman’s energy and devotion would later become legendary. Will Alexander, one of 
the founders of the Interracial Commission, later described Foreman as a “Billy-goat” whose 
way of getting thing done was to butt right into obstacles and keep butting until he was through 
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with the problems.21 Unlike many professed enlightened whites who lent only their sympathetic 
ears to blacks confessing their hardship, Foreman was pure act when it came to doing the right 
thing. Regardless of the scale of the problem, Foreman showed little hesitation in confronting 
injustice. “.If [Clark Foreman] had waked  [sic] up some night in a nightmare dreaming that he 
was not a liberal or had done some illiberal thing,” Alexander recalled, “he probably wouldn’t 
have slept again for a month. He leaned over backwards to be on the liberal side.”22 
Unfortunately, despite early optimism, Foreman would later find out that the cautious 
Commission was not liberal enough for him. Founded to resolve an immediate crisis, the 
Interracial Commission represented the quintessential enlightened paternalistic attitude of 
cautious liberalism.23  
After the end of World War I in 1918, the patriotic good will displayed between the races 
during the war evaporated as the post-war recession hit the nation’s economy. Economically 
frustrated, poor southern whites took their anger out on poor southern blacks. Fueling the flame 
of violence were the rumors that the returning black veterans were planning to use what they had 
learned in the army to stage violent insurrections against their white neighbors. In order to calm 
rumors of racial violence and to prevent barbarous lynchings, the Methodist minister Will 
Alexander assembled a group of ministers, bankers, and educators of both races to discuss the 
situation in Atlanta, Georgia in 1919. Traditionally, contacts between the southern blacks and 
whites were closest at the bottom of the social and economic level; the next level of interaction 
was between black servants and their white employers; and as one moved up the economic 
ladder, the level of interaction between the two races decreased dramatically. But Alexander 
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found out that once a line of communication between the two races was established, rumors 
could be tamed and violence prevented by the words of the better class. The positive results 
convinced the wealthy and educated segments of both races that an organization designed to 
foster communication between the two races would be beneficial to deter future 
misunderstanding and violence and to educate southern whites on the horrors of racial abuse 
suffered by southern blacks.24   
 Foreman’s first two years at the Interracial Commission were spent trying to get 
influential and wealthy whites to take pity on destitute blacks in their midst. Foreman was 
astounded by the condescending paternalistic attitude displayed by whites at the meeting. At the 
local branches of the CIC, it was the “civilized minority”—white, educated, middle-class 
southerners living in urban areas—who set the agenda. The organization had few rural, land-
owning members in its fold—the group that ultimately controlled the survival of the vast 
majority of southern blacks, who were overwhelmingly tenant farmers. White leaders would get 
together to hear complaints and grievances from leaders of the black community and dispense 
favors whenever they felt necessary. Some decrepit streets running through black neighborhoods 
were paved and some deteriorating black facilities were upgraded, but the fundamental 
instruments of oppression were left in place. This “civilized minority” naively believed that if the 
“better class” treated their blacks as “Christian brothers,” then low-class whites would learn from 
them. The problem, many within the Interracial Commission believed, would yield to the 
inspiring intrusion of paternalistic virtue.25  
The Basis of Racial Adjustment (1925), a college-text book published by the Interracial 
Commission to educate southern white college students on race relationships, exemplified 
                                                 
24 Reminiscences of Will Alexander, 156, 174, 176-78, 183; Sosna, In Search, 21-23. 
25 Sullivan, Days of Hope, 32; Sosna, In Search, 27, 28, 30, 34. 
16 
 
cautious liberalism. In it, the author and research director of the Interracial Commission, Thomas 
Woofter, identified three groups who made race relationships difficult: the ignorant and 
condescending Yankees, the bigoted Southerners, and the militant Negroes who demanded too 
much, too quickly. Woofter pointed out that agitation, whether it was stirred up by the forces of 
reactionaries or by militant blacks, would inevitably impede racial progress. Although he blamed 
the southern press for sensationalizing and magnifying the crimes of a few blacks, Woofter also 
faulted the black press for its unnecessary militant tone. Minor incidents that resulted from the 
foolish actions of both races should be conscientiously ignored by both races in order to prevent 
unnecessary riots and lynchings. The CIC should speak out in a moderate tone and with the clear 
force of reason behind it against atrocities like lynching. The CIC’s goal was to forge a cautious 
path of improvements.26  
Many of the Interracial Commission’s casual members were not gravely concerned about 
the civil rights of blacks, nor did they hold an altogether altruistic view of blacks. Conservative 
members wanted the CIC to help slow the tide of racial violence and prevent federal 
intervention. Conservatives even passively resisted efforts to gain voting rights for poor blacks 
and whites.  The liberal Will Alexander defended the CIC’s inaction by pointing out the other 
important programs that were preoccupying the Interracial Commission’s energy at the time.27  
The University of North Carolina sociologist and a member of the Interracial Commission, Guy 
B. Johnson, however, saw it differently, “I went through a sort of cynical, skeptical period, in 
which I think that…all of these activities that most organizations carried on were really rather 
trivial and had very little to do with the achieving of their announced goals…but that they had a 
lot to do with the personal functions. That is, what they did for the members who were taking 
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part.”28 The Interracial Commission gave those conservative white southern members a 
patronizing feeling of empowerment. Olive Stone, a member of the Quaker interracial 
Swarthmore Institute, marveled at the “patronizing approach on the part of the whites and the 
ingratiating appeal from the Negroes. Negroes… [who were] bursting with a smoldering sense of 
injustice and the ease of conscience…which the whites get from their benevolent gestures.”29  
Therefore, instead of establishing a foundation for future progress or creating meaningful 
dialogues, the cautious liberals and the conservatives of Interracial Commission “developed the 
tactics of evading principles; of being very indirect in attacking problems; of cajoling, coaxing 
and luring the public into giving in on minor issues .”30 
By 1926, two years into his tenure with the Interracial Commission, Clark Foreman 
decided that the Interracial Commission could neither continue to function on a basis of pure 
philanthropy nor could it depend on its powers of persuasion to convince southern whites to 
change. The progress of the CIC was insignificant when compared to the job that needed to be 
done. The CIC was passively treating the symptoms and were not getting to the roots of the 
disease.31 Will Alexander, in his later years, admitted that at the establishment of the Interracial 
Commission he “had no philosophy about the ultimate solution of the race problem.”32 Guy 
Johnson judged the Interracial Commission less harshly. He contended that the Interracial 
Commission had managed to do some good for blacks in certain instances, but problems like 
poverty, black employment, equal education, and the isolation of the races, were simply beyond 
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the meager resources of the Commission.33  Foreman, depleted and disillusioned by the glacial 
pace of progress, heeded W.E.B. Du Bois’s call for political activism and once again headed 
north to find new inspiration. 
The timing for Foreman was perfect. 1929 saw the worst economic collapse the country 
had ever experienced. The specter of violent revolution haunted the nation as hunger, 
unemployment, and despair mounted. The Depression spared no corner of the country, but 
nowhere did the economic downturn hit harder than the rural South. Economic depression meant 
plummeting prices of cotton, the main source of income for the majority of southerners. The 
infamous angry battle cries of “No Jobs for Niggers until Every White Man Has a Job!” and 
“Niggers, back to the cotton fields—city jobs are for white folks,” were on the lips of thousands 
of hungry and desperate whites.34 Frustrated and helpless, the white tenant farmers and urban 
workers inflicted their wrath on the black tenant farmers. Lynching doubled in 1930 from1929 
numbers.35 As the deepening Great Depression sucked dry the paltry coffers of the southern 
states, Dixie’s legendary xenophobic temperament buckled for the first time since the 
Reconstruction. The promise of a New Deal delivered with a supremely comforting voice and an 
optimistic smile of the ever-charming Franklin Delano Roosevelt was enough to captivate the 
South and caused it to seek salvation in the self-declared “part-time” southerner.36  
After F.D.R.’s resounding victory over Herbert Hoover in 1932, many southern liberals 
flocked to Washington D.C. to work on the promised New Deal. Sensing that the nation was 
entering a new age of progress, many of them believed that with careful management and the 
resources of the federal government, the South would finally realize its great latent economic 
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potential. Southern liberals had long anticipated the role they would play in the transformation of 
the South. Southern liberal journalists predicted that the Democratic Party would become the 
engine of progressive and liberal ideologies. The Democratic Party, with its long history of 
populism and standing up for the “little man,” was the only alternative to the Republicans who, 
southern liberals firmly believed, were all for the wealthy and the privileged. The solid 
Democratic South, they imagined, would be the vanguard of prosperity and change. The 
cautiously liberal Virginius Dabney quipped that this seemingly cataclysmic event would be “an 
almost unexampled opportunity for Southern Liberalism to reassert itself as a vital force in our 
national life. By furnishing an adequate answer to some of the principal questions raised by the 
existing economic distress, Southern statesmanship can establish itself once more as a 
controlling factor in the national councils.”37Another liberal southern editor, Hodding Carter of 
the Delta Democrat-Times, expressed best the feeling of many southern liberals when he praised 
the New Deal as “the Second American Revolution. Truly, it is a privilege to live through such 
times as these.”38 As these southerners looked northward with hope, President Roosevelt, too, 
saw that the only way to improve the South was to liberalize it. The President openly recruited 
young southern liberals to his administration, grooming them to replace the old southern guards. 
Indeed, many southern liberals would be elected to Congress for the first time on the long 
coattail of the New Deal. Others would contribute by working within the “alphabet soup” of the 
New Deal’s administrations and agencies.39  
In the middle of 1933, with the Rosenwald Fund funding his salary and the help of Will 
Alexander, Clark Foreman secured a role as an adviser to Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the 
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Interior, on the economic status of blacks.  Foreman’s task was to make sure that African 
Americans got their fair share of New Deal benefits. Immediately, Foreman’s appointment was 
met with protest from W.E.B. Du Bois and the NAACP. Despite his liberal credential, Foreman 
was still a Georgian and a first cousin to the conservative publisher of the Atlanta Constitution. 
Foreman, himself, felt that his job should go to an African American, but he would accept the 
post on the condition that he could hire the Harvard-trained economist Robert Weaver as his 
assistant and whom he would groom to succeed him.  Foreman’s liberalism went beyond just 
having a black assistant; he went out of his way to break the many racial taboos of Washington. 
He hired one of the first black secretaries to work in the federal government, Lucia Pitts, which 
prompted malicious gossip of miscegenation. To the great consternation of other federal 
employees, Foreman integrated the cafeteria at the federal building where he worked with his 
black staff.  Ignoring the complaints of local project managers of the Civilian Conservation 
Corps, Foreman hired highly qualified but unemployed blacks in semi-managerial or other 
skilled positions. For his progressive efforts, the unapologetic rabid racist Eugene Talmadge, the 
governor of Foreman’s home state of Georgia, denounced Foreman on the radio for mongrelizing 
the races. But Clark Foreman was resolute. “Fear was the tool of reaction,” Foreman concluded 
from his experience, “person who wanted to fight for decent conditions for all human beings had 
to make up his mind that he would not be frightened away from a position he knew to be 
correct.”40 Courage would be a quintessential characteristic of the advanced liberals. 
In order to further his intent to liberalize the South and eliminate opposition to reforms, 
President Roosevelt decided to press for the defeat of conservative southern senators seeking re-
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election in 1938. After the early flurry of activities that created the New Deal, the united 
conservative blocs in Congress refused to further any of F.D.R.’s agenda throughout the winter 
of 1937-1938. One of President’s first purge targets was the Senator Walter George of Georgia. 
F.D.R. asked Foreman if he knew any Georgian who could make a viable candidate against 
Walter George. Foreman had little experience in politics of Georgia and could not suggest any 
worthy candidate, but he quickly seized upon the opportunity to propose to the President an idea 
he had picked up during a Washington meeting of the Southern Policy Committee.  Foreman 
recommended that a pamphlet be published to educate southerners about the numerous economic 
benefits the South had reaped from the New Deal. F.D.R. recognized the pamphlet could be a 
potential weapon against his conservative opponents. But instead of listing the accomplishments 
of the New Deal, the President wanted the pamphlet to detail the economic ills of the South so 
that when the southerners see the facts, they would find their own answers. Sensitive to the pride 
of southerners and their resentment of outside criticism, the authors of the project were mostly 
made up of southern New Dealers and distinguished southerners like the President of the 
University of North Carolina, Frank Potter Graham.41 In his letter to conferees, F.D.R. famously 
declared, “It is my conviction that the South presents right now the nation’s No. 1 economic 
problem—the nation’s problem, not merely the South’s.”42 After studying the finding, the 
committee of southerners sadly agreed with the President’s assessment that the South represented 
the “Nation’s No. 1 economic problem.” 43 
The Report on the Economic Conditions of the South, officially released in August 1938, 
was a condensed list of all that was wrong with the South economically, agriculturally, 
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educationally, and financially. The South, by all economic rationale, was a colony of the United 
States. The South, “while it is blessed by Nature with immense wealth, its people as a whole are 
the poorest in the country….the South has been forced to trade the richness of its soil, its 
mineral, and forest, and the labor of its people for goods manufactured elsewhere.”44 Despite its 
unflattering portrayal of the South’s economic conditions, the Report did not put the blame on 
the South, but on the northern corporations that had exploited the region’s natural and human 
resources.  
Although the blunt honesty of the Report surprised and irked many, the content of the 
report itself was nothing revolutionary. The data had long ago been collected by the sociologist 
Howard Washington Odum and his team of social scientists, and had been available in Odum’s 
magnum opus, The Southern Region, since 1935. Foreman readily admitted that the report 
“wasn't a new thing. It was the prevailing attitude and had been for some time. What we were 
doing was bolstering that by putting the figures together [and] putting the story together in that 
pamphlet.”45 The outline of the pamphlet was leaked to the press and soon appeared in the New 
York Times and then later in the rest of the southern papers.46  
Immediately after its release, the Report had a life of its own, galvanizing many different 
segments of the South. Even before the actual release of the pamphlet, southern politicians were 
split in their opinions of the central tenet of the Report—the South being the nation’s number one 
economic problem. Eleven of the twenty-three southern governors and senators surveyed agreed 
that the South held the unenviable accolade, and while no one went out and flatly condemned the 
President’s claim, Senator Bailey of North Carolina replied with the typical defensive response, 
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“The South has advanced much in the last seventy-five years,” and the credits belonged to the 
“forefathers who rebuilt the South after the Civil War.”47 Southern Anti-New Dealers, similarly, 
resented the unflattering designation and were suspicious of the implication of federal 
interference. But for liberal southerners the NEC’s Report became a “kind of Bible.”48 One of 
the leading authorities on the era, the historian William Leuchtenburg, credited the report with 
helping found the “most important organization of southern liberals that had ever been created,” 
the Southern Conference for Human Welfare.49 The Southern Conference would, according to 
Foreman, merge the Congress of Industrial Organization unions with the liberal southern New 
Dealers to form a new southern coalition, one that would bring southern liberal activists onto the 
national stage for the first time.50 
After receiving the blessing of President Roosevelt to host a southern conference, Joseph 
Gelders and Lucy Mason approached Virginia Durr, sister-in-law of the former senator of 
Alabama and new Supreme Court and Justice Hugo Black, to get Black interested in a 
conference in his home state. Not wanting to play the intermediary, she suggested them to ask 
him themselves. But Durr also recommended Gelders to Clark Foreman and the rest of the 
Southern Policy Committee. The Southern Policy Committee was a group of young, liberal 
southern intellectuals, politicians and New Deal bureaucrats who met once a month for dinner 
and serious discussion of New Deal policy. As with any group of energized and idealistic young 
men, members of the Policy Committee had grand ambitions for the South and the role their 
organization would play in its transformation.51 Members of the SPC hoped their organization 
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would be, in the words of one historian, the “arbiter of political legitimacy in the South.”52 
Gelders’s conference needed the backing of bona fide and influential New Dealers and now he 
had access to them. Indeed, H.C. Nixon, the chairman of the SPC, had extensive contacts with 
prominent businessmen, industrialists, labor leaders, and educators and did not disappoint. The 
support of the members of the SPC ensured the conference would be very well attended. The 
determined supplicant wanted a broad representation of southern institutions in his new 
conference and he would not decline support from any segment.53  
No group, however, would be more important to Gelders and the subsequent survival of 
the Southern Conference than the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Founded in 1935 
as a challenger to the craft-oriented American Federation of Labor (AFL), the CIO’s mission was 
to unionize low-skilled and low-wage workers who were traditionally ignored by the AFL. The 
CIO recognized early on that the South, with a labor force of 14 million, the vast majority of 
whom were unorganized, represented the most tempting frontier for unionism. “The organization 
of the workers of the South,” read a unanimously passed 1941 resolution, “is the no. 1 task 
before the CIO.”54 The CIO also had good reasons to fear an un-unionized South. With wages 
pitifully low in the South and the politics corrupt, industries could easily transfer their production 
to the South and be rid of unions’ demands. The CIO’s efforts elsewhere in the country could be 
jeopardized if they lost the South.  
Unfortunately, the question of race challenged the CIO’s hope for the South. The South’s 
devotion to keeping its races apart posed a serious challenge to the CIO’s egalitarian model.  
Early southern unions were mostly limited to southern whites. Employers exploited this 
                                                 
52 Kneebone, Southern Liberal Journalists, 144. 
53 George B Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1967), 592-93; Reed, Simple Decency, 11-12. 
54 Robert H. Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955 (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 228-
30. 
25 
 
weakness to their great advantage by employing poor black workers as strike-breakers.  In order 
to make the South more hospitable to labor unions, the CIO decided to focus its energy on 
financing southern organizations to make the South friendly toward unionism and interracial 
cooperation. The two of most important beneficiaries of the CIO were the progressive 
Highlander Folk School of Tennessee and the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. The 
powerful head of the United Mine Workers, John Lewis, seeing potential in Gelders’s proposal, 
agreed to provide the subsidy and the manpower to make the conference a reality.55  
After a publicity campaign, extensive coalition building, and two preliminary planning 
meetings in July and September, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare finally took place 
in Birmingham on Sunday, November 20, 1938. The selection of Birmingham as the first 
meeting place of the SCHW had a great symbolic significance. Birmingham, a city “born but 
yesterday, but already a mighty forge,” was not more than seventy-five years old by the time of 
the conference.56 The town had experienced a population explosion as new industries like steel, 
iron, and coal drew workers from all across the state.  Nevertheless, despite the city’s dramatic 
growth, wealth was not distributed equitably and the town became a hotbed of unionist and 
Communist activities. In 1934, Birmingham witnessed a violent strike of black U.S. Steel ore 
miners. Fists and bombs were exchanged, strikers and strikebreakers were murdered, and homes 
of the black scabs were destroyed. By the time of the Conference, there were over 4,000 
unemployed workers with no relief funds. The city of Birmingham symbolized the modern South 
at a crossroads—so much potential and yet so many challenges to confront.57  
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On November 20, 1938, 1200 to 1500 delegates of both races and from all across the 
South—representing labor organizations, churches, southern politicians, educators, New Deal 
bureaucrats, and civic clubs—poured “into Birmingham like a cleansing flood, animated one and 
all with one selfless purpose—to help the South thru the democratic process of free speech and 
frank discussion.”58 It was a gathering of who’s who of southern liberalism. Famous academics 
included the highly revered Frank Potter Graham of UNC, the young historian C. Vann 
Woodward and the eminent sociologist Charles S. Johnson of Fisk University; New Dealers 
included the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, Governor Bibb Graves of Alabama, and Aubrey 
Williams of the Works Progress Administration; prominent journalists and publishers included 
John Temple Graves of the Birmingham Age-Herald, and Mark Ethridge and Barry Bingham of 
the Louisville Courier-Journal.  Mingling with these giants of southern liberalism were 
sharecroppers of the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union and the steelworkers of the mills. The one 
dollar fee, made possible by the subsidy of the CIO, made the conference affordable for those of 
modest means. In one of the rare moments of unity in southern history, the illiterate day laborers 
and the ivory tower intellects shared the same stage and the same dream, to guide the South 
toward an equitable and prosperous future.59  
Despite the conference’s theme of improving the South, the region’s sensitivity to 
criticism, especially from outsiders, made it necessary to require that only true southerners be 
voting delegates. All non-southern visitors were welcome to attend, but only as guests. The 
conference, however, opened its doors wide to people of both races. The conference became the 
first integrated meeting of its kind ever to be held publicly in the South. Delegates of both races 
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could sit anywhere without restrictions. Black delegates proudly walked through the front doors 
of the auditorium and ignored the “Colored” entrances. Prior interracial organizations like the 
Southern Tenant Farmers Union or the Commission on Interracial Cooperation had to keep their 
meeting private and with little publicity in order to avoid the unwelcome, intrusive, and critical 
eyes of Jim Crow.60 In contrast, the spirit of openness and the promise of a new progressive age 
in the South combined to make the event a cathartic experience for many southern liberals. 
Cherished of dreams and pent up hopes were released. “It was a love feast,” Virginia Durr 
recounted, “[We] had a lot of preaching and praying, singing…the whole meeting was just full of 
love and hope. The new day had come; the whole South was coming together to make a new 
day.”61  The Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, who was present at the conference, added, “[I] 
had a feeling that the real importance of this meeting was that here for the first time in the history 
of the region, since the era of the American revolution, the lonely Southern liberals met in great 
numbers… and that they, in this new and unique adventure, experienced a foretaste of the 
freedom and power which large-scale political organization and concerted action give.”62 The 
presence of Mrs. Roosevelt and the letter of greeting from President Roosevelt added legitimacy 
and prestige to the meeting. Southern liberals saw this as the long awaited golden opportunity 
they had wished for— to be able to organize and tackle the South’s numerous problems 
collectively. Following the outline laid out by the Report on the Economic Conditions of the 
South, the conferees discussed a broad and ambitious range of economic topics concerning the 
South: the need for more federal housing, fixing the freight rates, funding for vocational training, 
repeal of the poll tax, and promotion of land ownership. Their social issues ranged from adding 
more playgrounds for black children to having a women’s bureau in every state labor 
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department.63 Concluding the inaugural evening, Frank Graham summed up the conference’s 
progressive mission in his moving keynote address by calling for brotherhood between the races: 
This is their home. White and black have joined hands here to go forward by way 
of interracial cooperation toward the Kingdom of God…. Let us [southerners] 
prove at this Southern Conference for Human Welfare that we stand for the more 
helpless minorities and underprivileged….Let us show that this Conference stands 
for the Sermon on the Mount, the American Bill of Rights and American 
Democracy.64 
 
 After their first exciting and uplifting night, the jubilant conferees left the auditorium and 
returned to their hotel rooms in high hope.   
 On the following day the whole auditorium was besieged by police vans and policemen 
“on all four sides…inside and out.”65 Where the previous night promised a new age in the South, 
the morning sternly reminded the conferees that the present South would not go away without a 
struggle. The police commissioner of Birmingham, Eugene “Bull” Connor, made full use of his 
“bullfrog” voice to announce his presence, “I ain’t gonna let no darkies and white folk segregate 
together in this town.”66 He demanded the conferees to immediate comply with Alabama law 
and segregate themselves for the duration of the conference. Despite an arrangement made w
municipal authorities for the freedom of seating, Connor refused to budge from his position. 
Black members were visibly upset. Some of them left the meeting when the call for segregation 
was made by the liberal Judge Louise Charlton, who was presiding over the conference, “We 
didn’t make the law, and until it is changed we must obey it.”
ith 
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to the back or the balcony and blacks and whites could occupy the stage together for 
convenience’s sake. Mrs. Roosevelt, refusing to be Jim Crowed by Bull Connor, borrowed a 
ruler to measure the distance between the black and white sides and placed her chair right in the 
middle of the aisle between the two segregated sections. Not wanting to arrest the First Lady, 
Connor and his deputy ignored the violation of Alabama law. The First Lady defiantly held on to 
her little folding chair and carried it with her wherever she went.68  
 Prior to Bull Connor’s interference, the Southern Conference had no intention of 
challenging segregation outside its own meetings. Although Gelders had initially wanted to make 
civil rights the primary focus of the conference, he was forced to compromise when he tried to 
assemble a vast coalition of southerners whose numerous agendas and vary political leanings did 
not correlate well with the singular focus on civil rights. Connor’s segregation of the meeting 
forced the members of the conference to confront the inescapable Jim Crow and the challenge it 
would pose to their efforts to reform the South. In a resolution the conferees simply referred to 
the incident as a “situation we condemn” and urged the board that future meetings be held at a 
non-segregated locations. Unfortunately for the Southern Conference, the resolution was grossly 
misquoted by newspapers all across the country and was seriously misunderstood in the South.69 
The New York Times misleadingly declared that the unanimously passed resolution was a 
“Condemnation of the South’s ‘Jim Crow’ laws….”70 The prominent black newspaper, The 
Chicago Defender, went ever further, writing that the SCHW had “struck the first blow against 
the old conservative South by declaring…it was opposed to racial discrimination in any form. Its 
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program disagrees in all particulars with the ‘Old White South,’ on the Negro question.”71  
Serious damage was done to the Southern Conference’s standing within the white South. 
Southern newspapers that initially supported of the Conference’s forward looking mission now 
turned against it. The Montgomery Advertiser, which had expressed high hopes for the Southern 
Conference, now “peremptorily and emphatically replies that as far as it is concerned, it does not 
give a hoot whether there is another such conference either in southern Jim-crow towns or New 
England towns during the life of this generation.”72 The Alabama Journal denounced the 
Southern Conference as a “gathering of radicals, government employees and irresponsibles [sic] 
[that] is far from being representative of southern thought on anything.”73 Even the liberal 
Jonathan Daniels of the Raleigh News and Observers, who had once promised to serve on the 
board of the Southern Conference, penned his disappointment of the conference for its unwise 
“condemnation of the South’s laws…[because it] placed emphasis upon the one thing certain to 
angrily divide the South.”74 Southern politicians attending the meeting hastily followed the 
newspapers’ examples and denounced the Conference’s resolution against segregation and 
reiterated their loyal support for Jim Crow.75 
  On the other hand, becaues of the backlash from the conservative southern press and the 
suspicion of Communist influence, the Southern Conference instantly gained credibility with 
northern liberals and the African-American press. Writing in Crisis, the official organ of the 
NAACP, Charles Johnson praised the Conference as “the first bold emergence of the liberal 
South as a self-conscious group…” The Conference was the first interracial organization to 
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achieve “a comfortable tolerance in diversity.”76 The controversy also reduced number of 
conservative or moderates. The remaining members of the Southern Conference for Human 
Welfare were among the most progressive in the South.  
 In spite of the embarrassing ordeal with “Bull” Connor, the loss of support from most of 
the southern media and the diminished enthusiasm from the conservative supporters, the 
progressive and liberal supporters of the Southern Conference remained largely optimistic about 
the Southern Conference’s future. They saw the creation of the Southern Conference as heralding 
a new and fundamental shift in the thinking of the southern liberals, one of the few times in the 
South’s history that the “fringe” groups of southern liberalism openly joined together to create a 
progressive movement. Gunnar Myrdal viewed the Southern Conference as the first attempt by 
native southerners at practical and planned social engineering. Unlike previous participants of 
interracial organizations like the CIC, the New Dealers that made up the Southern Conference 
were experienced operators of politics and planning agencies. The leaders of the left- wing 
differed from the cautious liberals and moderates in that they felt little divided loyalty over the 
future of the South. Many of these progressive southern liberals had been educated in the elite 
universities of the northeast, others had traveled all across Europe including visits to the Soviet 
Union, and some had worked for the New Deal or organized for unions. Their common 
experience of spending an extensive amount of time outside of the South meant that the solutions 
that they would look for would be outside of the South. They saw themselves as part of a 
national liberal movement rather than just as provincial “southern liberals.” The loss of 
conservative members and the ire of the conservative southern press did not bother these new 
progressive southern liberals, as they would traditional interracialists, but actually enhanced their 
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progressive agenda.77 Virginia Durr, who had attended the conference as a representative of the 
Women’s Division of the Democratic National Committee, openly and optimistically embraced 
this new and more empowering branch of southern liberalism, “We had an absolute faith in our 
own government in those days, at least our Roosevelt administration. There was Mrs. Roosevelt 
working for us and Mr. Roosevelt working for us….It was just heaven to be young…We had the 
White House behind us; we had the government behind us…So we really were riding high, wide, 
and handsome.”78 Clark Foreman, too, saw a promising future ahead for the Southern 
Conference, identifying it as the “peak of the New Deal” and an “outgrowth of the efforts of 
President Roosevelt to help the people of the South…”79 Myles Horton, a representative of the 
Highland Folk School, optimistically believed that the SCHW could attract support from both the 
union and southern white-middle class and yet still maintain a progressive position on 
segregation.80  
 While some members of the Southern Conference who were also members of the older 
Interracial Commissions saw the SCHW as a more active and vigorous extension of the decaying 
Commission, others looked at the Southern Conference as representative of a more inclusive 
progressive strand of southern liberalism, a part of a wave of “new southern liberalism,” one that 
would unite the different branches of southern progressivism, liberalism, and radicalism into one 
powerful umbrella organization.81 Writing to Frank Graham, Lucy Randolph Mason expressed 
the unifying sentiment shared by members of the Conference, “The South cannot be saved by 
middle class liberals alone—they must make common cause with labor, the dispossessed on the 
land and the Negro…Some may find it too shocking to have the other three so articulate about 
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their needs. But this is the basis for progress…in the South.”82 The Southern Conference would 
for the next ten years be one of the most progressive forces for change within the South. Its 
political campaigns against the poll-tax, labor rights, and social and economic inequalities 
between the races were unprecedented for a southern interracial organization. The organization’s 
effort would challenge the image of a homogenously racist South.  
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Chapter 2: The Anti-Poll Tax Crusade (1939-1942) 
 
 
 
 In the final day of the Birmingham conference, the conferees established the Southern 
Conference for Human Welfare as a permanent organization. They elected Frank Porter Graham, 
in his absence, as the Chairman of the new organization. Graham, a highly respected educator 
with impeccable liberal credentials, brought the new fledging organization recognition and 
credibility. The Southern Conference came out of Birmingham with high hopes and a broad 
agenda. It ambitiously pledged to promote the general welfare, to improve the economic, social 
and cultural standards of the southern people, to initiate and support progressive legislation in 
Congress and states, and finally, to secure the cooperation of other progressive southern 
organizations and coordinate activities. To live up to its members’ high expectations, the 
Conference was authorized to establish twelve committees, each dealing with a different field. 
The ambitious agenda faced a logistical nightmare and a lack of manpower to carry it out. 
Because each member of the Southern Conference hailed from a different state across the South 
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and each had his and her own duty and responsibility to meet, it was impossible for them to hold 
meetings and maintain a working committee. Out of the twelve planned committees, only one 
would become an effective instrument of the Southern Conference in its early years: the Civil 
Rights Committee.83 
 The Civil Rights Committee (CRC), established in February 1939, took on the most 
important and ambitious goal of the Southern Conference: the repeal of the poll tax. The 
Southern Conference’s effort represented the first major attempt by an interracial organization to 
end voting discrimination in the South. Maury Maverick, a Congressman from Texas, was 
elected chairman of the committee, Virginia Durr of the Women’s Division of the Democratic 
Party was chosen to be its vice chairwoman, and Joseph Gelders became its executive secretary. 
The three of them were charged with the task of “dramatiz[ing] for the country the evil of the 
poll tax.”84 The poll tax issue, unlike the Conference’s other ambitious goals, was not abstract or 
overly broad. It was simple and could bring tangible benefits that could be easily communicated 
to the southern people. Furthermore, President Roosevelt and Mrs. Roosevelt were strongly 
behind the effort to repeal of the poll tax. In a letter to Arkansas Congressman Brooks Hays, the 
President condemned the poll tax as “contrary to the fundamental democracy and its 
representative form of government in which we believe,” and promised that he would publicly 
support measures to repeal the poll tax via the Federal government because “there is no reason 
under the sun why I should not talk about an important general principle that applies under our 
constitutional form of government in every state in the union.”85 In a letter to Gelders, F.D.R. 
urged him and the Conference to take up the cause against the poll tax. With the unanimous and 
                                                 
83 Douty, “Southern Conference Report,”15-16, 27. 
84 Durr, interview, March 1975, 93, 104 ; Foreman “Decade of Hope,” 142 
85 Brooks Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 22. 
36 
 
uncontroversial support from all the Conference’s members and the urging of President 
Roosevelt, the repeal of the poll tax was made the number one priority of the Conference.86 
 The poll tax was one of the many disenfranchising devices the South created during the 
late nineteenth century.87 Initially enacted to bar black voters from the poll, it was later used to 
keep poor whites from voting also. Through most of its history, the poll tax was a much more 
popular target for reformers than the literacy test or the white primary. According to the historian 
of southern politics, V.O. Key Jr., the poll tax often played the role of “chief villain” in the 
national discussion of what was wrong with the South. Many blamed the poll tax for being one 
of the chief causes of the Democratic Party’s domination of the South, why poor whites 
continued to be poor, and why African Americans continued to be oppressed. On its face, the 
poll tax was a simply tax a voter had to pay before he or she could vote in an election. The 
amount taxed varied between one and two dollars in the eight southern states that charged it in 
1938, but variations existed among different counties within the same state. Most of the revenue 
from the poll tax would go to public schools and education. Key pointed out, however, that the 
money collected from the poll tax was negligible and, unlike other taxes, the levy was not 
mandatory unless one was planning to vote. The poll tax, then, was not to generate revenues, as 
its defenders vehemently claimed, but was purely a disenfranchising device. Adding to the 
deterrence effect of the poll tax was the requirement that the tax had to be paid months before the 
election began. In Georgia, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia, for example, the tax had to be paid 
six to ten months before the election, a time when interest in the election was at its lowest point. 
The most serious disfranchising instrument of the poll tax was the accumulation of previously 
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unpaid poll taxes. The accumulation began once the eligible voter reached the age of twenty-one. 
Alabama led the South with the harshest cumulative provision, a maximum cumulation of 
$36.00. Considering that the average annual income of a southerner in 1937 was a measly $314 a 
year, the average worker barely had enough to subsist on let alone afford the luxury of voting. 
One Alabama Democratic Party official proudly boasted that once a voter owed $4.50, $6.00, or 
$7.50 in back poll taxes, the state had virtually eliminated the person as a voter.88  
 The poll tax was frequently manipulated by political machines to shift elections in their 
candidates’ favor. In important races, the political machines would finance block payments that 
pay the poll taxes of a large group of voters who would support the machines’ candidates. When 
a local race was heating up in one North Alabama county, the local registrars saw over ten 
thousand dollars in poll taxes paid the day before the deadline, whereas the greatest annual 
collection before was only $9,747. Another story related the experience of an Alabama teacher 
who found his poll tax was paid for when he tried to pay it. A few days later, the defeated 
candidates of the recent election came to the teacher’s home and demanded that the teacher 
refund the poll tax payment the defeated candidate had made on behalf of the teacher, who did 
not have the courtesy to vote for him. In Texas, those who had paid the poll tax but did not vote 
would have their ballots cast for them. Corrupt politicians were not above abusing the liberal 
exemptions from the poll tax many states made for elderly voters and disabled people, who often 
did not vote, and had phantom votes cast using their names. Sometimes, even the deceased elders 
voted for a candidate. Poll manipulations by the political machines were aided by compliance of 
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the registrars who were in charge of collecting the poll tax. These gatekeepers had an enormous 
influence on whether a voter was qualified or not. Registrars could make the payment process 
complicated and tedious if they deemed the potential voters undesirable. Even qualified white 
voters like Virginia Durr might experience bureaucratic delays and subtle intimidations because 
they were not natives of the state they were registering in.89 “They didn't want me to vote,” Durr, 
a native of Alabama said, recounting her experience trying to register in Virginia, “Nobody in 
Virginia wanted you to vote….they didn't care about my vote, they didn't care about anybody's 
vote unless they knew you….I was an outsider, a stranger. So, I couldn't vote.” 90 The poll tax 
was one of the most effective tools employed by the political machines to control the number of 
voters at each election. Unlike the one-time literacy or civic test, the poll tax could be used at 
every election.  
 The debilitating effect of the poll tax to southern voters was felt immediately after its 
passage. Two years after Tennessee enacted the poll tax in 1890, it lost over 40,000 voters, 
compared to 1888; Mississippi during the same period saw a loss of 60,000 voters; Virginia, 
within two years of the poll tax’s passage, lost 130,000 voters. The Southern Conference 
calculated that in the 1940 election, of the 13.6 million qualified southern voters, only three 
million, or 22 percent, cast a ballot, thus disenfranchising over ten million people. The eight 
southern states with the poll tax had the lowest participation rate in the country. Another study 
found that in the 1942 election, 25 out of every 100 people voted in non-poll tax states, but only 
3 out of 100 in poll tax states. President Harry Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights reported that 
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in the 1944 presidential elections saw 18.31 percent of the potential voters in the eight poll tax 
states cast a ballot, versus the 68.74 percent in non-poll tax states.91  
 Those who were hurt the most by the poll tax were poor southerners both black and 
whites. Tenant farmers, with their rock bottom earning, could never afford the price of the ballot. 
In addition, transportation to get to country registrars was difficult and expensive in rural areas. 
When these poor farmers migrated to the South to the cities looking for jobs in the factories 
during the South’s urbanization boom in the first half of the twentieth century, they continued to 
be disenfranchised by the poll tax. Urban workers and salaried men, if their pitiful wages would 
allow it, could not afford to take the day off to pay their poll tax. Without being able to vote in 
local elections, these workers had little say about who would be elected as town sheriffs and 
local and state officials, men who had the power to crush any attempt at unionization. And 
without the means to bargain for better wages, the workers remained poor and incapable of 
sending their children to school and improve the next generation’s standard of living. Southern 
liberals saw this as a vicious cycle brought on by disfranchisement. They, somewhat went so far 
as to blame the poll tax as one of the primary causes for keeping the South in perpetual poverty. 
They pointed out that the eight states that had the poll tax were at the bottom of every health, 
housing, and education standard list.s92 
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 Advanced liberals like Clark Foreman believed that poor southerners were the natural base 
of President Roosevelt’s New Deal. They felt that the working class would naturally be 
progressive because it was in their economic interests to be so. Furthermore, the South had 
enjoyed tremendous benefits from the New Deal through federal spending. Nevertheless, despite 
his enormous popularity in the South, F.D.R.’s failed purge revealed how politically vulnerable 
he was in the region. But advanced southern liberals did not blame Roosevelt’s defeat on the 
ordinary southerners; it was their political leaders who abandoned F.D.R. and disenfranchised 
southern people, they argued. 93 The “only hope for progressive democracy in the South lies in 
the lower economic groups—particularly the wage earner,” Lucy Mason wrote to Mrs. 
Roosevelt, “Yet this is the group so largely disfranchised by the poll-tax requirements of eight 
southern states.”94 The potential power of the South’s working class vote was tantalizingly 
tempting. In Birmingham, Alabama alone, 30,000 new voters, mostly union members, could 
potentially be registered to vote and mobilized in a city that had only 60,000 registered voters 
and only 20,000 who actually voted. Advanced liberals and F.D.R. believed that if voting 
restrictions like the poll tax could be removed from the South, then the President could build a 
powerful political base from the working class and continue expanding the New Deal without 
conservatives’ obstruction.95  
 Another reason why the Southern Conference wanted to the tackle poll tax first was 
because cautious liberals within the organization believed the repeal of the poll tax had more 
potential support in the white South than the abolishment of the white primary or literary test. 
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Although the poll tax was originally designed to disfranchise black voters, it now operated 
primarily as a deterrent to poor white voting. Statistics showed that 64 percent of potential white 
adult voters in the South were disfranchised because of the tax. Since there were other loopholes 
for whites to bypass the other restrictions, the poll tax stood as their only obstacle to the ballots. 
The removal of the financial barrier would thus disproportionately increase the number of white 
voters over black voters.  And even if black voters could afford to vote with the repeal of the poll 
tax, they still had to face the literacy/civic test, the property requirement, and the white primary.  
 The Democratic Party’s stranglehold on southern politics meant that winning the 
Democratic primary was equivalence to winning the election. Since wealthy African Americans 
could afford the poll tax, their exclusion from the Democratic primaries served as one of the 
most effective disfranchisement devices against southern blacks. The poll tax would only 
represent a burden on black voters when every other suffrage obstacles had been removed. 
Maury Maverick, chairman of the Civil Rights Committee heavily emphasized in his testimony 
before the Congressional House Judiciary Committee that the repeal of the poll tax would 
substantially benefit poor white voters over black voters. Another member of the Conference, the 
publisher Barry Bingham of the Louisville-Courier rejected the conservative Democrats’ 
argument that the poll tax was a device to preserve white supremacy. Like Maverick, Bingham 
insisted that white voters stand to gain much more than blacks.96 Despite these facts, African-
American members of the Southern Conference strongly supported the fight to end of the poll 
tax. They realized that the repeal of the poll tax was the beginning of a much larger struggle to 
end disenfranchisement in the South. “…my God, the blacks had stronger feelings [about the poll 
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tax],” Virginia Durr recounted, “although they always said that even when we got the poll tax 
abolished, they still had the registration restrictions to get around...they always realized that their 
own battle would have to come later.”97   
 The poll tax represented a daunting challenge for would be reformers who sought to repeal 
it state by state. State constitutions and political and economic white elites stood as barriers to 
change. As of 1939, only three southern states had abolished their poll tax: North Carolina in 
1920, a Huey-Long-dominated Louisiana in 1934, and Florida in 1937. The successes of these 
three states gave the Southern Conference hope that the poll tax was not the sacred cow of the 
South. But to create a grass-root mobilization effort in all the remaining southern states would 
require far more resources and coordination than the young Southern Conference could muster. 
Furthermore, of the eight remaining poll tax states, seven required their constitutions to be 
laboriously revised, making it almost impossible to repeal without near unanimous support from 
the state legislatures and the voting public within the states. When the state legislature of 
Tennessee successfully passed a law ending the use of the poll tax, its State Supreme Court 
declared the act unconstitutional and required the legislature to pass a constitutional amendment 
in two legislative sessions and then have the approval of the people in a constitutional 
referendum. But even if the anti-poll-tax amendment passed through the legislatures, standing in 
its way was the financially well-off and politically motivated southern electorate who were 
unwilling to relinquish their exclusive voting privilege. A 1941 Gallup poll discovered that two-
thirds of voters who had paid their poll tax were against repealing the poll tax, as opposed to 
two-thirds of the rest of country who supported its repeal. The number of poll-tax state voters 
against the repeal of the tax remained more than half during the heights of World War II. When 
Arkansas tried to get rid of its poll tax in 1938, its voters rejected the measure by a margin of two 
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to one. The middle and upper classes of the South, whose prosperity rested on the attraction of 
South’s cheap labor to industry, did not want a voting working-class with strong tie to unions.98 
Gelders lamented that this small voting populace in poll tax states constituted “a rule by an 
oligarchy; an oligarchy unwilling to vote itself out of power.”99 A more effective strategy would 
be to have the federal government ban the poll tax from federal elections. Although a poll tax for 
the local and state elections wouldn’t be nullified, it would give the southerners more power to 
choose their congressional representatives who would, presumably, be friendlier to later 
legislation to end poll tax and other disfranchising devices.  
  After the Civil Rights Committee was established, Gelders immediately headed for 
Washington D.C. to introduce a bill to repeal the poll tax. Despite Gelders labeling the bill as a 
solution to a national problem, not just a southern one, no southern congressmen wanted the 
honor of being the first to introduce a bill to repeal the poll tax. In spite of the fact that the repeal 
of the poll tax would enfranchise more white voters than black, many of them feared that the 
appearance of crossing the “color line” would bring swift political and social retribution from 
their constituents and colleagues.100 Maury Maverick, who would have introduced the bill, had 
lost his Congressional reelection bid and was now serving as the Mayor of San Antonio. 
Fortunately for the Civil Rights Committee, its vice chairwoman, Virginia Durr, whose husband 
Clifford Durr was the head general counsel of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and 
brother-in-law was Supreme Justice Hugo Black, was living in Washington D.C..  Durr’s 
political connections and determination made up for the loss of Maverick. The efforts of Durr 
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and Gelders gave the CRC the organizational cohesiveness, independence, and political 
connections that it desperately needed to survive and introduce legislation during its early and 
difficult years.  
 Virginia Foster Durr, born 1903, and raised in Birmingham, Alabama to an ancient family. 
Her grandfather was one of the few southerners who did not believe in the Civil War and did not 
invest his money in “The Cause.” Because of his foresight he was able to preserve his fortune 
and expand his plantation to 35,000 acres after the end of the war. Although her grandfather’s 
plantation was much diminished by Durr’s generation, she grew up with the romantic vision of 
the South and its benevolent patrician class—blacks were happy and dearly loyal to their 
benevolent white masters. Durr went up north to attend college at Wellesley before marrying her 
husband, Clifford Durr. When the New Deal came her husband moved the family to Washington 
D.C. in 1933. By chance she met her old acquaintance from her Wellesley days, Clark Foreman, 
and invited his family over for her house for a visit. By this time Foreman was already firmly 
committed to social equality. He unsuccessfully tried to convert Durr to his point of view. 101 
Durr, shocked by Foreman’s radical ideas, felt he had betrayed everything she and the South 
stood for. “You are going back on all the traditions of the South,” Durr admonished Foreman, 
“You, a Howell of Georgia going back on all of it. What do you think of the Civil War? What 
did we stand for? White Supremacy of course.” 102 Foreman, never a man to back down from a 
fight, scolded Durr as “a white, Southern, bigoted, prejudiced, provincial girl.”103 Despite the 
harsh exchange of words with Foreman, Durr was becoming more liberal as she spent more time 
in Washington. Durr, who thought her black mailman was the smartest African American she 
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knew before her time in the capital, was now traveling in New Dealers intellectual circles, which 
brought her into contacts with powerful African-American leaders like Mary McLeod Bethune of 
the National Youth Administration. Furthermore, the harsh economic reality of the South and the 
suffering of its people during the Great Depression shattered Durr’s simplistic and idealistic 
notion of the region. Her father and mother lost almost everything in the crash. As a volunteer 
for the Red Cross, Durr saw the worst kind of destitution and misery, men breaking down 
because they could not find any work to support their family. Men whom she thought were 
honorable leading citizens would employ strike breakers to use the most underhanded and brutal 
methods to prevent unionization of their mills and then deny any guilt. She found it contradictory 
that many southerners who spent their childhoods in the loving care of their black nannies would 
later find it repulsive to share a seat with them and their children on the bus. The suffering of the 
poor and the South’s response convinced Durr that whatever system the South had relied on for 
so long was broken. By late 1938 she was against racial discrimination in every form, including 
segregation. Durr stood as an example the of “Silent South” that southern liberals believed was 
there. Durr would carry on a zealous crusade against racial injustice and involved herself in some 
of the most important civil rights events in American history. 104 “Virginia was a very articulate, 
charismatic sort of person that people just soaked in,” a friend and fellow civil rights activist 
recalled, “She wasn't afraid of the devil with his horns screwed on tight, she was just greater than 
anybody.”105 In 1939, Durr focused her formidable will on the poll tax.  
 Gelders initially envisioned a multiple-front strategy for tackling the poll tax. The Civil 
Rights Committee would lobby Congress for a repeal of the poll tax in federal elections and 
actively file suit against states charging poll tax. The first and only case the Southern Conference 
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initiated, Pirtle v. Brown (1941), was on behalf of Henry Pirtle, a white Tennessean, against the 
poll tax charged by his state in federal elections. The Southern Conference contended that the tax 
did not represent a qualification of the citizens’ to vote, but a restriction. The right to vote for 
member of Congress and the President of the United States came from the Federal Constitution 
and federal elections were functions of the national government. State government, therefore, 
had no authority to regulate or impair the national government’s sovereignty to enfranchise its 
citizens as stated in the Fourteenth Amendment. Both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, following Supreme Court decision in Breedlove v. Suttlesi where the Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld Georgia’s poll tax law, rejected the argument and ruled that it was the 
states who granted the right of suffrage to the citizens and hence Tennessee did not violate any 
federal law. The case ended when the Supreme Court refused to grant it a writ of certioratiri on 
the ground of its Breedlove decision. Defeat in the Pirtle case had a profound impact on the 
Southern Conference’s outlook and strategy. Pirtle spelled the end of the Southern Conference’s 
attempt to use the courts to lift South’s suffrage oppression. It had hoped to file two more cases 
in Arkansas and Alabama, but the loss of the $5,000 investment made on Pirtle did not make the 
court strategy a viable option for the severely cash-strapped Conference. The Conference learned 
that the courts were unpredictable and too expensive for appeals without adequate financial 
reserve or pooled resources from other organizations. Finally, even if the Conference could get a 
victory in the federal courts, without the support of the southern court of public opinion or 
intrusive federal enforcement, the decision would ring hollow in the South. The Conference’s 
next best hope was to get Congress to pass legislation outlawing the poll tax.106  
                                                 
106 Augusta Jackson Strong, “Poll Tax Law Challenged in Federal Court,” CD November 4, 1939: 12; “H.R. is 
Constitutional,” SP 1, no. 10 (October 1943): 3; Pirtle v. Brown, 118 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1941); Reed, Simple 
Decency, 66-67; “Our Democratic Rights—and How to Enforce Them,” SP 4, no.3 (March 1946): 3. 
47 
 
 The Southern Conference’s Civil Rights Committee began its lobbying efforts under  
trying circumstances. When Gelders arrived at Washington D.C. in 1939, there was little in term 
of organizational infrastructure to support the Conference’s campaign. The CRC did not have a 
central headquarter or a paid professional staff to handle its office work and lobbying efforts. 
Without a southern supporter in the House, Gelders and Durr had to turn elsewhere. They found 
a kindred spirit and a staunch ally in the liberal Congressman Lee Geyer of California. Not only 
did Geyer agree to introduce the bill in 1939, but his congressional office became the 
headquarters of the homeless CRC. Geyer’s nephew and secretary became the CRC’s sole full 
time office staff. Durr, with her family responsibility, could only spend two to three days a week 
at the office. Gelders, after entrusting the poll tax work on Geyer, periodically left to go down 
South to work on other initiatives, leaving Durr, who confessed to not knowing how to operate a 
mimeograph machine, in charge of the entire operation. Due to a grossly inadequate salary from 
the Southern Conference Gelders could not afford to stay in Washington full time. But despite 
his chronic absences, Gelders was entirely devoted to the repeal of the poll tax.  Durr recounted 
one time when she found Gelders sleeping outside of the Geyer’s office building from the night 
before because he did not have a place to stay. She bought him some breakfast and invited him 
back to her home to shower. He would stay with the Durrs and a few other friends whenever 
possible, but Gelders was a drifter. Durr, in spite of her family duty and her inexperience in 
office management, labored tirelessly to make the campaign to repeal the poll tax successful. She 
organized meetings and rallies with unions to create an anti-poll-tax coalition. Using her 
connections, the most important being Mrs. Roosevelt, Durr lobbied with Lee Geyer and raised 
desperately needed money for the CRC. Durr was the anchor that held the Civil Rights 
Committee together during these difficult early years. The rest of the staff was made up of 
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mostly young and idealistic volunteers from the Tolan Committee or borrowed staffs from other 
friendly congressmen. Their daily activities involved lobbying congressmen and publishing a 
newsletter, “The Poll Tax Repealer,” to raise awareness and support for the anti-poll-tax bill. 
Overall, it was very amateurish operation. But what the CRC lacked in professionalism and the 
efficiency of a high-priced lobbying firm, it made up for it with its unwavering dedication, 
optimism, and faith in the righteousness of its cause. When the first bill to repeal the poll tax was 
introduced to Congress in August 1939 Geyer credited the Southern Conference for Human 
Welfare in the bill for making the introduction possible.107  
 The first anti-poll-tax bill, predictably, faced a formidable front of conservative 
southerners in Congress. Geyer, aware of the courts’ sanction of the constitutionality of the poll 
tax, argued that the bill’s primary goal was to end the “pernicious political activity” of the 
political machines in federal elections. He attached the anti-poll-tax bill as an amendment to a 
larger anti-corruption bill, the Hatch Act, which sought to curtail the participation of federal 
employees in partisan political activity. The fiercest opponents of the bill were southern 
congressmen and senators who had the most seniority in committees. Of the twenty-four major 
committees, ten chairmen were from poll tax states and fourteen had ranking members who 
supported the poll tax. Hatton Sumners of Texas, the chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, threw every parliamentary obstacle he could to slow down the hearing of the bill and 
its introduction to the rest of the House. Sumner successfully sabotaged the bill when it died in 
the House Judiciary Committee. Geyer, undeterred, reintroduced the bill the next session, and 
with the help of Congressman George Bender of Ohio, got it out of Summers’ Judiciary 
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Committee and into the House. 108 Conservatives in the House caustically raised the charge of 
anti-white and Negro-empowerment against Geyer’s bill. William Colmer of Mississippi warned 
that “if Congress can remove the poll tax requirements it can also remove educational 
requirements and registration itself.”109 Nevertheless, the anti-poll-tax force scored its first major 
victory when the House passed the bill with a substantial margin of 252 to 84. Unfortunately, the 
Senate, with its filibustering privilege, became the graveyard of the anti-poll-tax bill.110  
 Gelders and Durr initially approached George Norris of Nebraska, a progressive former 
Republican who supported Roosevelt’s election in 1932, to carry the fight against the poll tax in 
the Senate. Norris’s reelection defeat in 1942 forced them to turn to Claude Pepper of Florida. 
Pepper, whose state of Florida had abolished the poll tax in 1937, was a devoted New Dealer. 
Like Durr and Gelders, Pepper believed the repeal of the poll tax as a major step toward 
liberalizing southern politics. He credited his own hard won 1938 reelection battle to the votes he 
got from newly enfranchised Floridians. The then newly elected Senator Pepper, however, was 
more cautious than the Southern Conference leadership. Pepper resigned from the Southern 
Conference over its segregation controversy and filibustered along with the conservatives against 
the anti-lynching bill in 1938. But after his first year as a senator, Pepper became increasingly 
liberal. After 1938 Pepper would vote for every resolution of cloture to end debate and every 
civil rights bill that would come up. But even with Florida’s poll tax repealed, Pepper would be 
taking a tremendous political risk supporting federal intrusion into the states’ political affair. To 
bolster Pepper’s confident, Durr got Mrs. Roosevelt to invite Pepper to the White House for a 
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luncheon and surround him with southern liberals like William Alexander, Aubrey Williams, 
Mark Ethridge, and Frank Graham to convince him to pick up the bill.111  
 Pepper introduced his own bill in 1941, which would not only abolish the poll tax in 
federal elections, but also for the primaries leading up to the elections. Unlike Geyer, who 
justified his bill as an anti-corruption act, Pepper directly challenged the integrity of the poll tax. 
Pepper contended that the poll tax served no other purpose than to limit the number of voters in 
the South and was thus unconstitutional. Despite the courts contending that the states had the 
right to regulate its voting requirements, Pepper argued that the states’ rights extended only as far 
as Congress allowed them to.112 Peppers pointed out that in the Supreme Court’s decision United 
States v. Classic (1941), the Court had decided that “While, in a loose sense, the right to vote for 
representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states, this 
statement is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitution to legislate on 
the subject…[and] to the extent that Congress has not restricted state action by the exercise of its 
powers to regulate elections…”113 This decision, Pepper declared, showed that the regulation of 
federal elections fell within the authority of Congress to regulate. Defenders of the poll tax 
rebutted Pepper’s claim and argued that the Classic decision only applied to qualified voters, and 
those who could not pay their poll tax were not qualified to begin with. Some senators called for 
a constitutional amendment to resolve the debate. The Southern Conference, however, did not 
think that an amendment was a practical method and saw it as nothing more than a dilatory tactic 
of the conservatives. It firmly believed that Congress was perfectly within its constitutional 
authority to control the states’ regulation on voting rights. The constitutional debate was 
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inconsequential in the immediate scheme, however, since the southern reactionaries in the Senate 
had the power to filibuster the Geyer-Pepper bill regardless of its constitutional merits.114 
 The conservative Dixie bloc in Congress had a good reason to fear the repeal of the poll 
tax. Many of the entrenched conservative senators were elected with a winning margin between 
one and three percent of their people. The repeal of the poll tax, with its expansion of lower class 
voters, many of whom fervently supported Roosevelt and the New Deal, made future reelections 
unpredictable for these politicians who had never faced a serious election challenge through most 
of their careers. The reactionaries’ efforts, however, might have failed if not for implicit support 
from the cautious southern liberals in the Senate. Men like Lister Hill and John Sparkman were 
fearful for their reelection chances if they supported the repeal of the poll tax. Supporters of the 
repeal were caught in a Catch-22 position with wavering senators. The hesitating senators 
privately endorsed the attempts to repeal to the poll tax because they would stand to benefit from 
the expansion of the electorate, but refused to support the repeal publicly unless enough votes 
could be mustered without them being the deciding votes. Without their votes repeal would be 
impossible. These cautious southern liberals filibustered Pepper’s bill alongside the 
conservatives. Despite the early optimism of the bill supporters and a straw poll predicting the 
bill would pass the Senate by a vote of 61 to 36, the Senate rejected the call to cloture by a vote 
of 41 to 37 against shutting off the debate, effectively killing the bill. The lack of support from 
cautious liberal southern senators had made the difference. Defeat in the Senate was a fatal 
setback in the campaign to repeal the poll tax. Pepper would continue to introduce a bill to repeal 
the poll tax every year till the end of the Southern Conference’s existence in 1948, but each time 
it failed to survive the Senate. Despite the failure, the Southern Conference’s poll tax movement 
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had a measure of success. By 1942 the campaign against the poll tax had become a national 
movement extending far beyond the regional focus of the South.115  
 Lee Geyer, before his death in late 1941, envisioned a national committee to repeal the 
poll tax. Gelders initially resisted the attempt to broaden the movement beyond the South, but the 
united resistance put up by southerners in Congress forced Gelders to change his perspective. To 
garner support for the Geyer-Pepper bill, Gelders and Durr had to look for Republican and liberal 
Democratic allies from other regions outside of the South. Gelders understood that the success or 
failure of the campaign against the poll tax depended on public opinion. He was confident that if 
the American people found out all the evils of the poll tax, they would demand its abolition. The 
raising of national support for the legislation required funds and manpower, which were beyond 
the meager resources of the Civil Rights Committee.  A national coalition involving a broad 
spectrum of organizations to mobilize opposition against the poll tax became more attractive as 
the Civil Rights Committee’s battle in the Senate gained more attention.  The idea of a national 
organization created from the CRC was made easier by the large degree of freedom and 
autonomy the Committee had enjoyed since its inception. The Civil Rights Committee was the 
only committee to have its own budget aside from the main Conference. Howard Lee, the 
executive secretary of  the SCHW, even expressed concern that the CRC was competing against 
the Southern Conference for the same donors and called for more centralized fund raising. 
Finally, financial constraint forced the Southern Conference to turn the Civil Rights Committee 
into a national organization. By 1941, the CRC had raised only $3,825, versus the $4,470 of the 
general Conference during the same period, and had spent $4,425. Gelders had to go for long 
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periods of time without drawing a salary. A national organization would free the CRC from the 
Southern Conference’s restrictive requirement that only southerners could be a member and 
would help raise fund from all across the country instead of relying on the South’s paltry 
contributions. The Southern Conference and Lee Geyer thus created the National Committee to 
Abolish the Poll Tax (NCAPT) in August1941 out of the Civil Rights Committee, transitioning 
from a regional movement to an organization waging a national crusade against the poll tax.  The 
Southern Conference became a member of the Anti-Poll Tax Committee’s vast coalition where 
they retained a very close informal relationship and shared many of the same board members and 
officers.116  
 The National Poll Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax was a clearinghouse of anti-poll-tax 
efforts among a wide ranging number of regional groups and national organizations. Within its 
ranks were national organizations like the CIO, the AFL, the Railway Unions, the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the Elks, the American Newspaper Guild, the YWCA, the National Negro 
Congress, the NAACP, the Quakers and the Methodist Church. By the end of 1942, sixty-five 
organizations were affiliated with the Anti-Poll Tax Committee. Geyer, shortly before his death, 
became the chairman and Durr the vice-chairwoman of the NCAPT. Its board members consisted 
of Southern Conference directors and supporters like Eleanor Roosevelt, Frank Graham, Virginia 
Durr, Mary Bethune, John Lewis and his daughter, Kathryn Lewis. Despite the impressive 
coalition it assembled, the NCAPT heavily depended on funding from John L. Lewis and the 
CIO. Lewis brought to the NCAPT a cohort of unions which became the key to its strength. 
After Lee Geyer passed away in late 1941, it was the Railroad Brotherhood’s building in 
Washington that housed the NCAPT’s headquarters for a time. With its impressive coalition the 
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NCAPT was able to fulfill its dream of moving the poll tax from a regional problem into the 
mainstream consciousness of the nation.117  
 In spite of its failure, the fight for the Geyer-Pepper bill demonstrated a growing 
sophistication in the Anti-Poll Tax Committee’s tactics.  Where previously the Committee had 
focused on showing off support for the repeal of the poll tax from prominent southern leaders in 
congressional hearings and lobbying within Congress, after the failure of the Geyer-Pepper bill 
in 1942, the Anti-Poll Tax Committee stepped up its political operation against those who talked 
the bill to death. The Committee targeted not only members of Congress, but their constituents. 
In 1943, the NCAPT sent out over 50,000 letters raising support for their campaign and produced 
more than 350,000 pieces of literature against the poll tax. It regularly held petitioning drives in 
important congressional districts to recruit ordinary southerners to pressure their representatives. 
Because the trepidation displayed by most moderate southern congressmen and senators in 
supporting repeal of the poll tax, the NCAPT abandoned its fixation on getting southern support. 
It expanded its congressional base to include liberal Republicans—a step that an exclusively 
southern political organization would have hesitated to contemplate. Within the first two weeks 
of 1943, four bills to repeal the poll tax were introduced in the House. With Geyer dead, the 
Anti-Poll Tax Committee initially threw its support to the gentlemanly Joseph Baldwin, a 
Republican from New York, hoping that through Baldwin’s respectability they could get more 
Republicans to join their cause and unite the other three anti-poll bills under one bill. The 
militantly radical and eclectic Vito Marcantonio of New York, the only member in the House to 
have won primaries from the Democratic, Republican, and the American Labor Party and who 
had introduced his own anti-poll-tax bill in the House, furiously refused Virginia Durr’s request 
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to withdraw his bill in favor of Baldwin’s. Although there was no difference between their bills, 
Marcantonio wanted his bill to be the one that do away with the poll tax. Marcantonio 
maneuvered to have Baldwin withdraw his bill and endorse Marcantonio’s. Despite the 
unfriendly beginning with Marcantonio, the fiery congressman became one the Anti-Poll Tax 
Committee’s staunchest supporters in Congress. And in spite of his reputation as a radical and 
fear from members of the NCAPT that the bill would never escape committee hearings, 
Marcantonio adroitly brought together Republicans to support his bill and passed anti-poll-tax 
legislation in the House in 1943, 1945, 1947, and 1949, only to have each bill fall in the 
Senate.118  
 At the same time the Geyer-Pepper bill was struggling in the Senate, the NCAPT scored a 
major victory against the poll tax when it got Congress to allow soldiers fighting in World War II 
to vote without being charged the poll tax from their home states. Durr, frustrated with the 
stalling of the Geyer-Pepper bill in the Senate, approached Mrs. Roosevelt for help from the 
administration. Together they came up with the idea of suspending poll tax for fighting soldiers. 
They correctly predicted that at a time when patriotic fever was at its highest, it would be 
politically dangerous and difficult for reactionaries to challenge the bill. Durr recruited 
Representative Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, one of the few close allies the Anti-Poll Tax 
Committee had in the southern congressional delegation, to offer an amendment to the Ramsay 
bill, to exempt the fighting soldiers from paying the poll tax for the duration of the war. The 
amendment was excluded from the bill by the conservative forces in the House, but Claude 
Pepper of Florida and Charles Brooks of Illinois revived the amendment in the Senate version of 
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the bill despite warning from the Senate Majority Leader Alben Barkley not to do so. This act 
triggered an immediate fight from conservative Senator Walter George of Georgia. 
Conservatives, currently locked in a struggle to the death against the Geyer-Pepper bill, were 
terrified that, once enfranchised, soldiers would demand more concessions when they returned 
home. Repeal could potentially enfranchise more than 400,000 African-American soldiers who 
had never voted before.119 Senator Tom Connolly of Texas and Lister Hill of Alabama called the 
Senate vote an attempt to “rupture the constitutional process.”120  The leader of the opposition in 
the House, John Rankin of Mississippi, went further  when he condemned the bill as the 
beginning of a “[Communist] scheme to abolish State governments” and to turn over the 
elections “to certain irresponsible elements that are constantly trying to destroy private enterprise 
and to stir up trouble, especially in the Southern States.” 121 The fighting spirit of the more 
moderate southerners like Senator George was quickly deflated however; they did not want to go 
on record denying the suffrage rights of the men and women who were engaging in a global 
struggle to protect democracy. The amendment passed the Senate next day with a vote of 33 to 
20, with the twenty nay votes coming mostly from conservative Democrats and a few 
Republicans. With little appetite for a politically hazardous fight, the House voted 247 to 53 to 
pass the Soldier Voting Bill, with all except three of the opposition votes coming from southern 
congressman. Roosevelt signed the bill by mid September.122 
 The Soldier Vote Bill was the first significant victory for the Anti-Poll Tax Committee. 
Even though the Geyer-Pepper bill floundered in the Senate a few months later, the soldier bill 
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victory gave activists hope that the poll tax was on its way out. The NCAPT’s work against the 
poll pushed the issue to the national stage and made being against the poll tax politically 
acceptable. In 1944, the majority report of the Senate Judiciary Committee did not recognize the 
poll tax as a legitimate qualification for voting in federal elections, equating it with an inane 
restriction of the ballot to people with red hair or those who were a hundred year old. Away from 
Washington, the progressive governor of Georgia, Ellis Arnall, aided by the work of the 
Southern Conference’s Georgia Committee, repealed the poll tax in his state in 1945, making it 
one of only four southern states without a poll tax. 123 Although the Southern Conference and the 
NCAPT ultimately failed to get an anti-poll-tax bill through the Senate, their work raised 
national awareness on the issue. The accomplishments of advanced liberals of the Southern 
Conference in building a national anti-poll-tax organization and working toward the repeal of the 
tax showed the rest of the country that southerners were not monolithic in their outlook toward 
suffrage and federal involvement.  
 The Southern Conference’s national strategy to get rid of the poll tax defied the state-
rights thinking of cautious southern liberals. Although cautious liberals abhorred the poll tax as 
much as advanced liberals, they saw it as an issue the South should resolve internally without 
federal intrusion. Sociologist Howard Odum, whose seminal work, Southern Regions of the 
United States, became a central defense of cautious liberalism, explained that the South was 
made up of a distinctive “folk-regional culture” which set it apart from the rest of the nation. 
Long-held traditions and customs in the South exerted a powerful pull forcing members of the 
community to conform to them. Attempts to change the folkways of the South through law and 
legal enforcement by forces would inevitably lead to “civil war in the community.” A gradual 
shift in communal attitude was necessary before lasting change could be brought about. 
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Furthermore, Odum argued that only individuals who understood the nature of the South’s 
folkways could devise successful programs for social change. The federal government lacked the 
local knowledge and sensitivity to understand regional reality and thus was not capable of 
creating lasting and meaningful social change in the South.124  
 Cautious southern liberals, especially those in the southern press, borrowed Odum’s 
southern folkway thesis to argue against the federal intervention in a whole host of social issues. 
Hodding Carter, editor of the Delta Democrat-Times, opposed federal intervention in lynching, 
poll taxes, and employment practices. Lynching, he felt, was so heinous that it would die out on 
its own. The poll tax and job discrimination, on the other hand, were not the domain of the 
federal government to regulate and should be left to the states. Ralph McGill of the Atlanta 
Constitution echoed the sentiment when he declared that anti-poll tax legislation being 
considered before Congress was unconstitutional. And even if it were constitutional, McGill 
argued, it would destroy local determination and create an attitude of “Let the FBI do it” among 
southerners. Virginius Dabney of the Richmond Times-Dispatch was strongly against the poll tax 
as an instrument of the corrupt political machine, but he was also against interference by the 
federal government. The states, Dabney argued, were more capable of handling local issues 
because they understood local concerns and could pass laws that fit their specific need. The 
federal government should step in only when the states were absolutely incapable of doing it 
themselves. Dabney, like Carter and McGill, feared that average southerners would consider 
federal intervention into their customs as an invasion and might react violently. Although the 
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poll tax had little to do with the race issue, it was being falsely portrayed by conservatives as an 
attempt by radicals and outsiders to give blacks electoral power. Abolishing the poll tax through 
the states represented the safest option. Southerners would only consent to that to which they 
believed they had freely given consent.125 
 Although Dabney insisted those who were against the poll tax and federal intrusion were 
different from the “hardboiled bourbons” who were ranting against the anti-poll-tax bill in 
Congress, he readily joined the conservatives in Congress in declaring that  “much of the [anti-
poll-tax battle] is pitched on a hate-the-South key, and the whole South is denounced as though it 
were inhabited by ruthless exploiters and quasi-Fascists.”126 Cautious liberals’ and 
conservatives’ portrayal of support for the anti-poll-tax bill as alien interference and anti-South 
contradicted the fact that the Southern Conference, the Civil Rights Committee, and the active 
leadership of the Anti-Poll Tax Committee were southern. Because cautious liberals looked 
within the South for solutions to the region’s problems, the advanced position of the Southern 
Conference in regard to federal intervention might as well been that of a northern agitator.  
 The South-centered, pragmatist position of the cautious liberals stood in contrast to the 
Southern Conference’s national approach to southern problems. The differences between 
cautious and advanced southern liberals would be magnified by the events of World War II. The 
ideas of freedom and liberty, once abstract concepts, became more real for southern liberals. As 
millions of soldiers were shipped to all the corners of the world to combat an ideology of racial 
superiority and totalitarianism, the struggle at home for racial equality became more urgent and 
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pertinent. African Americans, emboldened by the war’s reaffirmation of the democratic 
principles against fascism, would challenge the nation to live up to its democratic ideals. The 
long held gradualist tendency of many cautious southern liberals became increasingly untenable 
and many retreated to the right in the face of more assertive demands for civil rights. Advanced 
liberals, on the other hand, would stand with the emboldened African Americans in their quest 
for greater freedom and prosperity. The Southern Conference would expand its role and ambition 
during the war years and its aftermath. The organization would not only fight against the poll tax 
at the federal level, but it would seek to mobilize the South politically against conservative 
Democrats. Where the cautious liberals would retreat from the race issue, the Southern 
Conference came to embrace it, advocating for the end of discrimination and social segregation. 
World War II and the postwar years would come to define the Southern Conference as the most 
progressive white-led organization in southern history.   
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Chapter III: World War II and the Years of Hope (1941-
1946) 
 
 
 Shortly before the conference at Birmingham, H.C. Nixon, one of the original organizers 
of the Southern Conference, wrote to Francis Pickens Miller to emphasize the fact that the 
“Conference must make a mass appeal if it makes the grade at all.”127 Unfortunately for the 
Conference, Nixon’s hope did not come to fruition. The first three years of the Southern 
Conference were a time of idleness. With the exception of the Civil Rights Committee and the 
National Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax, the Southern Conference’s many ambitious plans 
were left unrealized. Virginia Durr confessed years later that aside from the poll tax, she did not 
know what the Southern Conference did during the pre-war years. She thought the Conference 
existed solely to extinguish the poll tax. Most of its leadership had numerous other commitments 
and did not give the Southern Conference their full devotion. Frank Graham, the chairman of the 
organization, had heavy responsibilities as the president of the University of North Carolina and 
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the leading voice of liberalism in the South. Clark Foreman went back to work on the New Deal, 
devoting most of his energy as a director of the Division of Defense Housing. Southern 
Conference’s chronic problem of inadequate funding prevented it from maintaining a working 
staff. From December 1938 to January 1940, the Conference collected a paltry sum of $1,963.48. 
H.C. Nixon, one of the few paid staff of the Conference, had to leave his post at the Conference 
for a teaching position because he could not live on what he was given; only Gelders, who 
declined the salary owed to him by the Conference, remained on the staff.  
 Due to its small budget, the Conference was forced to abandon its goal of hosting annual 
conferences and settled instead for biennial ones. The second conference at Chattanooga, 
Tennessee, with the theme of “Democracy in the South,” was a more modest gathering lacking 
the star power of Birmingham and had fewer representatives from the upper-classes or the 
industrial elites. Southern Conference stalwarts like Eleanor Roosevelt and Frank Graham still 
made the trip in a show of support. Because of the SCHW’s tight straits, the Chattanooga 
conference was in danger of not happening if not for last minute financial support from labor and 
the organizing skill of the CIO’s spokesperson in the South, Lucy Randolph Mason.128 The 
Chattanooga conference did not set out any new ambitious program or craft a different message 
from the Birmingham conference; instead it played up support for its anti-poll-tax campaign and 
urged members not to give up during this difficult time. Will Alexander, who was accepting the 
Thomas Jefferson Award, soberly asked members to be ready for a long-time job that called for 
“wisdom and patience and determination of the highest possible order.”129 Reality would test the 
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wisdom and patience of the leadership of the SCHW to their maximum. After the Chattanooga 
Conference was over, the SCHW was running a deficit of $550.130   
 The Southern Conference’s difficulty did not stop at the apathy of the South and the busy 
schedules of its members, but extended to the loss of promised support from F.D.R.. President 
Roosevelt, whose leadership and New Deal programs the SCHW relied upon, was backing away 
from his domestic agenda as Europe became embroiled in a new great war. The SCHW 
“represented not so much the peak of the New Deal as the epilogue,” wrote the historian George 
Tindall, “coming after the period of reform legislation and hard on the heels of the ill-fated 
purge.” 131 With his eyes fixed on warring Europe, Roosevelt needed the support of the bellicose 
southern senators against the isolationist senators of the North and West. He could not afford to 
antagonize them over the poll tax or race issue. F.D.R.’s popularity and the prospect of war had 
prevented southern conservatives from directly attacking him, but his subordinates and his 
programs were easy targets. Opponents used the war as an excuse to scrap all non-war related 
agencies and direct resources elsewhere. From 1941 to 1943, the southern conservatives 
systematically abolished most of the New Deal agencies and purged many New Dealers from 
positions of power.132 Although the President still sent his greeting to the Chattanooga 
conference, F.D.R. did little for the Southern Conference beyond letting his wife help the 
Conference. Even Roosevelt’s promised support in the fight against the poll tax never 
materialized. Durr recounted a conversation with the First Lady in which Mrs. Roosevelt said 
that “as far as Franklin was concerned…he wasn't going to touch the poll tax with a ten foot 
pole….and she couldn't have any open part in it either. [Roosevelt] had changed from Dr. New 
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Deal to Dr. Win-The-War.”133 The Southern Conference lamented that by holding out on liberal 
programs Roosevelt had caused his supporters to become apathetic and his enemies more 
aggressive. But the nation’s entry into World War II actually reignited the passion in the 
Southern Conference for Human Welfare and changed its declining fortunes and ineffective 
leadership.134  
 Frank Graham had never wanted the presidency of the Southern Conference. His duty at 
the University of North Carolina and as the most highly regarded spokesman of southern 
liberalism occupied most of his times. The Conference needed a big name to draw in supporters 
and fend off conservative attacks, but few candidates could command respect like Graham. 
Graham was unanimously elected to the post of president at the Birmingham conference. He 
accepted the position in order to give the young Conference the stability and respectability it 
desperately needed before it could find more active leadership. After the Chattanooga 
Conference, Graham and Foreman tried desperately to find a new president. The publisher of the 
Louisville Courier-Journal, Barry Bingham, was first approached. Bingham, however, doubted 
the future of the Southern Conference and turned down the offer. Next asked was Will 
Alexander, who was retiring from the Farm Security Administration, to be either executive 
secretary or the president of the Conference. Alexander, though intrigued by the offer, confessed 
that he had no “administrative urge” and would rather plant ideas and watch them grow than to 
tend them. Alexander turned down the offer and accepted a more lucrative vice president 
position at the Rosenwald Fund. In desperation, Graham approached the esteemed sociologist 
Howard Odum and asked him to become the executive secretary. Odum, who always had 
apprehensions about the Southern Conference and feared that advanced liberals were moving too 
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fast in their push for progress, declined Graham’s offer. Almost by default the job went to John 
B. Thompson, the director of the Presbyterian Foundation at the University of Oklahoma. 
Foreman opposed Thompson’s nomination criticizing him for lacking a vision and the strength to 
carry out the fight that the Southern Conference would engage in. Ultimately, Thompson was 
elected president by a meager 3-to-2 margin in mid 1940, and alongside him,  Howard Lee was 
promoted in late 1939 from the executive secretary of the Council of Young Southerners to the 
executive secretary of the Southern Conference. As the doubters feared, Thompson and Lee did 
not have the ability to cure the Conference of its malaises, but let it drift into further needless 
division.135 
 The period of the Thompson’s chairmanship and Lee’s helm as the executive secretary 
was characterized by idleness, financial woes, and political controversies. Thompson and Lee 
were absorbed with their work at the American Peace Mobilization (APM), a coalition of anti-
war activists, where Thompson was the chairman. Thompson and Lee often did not hold 
executive committee meetings or take any action with the SCHW’s officers for months. In a 
letter to Thompson, Clark Foreman, who was then the treasurer of the Conference, expressed his 
frustration at the inactivity and the dire financial situation. Foreman also complained to 
Thompson and Lee about their unauthorized expenses and expressed dismay that he was not 
informed of them. Foreman’s complaint went unanswered. Between December 1938 and August 
1939, the Southern Conference collected less than a thousand dollars in donation. At one point 
its beggarly account had only $28.05 while owing more than $500. Howard Lee and Joseph 
Gelders, whose positions were the only paid ones in the Conference, had to forgo most of their 
already modest salaries for long periods of time. By August 1941, the SCHW owed Lee $221.36 
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and Gelders $1,470 in back salaries. Despite claiming to have seven thousand members, low 
financial contributions to the Conference indicated that the present membership base was not 
very dedicated. 
 Adding to the frustration were disturbing rumors that the APM was a Communist front, 
especially because APM called for the cessation of aid to Great Britain and a closer relationship 
with the Soviet Union. The Southern Conference, which faced communist charges of its own, 
could not afford the publicity that its chairman was so closely aligned to such a controversial 
group. Furthermore, the Chattanooga Conference had seen serious tension between the 
isolationists and the interventionists within the Southern Conference. The rift had not healed 
before Thompson publicly accepted the chairmanship of the APM. The last straw came when 
Thompson and Lee sent out a letter calling for support for the American Peace Mobilization, but 
using the letterhead of the Southern Conference. In it they identified the APM mission as closely 
aligned with that of the Southern Conference. The letter gave the impression to many within the 
Southern Conference that the organization had officially endorsed the American Peace 
Mobilization. Thompson’s and Lee’s action created an uproar among interventionists in the 
SCHW and those who distrusted the Communist influence of the APM.136 Judge Louise 
Charlton, disturbed by the breakdown of unity, warned that the Southern Conference “must be 
either redirected along its original lines, or disbanded.” A meeting of the executive committee 
was called on May 2, 1941 and Lee was put on indefinite administrative leave while Thompson 
was given a stern warning. Thompson would resign within a year.137 
                                                 
136 Douty, “Southern Conference Report,” 80-82, the full letter that Foreman sent to Thompson was reproduced in 
the Douty report; Reed, Simple Decency, 35-36; “Pick Oklahoman as Chairman of Peace Group,” Chicago Daily 
Tribune, September 9, 1940; “A.M. Head ‘Welcomes’ Aid of Communists,” WP, January 26, 1941; “500 Attend 
Rally Against Aid to Britain,” WP, January 7, 1941; Frank T. Adams, James A. Dombrowski: An American Heretic, 
1897-1983 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1992), 135; the Thompson and Lee letter on behalf of the 
APM was reproduced in Douty, “Southern Conference Report,” 85. 
137 Douty, “Southern Conference Report,” 97-98. 
67 
 
 The replacements for Lee and later Thompson transformed the Southern Conference into a 
politically active organization following the war years and the tumultuous post-war years. James 
Dombrowski came to the Southern Conference at its lowest point and would preside over the 
organization during its highest point and most difficult years. Dombrowski was born in Tampa, 
Florida in 1897, the fourth child of a jeweler. His placid and normal life was greatly disturbed by 
the First World War. As a volunteer in the ambulance service, Dombrowski encountered the 
suffering the dead and dying and the stark distinction between white and black soldiers. From 
African-American servicemen Dombrowski learned that fighting in the Great War was not for 
them a patriotic thing to do, but an escape from the South, where their futures were bleak and a 
chance to get three square meals a day. Life as a jeweler lost its appeal and Dombrowski 
determined that he would do something to help people in need. He attended Emory University 
and after his graduation he spent years wandering through different universities before finally 
getting a joint Ph.D. in history from Columbia and Union Theological Seminary. Dombrowski’s 
journeys during those years educated him on the suffering and powerlessness of the common 
laborers. He slowly moved away from the Methodist Church and toward Christian Socialism and 
the teachings of social gospel reformers Reinhold Niebuhr and Harry Frederick Ward. 
Dombrowski devoted his dissertation on the early days of American Christian Socialism. After 
getting his doctorate, he joined his friend from his Union Theological Seminary days, Myles 
Horton, founding the Highlander Folk School in Monteatle, Tennessee. Highlander became a 
training ground for many union and social activists in the South. Despite its advocacy that 
cooperation between black and white workers was crucial to the labor movement’s success in the 
South, the residency program remained closed to African Americans. Members of the faculty 
danced around the issue of segregation delicately, but they would favor resolutions that were to 
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the satisfaction of white participants over black. Few in the Highland School were willing to 
confront the issue head on, leaving Dombrowski disillusioned with the institution. Frustrated, 
Dombrowski resigned in the winter of 1941 and turned to Virginia Durr for help. Soon Durr was 
in contact with Frank Graham and without hesitation Graham offered Dombrowski the post of 
executive secretary that Lee had recently vacated.138  
 The post of presidency was more difficult to fill. Homer P. Rainey, the President of the 
University of Texas, was initially tapped at the 1942 Conference in Nashville to replace John 
Thompson. Under pressure from the University of Texas’s Board of Trustees, Rainey resigned 
his brief presidency. The Southern Conference’s reputation as a radical interracial organization 
with Communist members did not sit well with the school’s conservative board of trustees. With 
no one else to turn to and the Southern Conference in a desperate situation, Clark Foreman 
agreed to become the organization’s president. By the time of his appointment, Foreman had 
been forced out of his position as the director of the Division of Defense Housing. Southern 
congressmen on the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds targeted Foreman for his 
refusal to convert the Sojourner Truth, a housing project for black defense workers, built near a 
predominantly Polish neighborhood, into whites only housing. Frank Boykin of Alabama 
threatened to withhold funding from Division of Defense Housing unless Foreman resigned. 
Once Foreman was gone, protests from the Mayor of Detroit, union leaders, and civil rights 
activists succeeded in keeping the project black despite threats of riots from the white residents. 
The Sojourner Truth incident served as one of many examples of the mounting racial tension 
produced by the growing rebelliousness of African Americans in their call for equal rights and 
economic opportunity. As the United States  began to engage in the Second World War, it would 
be up to Dombrowski and Foreman to steer the Southern Conference off its path of self-
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destruction and back to relevancy during some of the most tumultuous and transformative years 
in American history.139  
 World War II and its aftermath brought unprecedented economic and social changes to the 
South. One historian called the war a “great divide” separating the South into two halves: the 
pre-war half of unemployment, poverty, rural living and provincialism, and the post-war half of 
industrial development, a growing middle class, urbanization, and the breakdown of its moral 
isolation. The historian of the southern liberals, Morton Sosna, wondered if World War II was 
even more important to the South than the mythic Civil War. The war transformed the region 
from the country’s number one economic problem to its number one economic opportunity. The 
transformation was helped by the defense industry, which was attracted to the region’s cheap 
source of labor. More industrial plants, many of them financed by the federal government, were 
constructed in the country during the four years of the war than during the previous fifteen years. 
The growth of factories pushed manufacturing employment in the South up by 50 percent. In a 
region where wages were infamously pitiful, southerners saw their annual income increased by 
40 percent. With such unheard of high wages, tenant farmers traded in their cotton bales for steel 
ingots. One estimate had 20 percent of the South’s farm population left the land to work in the 
cities all across the region and the country. The wave of urbanization was unprecedented in the 
South’s history. Between 1940 and 1944, the population of Mobile, Alabama jumped by 83,839 
(or 64.7 percent) and Norfolk-Hampton Roads, Virginia saw its population increased by 165,760 
(or 44.7 percent). To cope with the loss of almost 3.2 million people, southern farmers 
mechanized their production with the assistance of the federal government. The exodus out of 
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rural farms was the beginning of the end of the South’s long tradition of tenant farming. 
Although the South was still a poor and low-wage region at the end of the war, wartime needs  
had given it an expanding industrial labor pool and growing base of affluent consumers.140 
 The racial consequences of the war and its aftermath were as profound as the economic 
boom. Gunnar Myrdal, writing during the middle of the war, foresaw “a redefinition of the 
Negro’s status in America as the result of this War.”141 The war brought the long simmering 
resentment of African Americans all across the country to full steam. Unlike World War I, where 
black leaders like W.E.B. Du Bois advocated unity in order to demonstrate black loyalty and 
capability, African-American leaders in World War II did not advocate a closing of the ranks to 
support their country in its hour of crisis, but continued to airing their grievances. African 
Americans learned from the bitter lessons of World War I. They believed that once the crisis was 
over things would return to the way they were before. Injustices in the defense industry and 
discriminations in the arm forces provided the sparks that lit the fire of the militant spirit of 
African Americans. Despite the boom in the defense industry, black workers initially shared little 
in the growing prosperity. African Americans were often told by defense factories that only 
janitorial jobs were available. Countless excuses were made by employers to deny African 
Americans the jobs that the same factories fulfilled by busing white workers from other towns. 
The Army’s treatment of its black recruits and soldiers was no less appalling. Black men who 
wished to serve their country were often excluded by the arbitrary caps on black enlistment. 
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Those who managed to enter the service were often limited to menial duty like cooks and 
stewards. Black soldiers who actually saw action were segregated in all-black units and led 
mostly by white officers. There was only one black officer for every seventy black enlisted men, 
but one white officer for every seven white enlisted men. The discrimination African Americans 
experienced cut deeper than just external rejection. When they tried to fulfill their patriotic duty 
by giving desperately needed blood, they were told that their blood was not fit to save white 
soldiers. African Americans considered these rejections a mockery of their dignity as human 
beings by a country that was hypocritically wrapping itself within the cloak of righteousness and 
freedom.142 
 Throughout the country black communities were seething with resentment. “Negro's usual 
protests have become a mighty chorus of discord,” said one amazed southern sociologist.143 No 
longer docile and content with tokenism, many African-American communities began to demand 
more from America. The democratic message of the war emboldened many African Americans 
to hope for more. Black soldiers who had fought and suffered injury were keen to point out what 
their sacrifices were for. “After having been overseas fighting for democracy, I thought that 
when we got back here we should enjoy a little of it,” one black Alabama soldier defiantly told a 
white registrar who was refusing to register him to vote.144 There was a readiness to protest and 
openly express their grievances to the country. The spirit of militancy was embodied by the 
March on Washington Movement led by A. Philip Randolph. The threat of a hundred thousand 
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men descending on Washington got Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802 to establish the 
Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) to ensure that companies with government 
contracts do not discriminate on the basis of race. 145 Although the FEPC never lived up to 
expectations, it was the first tangible result of black protest.146 During the same period, the 
NAACP, which had been weakened by the Great Depression and competition with the 
Communist Party, experienced a Renaissance. From 1940 to 1945, the NAACP’s nationwide 
branches tripled from 355 to 1,073, and its membership increased by eightfold, from 50,556 to 
450,000. The civil rights organization also found successes in the South. At the end of the war, 
the South’s membership jumped from 18,000 to 156,000. The NAACP would rely on this 
newfound strength, built during the war years, to meet the escalating demand of African 
Americans for equal rights and to pave way for its critical battles ahead.147  
 The growing fearlessness of African Americans was having effects on other fronts. During 
the spring and summer of 1939, despite the potential dangers, several hundred African 
Americans unsuccessfully tried to vote in Alabama. The NAACP aided a few dozen from the 
group to file three consecutive lawsuits against the board of registrars. Although rule against, 
they were ultimately vindicated. Prior to 1927, African Americans had been excluded from the 
Democratic primaries with impunity. Then in two lawsuits against the Texas Democratic Party, 
the Supreme Court held that the white primary violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
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primary was a state function and thus was subjected to the Constitution. Undaunted, the Texas 
Democratic Party declared itself a private entity and maintained that the club was open to whites 
only. In Grovey v. Townsend (1935) the Court rewarded the perseverance of the Texas 
Democratic Party by ruling that the political party had sufficiently severed itself from the state 
and became a private organization.148 In 1944, however, the Court reversed itself in Smith v. 
Allwright (1944) and reasserted the position that because the membership of a party was a 
qualification to vote in a primary to select nominees for the general election, “the state makes the 
action of the party the action of the state,” and therefore the Texas Democratic Party fell within 
the jurisdiction of the Fourteenth Amendment.149 Smith v. Allwright inevitably led to more 
lawsuits to enforce the decision and to combat the inventive imagination of the southern 
legislatures, which relentlessly tried to discover new ways to circumvent the Supreme Court. 
Nevertheless, the decision was a major milestone in the black enfranchisement movement.150 
Although they still had the poll tax and the literacy/civic exam to contend with, southern blacks 
had caught the political bug. In his travel through the South during the immediate postwar years, 
Robert Martin, a professor of government from Howard recounted that blacks all across the 
region expressed to him their political enthusiasm, “Us colored folks use to think that politics 
was white folks business. But now we feel like it’s for us, too, that we have a right to be in it.”151  
 Following the Smith v. Allwright decision, African-American voters’ leagues sprung up all 
across the South, working in collaboration with other progressive organizations like the Southern 
Conference or labor unions, they helped educate hundred of thousand of southern black voters on 
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the intricacies of registration, the issues on the ballots, and how to operate the voting machine. 
The NAACP also stepped up its drive to register and help with the poll taxes for African-
American voters. Within two years there was a spectacular increase in black registration and 
voting. In 1940, an estimated 80,000 to 90,000 African Americans voted in the general election 
in the Deep South states and a quarter of a million total in all eleven southern states. The 1946 
primary election saw southern black vote triple its 1938 number, passing 600,000 votes. By 1950 
the number had jumped to 900,000. Although these numbers still represented only a third of the 
total potential voters, and many black voters remained disenfranchised by the poll tax and other 
means, progress had undeniably been made.152 Howard Odum looked at the transformation in 
awe, “It is as if some universal message had reached the great mass of Negroes, urging them to 
dream new dreams and to protest against the old order.”153 And like Odum, many southern 
whites were taken by surprise by the sudden change in the southern blacks they had known so 
long. But African-American protest was a natural outcome of migration, urbanization, and 
education. 
 The revolt of African Americans against the status quo was not a spontaneous 
phenomenon, but a result of forces  at work in the war. The mass migration of African 
Americans from rural areas to urban cities, which had begun during the early twentieth century, 
accelerated during the war years as promises of better work increased. One estimate contended 
that 17 percent of southern blacks moved to urban areas or out of the South altogether during the 
war. Migration changed the outlook African Americans had of themselves and their economic 
opportunity. They got the chance to go where they could never have gone before, to discover 
another way of life beyond the oppression of King Cotton, and as a consequence their 
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expectations changed. Economically, African Americans benefited greatly from the war. Black 
unemployment fell from 937,000 in 1940 to 151,000 within four years. And despite 
discrimination, black employment in defense industries rose from 3 percent in 1942 to 8.3 
percent at the end of 1944. The average income of black workers in urban areas more than 
doubled during the same period, even after factoring in the cost of living.154  
 Migration brought more than just economic security. African Americans moved from 
states where they could not vote to states where they would play an important role in Democratic 
Party politics. The shift in electoral demography meant that blacks, especially those from the 
North, were becoming an important constituent in a party that generations of southerners had 
sworn loyalty to. Their electoral power could be seen in President Truman’s civil rights proposal 
and desegregation of the army, all designed to win him the crucial African-American vote in the 
1948 presidential election.155  Migration to the cities also led to better education than the decrepit 
and overcrowded country schools that African Americans were used to in the South. Education 
fostered in African Americans the idea that they were as worthy as any white American. “In 
subjecting Negroes to an American education we have made them Americans,” Will Alexander 
explained to his fellow white southerners, “Their unrest…is [a] result not of sinister influence 
from outside, but of our education, which, with all its faults, is the best thing in our 
democracy.”156 The increase in the numbers of educated African Americans and their 
concentration in the cities led to the expansion of the black press, one of the most important 
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agencies in forming and reflecting black thought. Black newspapers fostered a spirit of positive 
discontent among its primarily black readers. They fueled their readers’ outrage with endless 
stories of discriminations of black men and women. They challenged their black audience not to 
be content with the tokenism that whites threw at them, but to demand what they were entitled to 
as citizens of the United States. The black press’ defiant message found a receptive audience 
among disillusioned blacks during World War II.  Black newspapers saw their weekly circulation 
increased from 1.265 million in 1940 to 1.809 million by the end of the Second World War.157 
One Chicago Defender columnist expressed that sentiment when he wrote, “Negroes know that 
if they don’t get a chance to fight in this war like men, they won’t be treated like men after the 
war.”158 The “Double V” campaign advocated by the black press sought to harness black 
frustration into energy to fight against the Nazi abroad and the conservatives at home. “We call 
upon the President and Congress to declare war on Japan and against racial prejudice in our 
country,” declared the black paper Pittsburg Courier, “Certainly we should be strong enough to 
whip both of them.”159 The black press would use their transformative power to rally disaffected 
black civilians and soldiers to give everything they had to win the war and strengthen their 
postwar position. And with the “Double V,” the black press held the country to a higher standard 
once the war was over.160 
 African-American protest did not exist in a vacuum of bitterness and resentment. 
Rebellions do not feed off hate alone, but commingle with the hope for a better day. The black 
sociologist Charles Johnson saw hope for the American creed even in the South. He rejected the 
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notion that the South had a rigid caste system because a “true caste system is based on the 
acceptance by each individual of his place in the system….This pattern is ruled out in the 
American South by the basic democratic philosophy of the American creed.…[and this] creed 
has power enough in the South to make it impossible to exclude the Negro altogether from 
opportunities for education and self-advancement.”161 Despite the abuses and injustices they 
endured, African-American servicemen shared Johnson’s optimism and hope. One study found 
that 41 percent of black soldiers expected to be better off as a result of their service compared to 
only 25 percent of whites. They had fought and died for the democratic principles of America, 
and they expected to share the fruit of their sacrifice when they returned home.162   
 When the nation went to war, the Southern Conference marched along with it. The 
Second World War was the Conference’s chance to reinvent itself in the southern public’s eyes. 
Before Pearl Harbor, the South, more than any other region in the country, was already 
overwhelmingly supportive of a possible war against the Fascist states. An October 1941 Gallup 
Poll revealed that 88 percent of the South agreed that Germany must be defeated while only 77 
percent of Democrats and 64 percent of Republicans thought so. Furthermore, the war provided 
the Southern Conference with a moral argument against white racism and the hypocrisy of the 
South in oppressing its own people. Despite its financial difficulties, the Conference took a full-
page advertisement in the Birmingham News-Age Herald denouncing racism as helping the Axis 
cause and pledging to Roosevelt the Conference’s wholehearted support in winning the war. In 
September 1942, Dombrowski suggested that the Southern Conference publish a monthly 
newsletter to educate the southern public on the Conference’s policies and the current progress of 
race relations in the region. The aim of the paper was to educate the southern public on 
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progressive ideals and to rebut conservative ideology rather than advocating directly for the 
Conference. The name Southern Patriot was chosen to reflect the Conference’s “love of 
country.” The Southern Patriot would become the Conference’s most useful and important tool 
to defend itself against its critics and to craft and promote its policy to the public.163    
The Southern Patriot, although it did not become a mass publication as it was hoped, was 
one of the most successful ventures the Southern Conference undertook. Foreman credited the 
paper for keeping the Southern Conference alive during the difficult war years when everyone 
was preoccupied with victory. The Southern Patriot developed a reputation as a reliable source 
of news on the progress of racial, economic, and political reforms in the South. The newsletter’s 
insightful articles from influential editors, academic papers, and government reports became an 
important up-to-date source of information for many southern liberals and activists. Within three 
years of its first issue, Southern Patriot had a circulation of five thousand paid subscribers 
reaching seventeen thousands people. The newsletter also published its own original research in 
special editions and pamphlets. One special edition, “Segregation in Education,” had 100,000 
copies printed and 70,000 copies were widely circulated. 164  
Like its namesake, the Southern Patriot both put its full energy behind the war’s effort 
and made the war work for it. Using the war as a stage, the paper would play both political 
watchdog against the southern conservatives and cheerleader for liberal programs it deemed 
necessary for victory.165 In its inaugural issue the Southern Patriot assured to President 
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Roosevelt that the Southern Conference is “watching the subversive efforts of irresponsible 
politicians who for selfish purposes are endangering the nation’s war efforts. Deliberately 
inflamed race hate is slowing down war production and weakening the war unity of the South. 
These politicians are aiding Hitler by their efforts to provoke racial strife.”166 In return the paper 
asked that the South receive infrastructure investments, economic justice for the poor, and 
political empowerment for the ordinary workers. The challenge of economic development and 
industrial recovery weighed heavily on the South since its infrastructure remained the least 
developed of all the regions. The Conference feared that the economic boom created by the war 
would not be sustainable without more federal aid and intervention to maintain full employment. 
The poll tax would continue to disenfranchise poor voters, the low number of union workers in 
the South would keep workers in poverty, and race prejudices would continue to be inflamed by 
corporate interest in order to create competitions between the races and keep wages low. These 
problems would perpetuate the poor education and bad health care systems of the South. The 
Conference hoped that if the federal government took proactive steps to deal with these 
problems, then the South would not only turn a new page economically, but politically as 
well.167 “The South is ripe for a political turnover,” the Southern Patriot declared, “It will 
happen whenever the new army of industrial workers realizes the vast power within its reach, 
and when the poll tax system has been broken.”168 The Southern Conference was confident that, 
as the lot of the southern workers improved, the days of the conservative Democrats would be 
numbered. Without demagogues instigating race strife for their political advancement and 
economic competition creating tension, race relationships in the South would gradually improve. 
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With conservative southern Democrats defeated, progressive legislation could be enacted to end
Jim Crow. To the Southern Conference social, economic, and political advancements were 
deeply intertwined. Success of one could not be realized without attainment of the other two
euphoria the nation experienced at the end of the Second World War gave the Conference hope 
that the country was ready to turn a new page of progress.
 
. The 
                                                
169  
 After the war ended, SCHW faced a changed environment and a different set of 
expectations. The repeated death of the anti-poll tax bill in the Senate at the hand of the 
conservative Democrats forced the Conference to modify its strategy from top down change to 
an emphasis from the bottom up. The Conference would restart its South-focus mission and 
begin a new political campaign against conservative Democrats. In order to preserve the 
economic gains the South made during the war and to build a base for political mobilization, the 
Conference closely aligned itself with labor unions, especially those of the CIO. It became 
increasingly dependent on the CIO for the funds it needed to carry out its ambitious agenda. The 
growing activism and expectation of the African Americans challenged the Southern Conference 
to expand further its civil rights advocacy. The Conference would take on increasingly advanced 
racial positions, eventually coming out against segregation in 1946.  
 With victory over the Axis powers achieved, a new found optimism enveloped the 
country. A brighter economic future brought a “new social ferment” to the South. Southerners 
felt that demagoguery was in decline and the region was entering a “new climate” of racial 
harmony and accommodation.170 “There seems to be a bottom deep awakening,” Aubrey 
Williams, a Southern Conference executive committee member, rejoiced, “a breakup of the thick 
shed that has for decades covered the South; a stirring, or to use a good southern term of 50 years 
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ago, a refreshing. An unmistakable assertion of decency and a turning on people who live by 
exploiting hatred, religious bigotry by trading in people’s prejudices and fears.”171 The spirit of 
racial optimism was reflected in the youth of the nation. One survey of college students after the 
war found that almost half wanted the end of discrimination of African Americans in restaurants, 
hotels, and public places, versus 32 percent opposing, and 68 percent supported ending 
discrimination in schools and universities. The Southern Conference believed that a new day had 
dawned on the South. It was confident that behind the fierce and noisy cry of the conservatives, 
there was a new “Silent South” that needed to be urged to speak and act. The Southern Patriot 
broadly and vaguely defined this new “Silent South” as southerners who rejected the backward 
looking and divisive policy of the conservative Democrats and embraced the forward looking 
policy of Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Roosevelt. The Conference believed that the 
progressive “Silent South” was composed of the returning veterans whose sacrifices in the war 
had raised the expectation they had for their region and for their country.172   
The war’s destructiveness caused many soldiers to look for a higher purpose to justify 
their sacrifices. The war had magnified the value of freedom that these southerners had taken for 
granted. Having shared those sacrifices with black soldiers, the racial outlook of many white 
veterans had been irrevocably altered. There were no colors during combat. The white soldiers 
were just as afraid of death as the black soldier, who also fought just as valiantly. 173 “I found out 
after I did some fighting in this war that the colored boys fight just as good as the white boys,” 
the highly decorated Lt. Van T. Barfoot told a red-faced Senator Theodore Bilbo, “I’ve changed 
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my ideas a lot about colored people since I got into this war and so have a lot of other boys from 
the South.”174 Another veteran, Harold Fleming, a native Georgian who was put in charge of a 
black company witnessed firsthand the debased treatments that black soldiers had to endure from 
white soldiers. “Here they are being called on to follow the rules, shape up, be a good soldier, 
work your ass off, be ready to die for your country,” Fleming recounted, “and then they would 
crap all over you without apology.”175 Fleming, who was ambivalent about race before he 
entered the war, had a conversion. His shared traumatic experience with the men who served 
under him motivated Fleming to join the Southern Regional Council, an interracial organization, 
to fight for the rights of African Americans. Other white veterans followed his footsteps. Many 
of them joined organizations like the American Veteran Committee where white and black 
veterans worked together to secure their G.I. benefits. In Georgia, white and black veterans 
created the Georgia Veterans for Majority Rule to overturn the county-unit system, which gave a 
disproportionate representation to rural counties, the bedrock of Georgia demagogues. This 
newfound interracial cooperation did not mean, however, that all white veterans returned to the 
South with a change of heart. The majority of white southern veterans believed that the war had 
been fought to preserve the customs and racial mores of the South, not to overturn them. Black 
veterans who believed they had honorably earned their rights were confronted with the same 
barriers they thought they had left behind. Some of the most reactionary postwar organizations, 
the Columbians, the KKK, and White Citizens’ Council, drew their members from war 
veterans.176 Nevertheless, the sociologist Guy B. Johnson saw in the change of attitude a 
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glimmer of hope for interracial cooperation. Johnson noted that “the majority of our fighting men 
have had experiences which have taught them a new appreciation of their fellow Americans of 
another race.”177 The Southern Conference would seek to harness this new spirit of 
progressivism and optimism and turn it into political power, to preserve the gains made by 
workers during the war by expanding labor unions within the region, and finally, to bring about a 
new age of race relationships within the South by working closely with African Americans.  
After the fierce and ultimately futile battles against conservative Democrats in the Senate 
over the poll tax, the Southern Conference reached the conclusion that the current status quo of 
the Democratic Party could not continue. The party simply could not remain “half-liberal-half-
reactionary.”178 The conservatives Democrats had undermined New Deal social reform and 
continued to be a major threat to postwar liberalism. The Southern Patriot saw the attempt by 
some conservative Democrats to deny Roosevelt the South’s electoral college votes during the 
1944 election as a “Great Conspiracy” to destroy liberalism. The apocalyptic tone of the 
Southern Patriot might have been exaggerated, but the incident was one of the growing signs 
that a conservative backlash was beginning to take form in the South. Although the war had 
brought together black and white southerners in the battlefields and showed that the two races 
were capable of working together in the face of adversity, the feeling of cooperation after World 
War II might turn into bitterness and rivalry if it was not channeled into something positive. 
With World War II coming to an end and Roosevelt’s health in decline, the Southern Conference 
believed that it imperative to mobilize a southern liberal front against the conservative tide. 
Foreman was confident that the economic prosperity during the postwar years and the growing 
liberalism of the younger generation had built the foundation for a renewed interracial activism. 
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In a report done by Foreman and Dombrowski for the CIO’s National Citizens Political Action 
Committee (NCPAC), the pair argued that the racist South did not represent the majority of the 
South. With only twenty percent of the South’s potential voting pool going to the polls, southern 
liberals needed to fight for the enforcement of the Supreme Court’s decision against white 
primaries and to continue its work against the poll tax; but more importantly, they needed to 
mobilize the moderates, liberals, and progressives in the South for political action. And the first 
place to start was to be the Southern Conference for Human Welfare.179  
The Southern Conference’s strategy for mobilizing the South marked its retreat from its 
sole reliance on the federal government. The Conference saw three ways to protect citizens’ 
constitutional rights: federal laws and prosecution, civil suits in the courts, and organized 
pressure. The Conference’s experience with its failed litigation in the Pirtle case and the futile 
battle against the poll tax had soured it on the first two approaches. Federal laws could be 
effective in stopping the civil rights abuses in the South, but the Conference contended that the 
difficulty lay in putting enforcement in the hands of U.S Attorneys who often prosecuted half-
heartedly or not at all and federal grand juries who refused to indict. Federal laws would only 
work if there was “a constant, alert and determined demand for their enforcement.” The potential 
for enforcement was unrealized, however, as comprehensive reforms could not survive the 
parliamentary tactics of southern conservatives in Congress. Civil suits, the preferred course of 
the NAACP, were expensive and required the collective resources of many individuals and 
organizations. Furthermore, as the example of the South’s defiance against the Supreme Court’s 
white primary decision had shown, the effectiveness of any judicial ruling depended on the 
                                                 
179 SP 2, no. 5 (May 1944): 4; SP 2, no. 6 (June 1944): 5; “‘This is Not Politics—This Is Treason’: Electoral College 
Plot Condemned,” SP 2, no. 7 (July 1944): 1; Editorial, SP 2, no.1 (January 1944): 3; Clark Foreman, “SCFHW in 
Postwar American,” SP 2, no. 6 (June 1944): 5; Ramona Lowe, “South Essentially Liberal, Believes Clark 
Foreman,” CD, April 7, 1945; Foreman, “Decade of Hope,” 144; Sullivan, Days of Hope 187-89. 
85 
 
South’s willingness to comply along with the ruling and the federal government’s willingness to 
enforce it. The Southern Conference believed the most effective method was organized public 
pressure and the expansion of the southern electorate. Only by having southern voters demanding 
change would politicians enact necessary legislation and the courts’ rulings be respected. It was 
time for the Conference to test its faith in the common southerners with an unprecedented 
political mobilization to oust the conservative Democrats.180  
 The Southern Conference’s postwar political mobilization was not the first attempt by 
southerners to shake up the political foundation of the region. Nineteenth century southern 
populists had attempted similar reforms. The Conference’s attempt, however, was the first effort 
made by an organization composed of respectable and highly educated middle-class 
professionals: educators, lawyers, New Dealers, clergymen, labor activists, and journalists—
individuals who projected the image of the privileged class of the New South and not a band of 
starving tenant farmers rebelling against their landlord or factory workers striking against their 
employers. Although organized labor would come to provide much of the Southern Conference’s 
financial resources, it was nevertheless an interracial white middle-class led movement. Previous 
interracial middle-class organizations like the Commission on Interracial Cooperation and the 
Southern Policy Committee had steered clear of politics, preferring the safety of planning and 
discussion or gradualist, white-controlled improvements. These cautious organizations, fearing 
the loss of their social standing and economic repercussion, never engaged in political 
mobilization of the southern people. The SCHW’s political campaign was thus unique in 
southern history, defying the convention of preceding southern interracial organizations and 
traditional southern liberalism, by trying to empower the common people with the power of the 
ballot.  
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Clark Foreman and James Dombrowski envisioned a popular mass membership 
movement led by the Southern Conference. The Conference’s first task would be to establish 
state committees that could operate on their own and begin to change their respective states from 
within. They pushed through the creation of local state committees in all of the southern states. 
These state committees were charged with carrying out the Conference’s political ambitions and 
expanding its influence on the southern public in each state. To accomplish their political goals, 
state committees’ primary strategy was to expand the voter roll within their states, register 
African-American voters in large number, and seek out progressive candidates to challenge 
entrenched conservatives. From 1944 to early 1946, the Conference had set up eleven state 
committees in the South and two associate committees in Washington D.C. and New York. 
There were early promising signs that the mass membership movement was picking up 
momentum. The Conference recruited 336 new members during the month of December 1945, 
and the number jumped to 967 in January 1946. It continued to grow rapidly each month, hitting 
1177 new members in March and 1220 by April. The four most successful committees in term of 
political mobilization and membership growth were the Committee for North Carolina, 
Committee for Georgia, the Alabama Committee, and the Washington D.C. Committee. Each 
committee was relatively autonomous and tackled different political issues pertinent to its 
state.181  
The Committee for Georgia was founded in January 1945 to unite the liberal middle-class 
forces in the state to create a political climate conducive to progressive social and economic 
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legislation. Under the competent and energetic leadership of Margaret Fisher, the Committee for 
Georgia tackled the minimum wage, Georgia’s defiant retention of the white primary, the poll 
tax, and a permanent FEPC. It published newsletters and pamphlets educating Georgians on the 
need for the expansion of suffrage and on the procedures for voting in the state. Living up to the 
Southern Conference’s mandate of political mobilization, the Georgia Committee and its field 
secretary, Osceola McKaine, helped increased the number of Georgia’s eligible black voters in 
Savannah from 900 to 19,000 and in Augusta, from 1,200 to 4,900. The gains were impressive 
considering the stiff resistance put up by white registrars.182 McKaine observed that the growing 
number of black voters would enable white moderates and liberals to be “more vocal, more 
consistent and more steadfast in their efforts to bring democracy to Dixie.”183 As part of its 
campaign to expand voter base, the Georgia Committee involved itself heavily in the work of 
repealing the state’s poll tax. When Georgia became the fourth southern states to abolish its poll 
tax in 1945, the chairman of the Georgia State Industrial Union Council of the CIO praising the 
Georgia Committee for its work and declared that no other agency in the entire state had done 
more than the committee on repealing the poll tax. The Georgia Committee also actively 
campaigned for the progressive programs of liberal Governor of Georgia, Ellis Arnall and quietly 
supported New Dealer Helen Douglas Mankin’s bid to win the congressional seat vacated by 
Robert Ramspeck, the House majority whip. At the same time, it was fielding two test suits 
against the Georgia county unit system that ultimately failed. Outside of politics, the Georgia 
Committee helped black schools secure a $4,000,000 share of bonds issued for education, a 
threefold increase from the original $1,000,000 allotted.  Within a few short years, amidst a 
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whirlwind of activities, the Committee for Georgia established itself as the most effective 
organization within the Southern Conference.184  
The Committee for North Carolina, formed in November 1945, was slightly different 
from the Georgia Committee in its emphasis. North Carolina Committee’s leader, Mary Price, a 
native of the state and an experienced organizer, pushed the Committee to cultivate a close 
relationship with labor unions to improve the substandard living and working conditions of the 
people, to increase in the minimum wage, and to lobby for equal educational facilities. When 
North Carolina considered a “Right to Work” bill, which would have curtailed labor’s attempt to 
unionize in factories, the Committee immediately sprang to action and rallied support against it. 
In a piece of theatric, the Committee presented the Speaker of the Senate of North Carolina with 
an 80-fot long petition against the bill. Labor unions were willing to work closely with the North 
Carolina Committee on many issues, but despite Price’s courting, no labor unions formally 
endorsed the committee. The CIO, in the midst of organizing its “Operation Dixie,” a massive 
campaign to unionize the South, did not want to antagonize southern politicians the way the 
Southern Conference was doing. Despite labor’s cold shoulder, The Committee for North 
Carolina continued to cooperate with unions in its political work. The Committee often teamed 
up with local unions to educate voters on the positions of candidates for elections, registered new 
voters, and worked to lower the voting age to 18. Thanks to Price’s leadership and the state’s 
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history of progressivism, the North Carolina Committee became the largest state committee 
within the Southern Conference with over 1,500 members.185 
Founded in 1944, the Alabama Committee, more than the Georgia or North Carolina 
committees, focused its energy on political organization. As one of the first state committees, the 
Alabama Committee followed closely the directive of the Southern Conference and spent its 
energy registering black voters and building a liberal coalition of Roosevelt Democrats within 
the state. Unlike the other state committees, the Alabama Committee took steps to establish local 
chapters in every part of the state. Politically, the committee strongly aligned itself with the 
progressive Alabama Governor, James Folsom, and claimed credit for his election in 1946 when 
it got Folsom 90 percent of the modest number of black votes cast. When the Alabama 
legislature tried to circumvent the Supreme Court’s decision against the white primary by 
proposing the Boswell Amendment to the voters, which would give local registrars power to 
determine the qualification of voters, the Alabama Committee set out in force to thwart 
amendment. But, despite its vigorous campaigning, the amendment was passed by 53 percent of 
the voters. Under the leadership of Aubrey Williams, the Alabama Committee, though in the 
Deep South, gained a reputation for being the most progressive of all the state committees. Its 
reputation made it difficult to operate within ultra-conservative and highly violent Alabama. 
Edith Mitchell Dabbs, a close friend of Virginia Durr and a member of the Alabama Committee, 
recounted that the location and date of meetings were kept in secret until meeting time, which 
was often at night. The places of meeting were often poorly lit on the outside and curtains draped 
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over the windows. Members often took turns exiting the building after the meeting was over in 
order not to draw attention by leaving in a crowd. In spite of the dangers involved, the Alabama 
Committee did not moderate its position. When a local CIO endorsed “Bull” Connor’s 1944 re-
election bid as Birmingham police commissioner, the Alabama Committee, appalled by 
Connor’s atrocious record of abuses, threatened to break with the CIO. Dombrowski, fearing that 
the incident would jeopardize the Southern Conference’s relationship with the national CIO,  
advised the Alabama Committee against taking a public stance in the matter. The Committee 
reluctantly acquiesced to Dombrowski’s wish.186 
Because of the city’s high concentration of southern New Dealers in city, the Washington 
D.C. Committee became one of the first committees established by the Southern Conference and 
remained its sole non-state affiliate. Unlike the previous three committees, the D.C. Committee 
combined fundraising prowess with the political activism. Although it had only 300 members, by 
situating in the nation’s capital, the D.C. Committee gave the Southern Conference access to the 
national press corps, political leaders, and sources of funding. It often acted as the Conference’s 
lobbying arm in federal issue and hosted monthly luncheons which drew influential labor, 
newspaper, and political speakers. One fundraising dinner honoring Justice Hugo Black included 
Mrs. Roosevelt and four other Supreme Court Justices. Thus unlike the state committees which 
had to struggle to gain legitimacy within their communities, the D.C. Committee had the direct 
sympathetic ear of many of Washington liberal figures. Even during the difficult year of 1947 
when the rest of the Southern Conference was facing a backlash from the growing reactionaries, 
the Washington Committee was able to raise $33,000, which was double what the rest of the 
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Conference could manage. Without the pressure of political organizing and compromising in the 
Deep South, the D.C. Committee was unrestrained in its demands for the end of discrimination in 
travel, recreation, and education and was the first local committee to call for the end of 
segregation in 1946.187  
Other than the four major ones, the other committees made some public relations gains, 
but had tremendous difficulty gaining political traction. The New York Committee’s sole 
contribution was to raise funds for the Southern Conference from northern foundations and 
liberals. It hosted fundraising parties and rallies in New York with celebrities like the up-and-
coming Frank Sinatra, the actor Orson Welles, and the boxing champion Joe Louis. Louis drew 
over 3,000 spectators to one rally and raised a thousand dollars for the event by auctioning off 
his necktie and handkerchief. The New York Committee’s “Lend a Hand to Dixieland” 
campaign ambitiously promised to raise $100,000 for the Southern Conference. Although the 
Committee’s fundraising never reached six figures, it was nevertheless a crucial source of 
revenue. Political successes, however, proved elusive. The Virginia Committee, founded in 
January 1946, valiantly struggled in a futile campaign to defeat Harry Byrd in the state’s 1946 
senatorial primary. The Committee for Tennessee, formed in Nashville on May 18, 1946 with the 
mission of raising the living standards of the people of the state, got into a similar losing political 
skirmish with Senator Kenneth McKellar during his reelection bid. The Tennessee Committee 
was mercilessly vilified by the conservative Nashville Banner as a minion of the CIO and 
Communists for its opposition against McKellar. The short lived Florida’s Fourth Congressional 
District Committee tried to fight the white primary legislation in Florida to little avail. 
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Committees in Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Oklahoma did little of 
significance.188  
The state committees’ political campaigns were long shot experiments. The Southern 
Conference, being one of the first regional organizations to involve itself politically, did not have 
a blueprint to follow. There were debates within the Conference leadership about how big a role 
the mother organization should have in the strategic planning and operation of the state 
committees. Foreman favored strong centralized control over its state committees. James 
Dombrowski and the writer Lillian Smith, however, wanted the committees to be autonomous. 
argued that it was the state committees who knew best which local issues to tackle and the 
approaches to take. Foreman pointed out, however, that with the exception of Washington D.C., 
the state committees were not financially sustainable without substantial subsidy from the 
Southern Conference. In 1945, the Georgia Committee alone took more than $11,000 from the 
SCHW and $25,000 was budgeted for 1946. For these investments Foreman believed that the 
Southern Conference should have some control over the affair of the committees. The 
controversy about centralization, combined with money problems, would later lead to the demise 
of the separate state committees.189  
The Southern Conference’s regional strategy for mobilization was different from the 
marching, boycotting, and civil disobedience that would later characterize the Civil Rights 
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Movement in the 1950s and 1960s, but it was also similar in its campaign to enfranchise the 
southern electorate, educate them on the issues, and then mobilize public opinion behind a 
particular cause. The strategy stemmed from the Conference’s faith in the moral imperative of 
the southern people. The Conference believed that because their goodness and decency, the 
southern people would not knowingly let injustice continue to plague their beloved region. The 
Conference’s task, then, was not to show the region the ugly consequence of its action with street 
protests, but to get them to speak in a unified voice against what was keeping the South back. 
One example of the SCHW’s strategy was its involvement in the preservation of the Fair 
Employment Practices Commission, the federal agency established by Roosevelt to combat 
discrimination in the defense industry. The Conference worked with its southern committees to 
organize meetings across nine southern cities to raise awareness and support for the endangered 
agency. It urged its members and supporters to register publicly their protest by writing to their 
representatives in Congress and to newspapers demanding an end to the filibuster in the Senate. 
The SCHW itself advertised its defense of the FEPC in southern newspapers and released a 
4,000 signature petition asking that the bill to renew the FEPC be brought to a vote in the Senate. 
To further demonstrate that the southern people were behind its effort, the Southern Conference 
frequently published opinion polls stating majority support for its program and circulated them 
among southern newspapers. The Conference asked the people of Georgia to mobilize against 
the reinstitution of the white primary with “public protest and pressure,” calling it the best 
weapon instead of filing needless and slow-moving law suits that would be ignored by 
southerners who were not engaged in the process. By educating the southern populace and 
registering voters, the SCHW hoped to build a mass movement of informed voters who had a 
stake in the welfare of their region.190  
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At the same time, the Southern Conference made use of its official organ to rail against 
conservative Democrats. Dombrowski, as the editor of the Southern Patriot, stepped up his 
attack against white supremacist politicians like Senators James Eastland and Theodore Bilbo of 
Mississippi in the paper. Dombrowski frequently raised, to the point of cliché, the charge of 
treason against southern reactionaries for working for special interests instead of the people, for 
ruling the South as a de facto fascist state, and for opposing the national administration’s attempt 
to fix the region’s problems. Yet, although the Southern Conference carried on one of the most 
vigorous campaigns against conservative southern Democrats during the immediate postwar 
years, it never took its activism to the street and it never became the mass mobilization that 
Dombrowski and Foreman had hoped for. Despite the Conference’s hope and urging, white 
progressives in Mississippi did not step up to support black Mississippians who were mapping 
out a plan for public protest and civil suit. There was never a white plaintiff filing suit against the 
poll tax or the white primaries. Although its will was there, the Southern Conference simply did 
not have the organizational ability, the man power, or the financial means like the CIO or the 
NAACP to carry out a prolonged and exhausting campaign.191 But most importantly its 
campaign to change the political heart and mind of southerners could not sustain itself long 
enough to make a deep impact on the region. Nevertheless, the contribution made by the 
Southern Conference toward voter registration and education did make a big impression. V. O. 
Key praised the Southern Conference as “one of the more conspicuous agencies in exciting the 
electorate” during the postwar years. 192 Even if it was only for a brief moment, the Southern 
Conference did offer up the possibility of an internally reformed South. 
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The state committees represented only one half of the Southern Conference’s overall 
political strategy. The other part dealt with the unionization of the South. The SCHW, since its 
beginning, had an especially close tie with organized labor. From the poll tax to the political 
campaigns of the state committees, the Conference’s activities had revolved around the 
economic improvement and the political mobilization of the southern working class. Without a 
strong union foundation in the region to keep wages high and the people voting pro-labor 
candidates, who were often more progressive than the usual southern politicians, then the 
Conference’s efforts would be in vain. Organized labor was thus a natural ally to the SCHW’s 
cause. The close relationship between the Conference and the CIO was further enhanced by the 
close tie that Dombrowski and Foreman shared with the leadership of the union federation. 
Dombrowski’s involvement with the Highland Folk School gave him extensive contacts with 
labor leaders all across the country. Foreman built a close friendship with Sidney Hillman, the 
head of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, and Philip Murray, the president of the 
CIO, while working for CIO’s Political Action Committee and the National Citizens Political 
Action Committee. Through their ties with Foreman, the two helped raise funds for the Southern 
Conference. Foreman envisioned the relationship between labor and the Southern Conference as 
more than just a patron-client one. He wanted to unite SCHW, the AFL, and the CIO to form the 
most powerful progressive front in the postwar period. Foreman gave the AFL and the CIO each 
three seats on the executive committee of the Southern Conference.193 The CIO returned the 
favor when at a conference in Atlanta, Georgia, representatives from nine southern states 
endorsed the Southern Conference “as the natural agency of the South itself to spearhead the 
liberal forces to the Region.”194 The representatives pledged to support the Conference in its 
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efforts to achieve a democratic, progressive, and prosperous South. The Southern Conferences 
Vice President, Paul R. Christopher, was named a representative of the CIO-PAC. After the 
public endorsement from CIO, the unions stepped up their donation to the Southern Conference. 
The money from labor would fuel the SCHW’s political campaign and the creation of its state 
committees. 
Unions had since the beginning played a critical role in keeping the Southern Conference 
afloat financially. After the sorry state of the Conference under the poor management of Howard 
Lee and John Thompson, the organization was only able to avoid a complete collapse thanks to 
the thrifty management of James Dombrowski and the infusion of money from organized labor 
and foundations. In August of 1942, the Southern Conference reported its healthiest surplus yet, 
$3,000 in cash. The Conference ended up collecting a total of $15,000 for the year. The situation 
worsened in 1943, however, and the SCHW’s income was less than $8,000. But the Conference 
recovered in 1944 and collected over $17,000, with almost quarter of it coming from the unions. 
It was not until 1945 that the budget of the Southern Conference exploded by more than fourfold 
to more than $86,000, a third of which came from the unions. As fast as the money was flowing 
in, it could not keep it up with the Southern Conference’s growing expenses. The state 
committees, which were partially created to help the mother organization with its financial 
problems by expanding the membership base to collect more dues, were now dependent on the 
Conference for subsidy. Feeling that the Conference was finally gaining its financial momentum, 
the executive committee ambitiously proposed to increase the budget by 41 percent to $121,730 
for 1946 to broaden the political reaches of the Southern Conference. 1946 would prove to be the 
best year financially and membership wise, with the revenue rising to $116,844 and the total 
membership expanding to 6,000. The SCHW’s financial triumph, however, had a dark portent. 
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Although missing its budget target by only five thousand dollars, the Conference ended the year 
thirteen thousand dollars in the red. Its growing appetite for funding meant that a disruption or a 
decrease in donations would leave the Conference unable to function. With its arms reaching out 
all across the South, the Conference could not afford to return to its days of idle frugality.195  
The Southern Conference repaid the aid it received from labor with a staunch defense and 
promotion of unions in the South. The Southern Patriot became the primary tool for 
Dombrowski and Foreman to advocate the cause of labor. The paper lamented labor’s setbacks, 
extolled labor’s successes, and aired the dirty tactics used against labor by unscrupulous southern 
industrialists and their Wall Street backers, whom the Southern Conference labeled as fascist and 
corrupt special interests. The Southern Patriot equated the attack on labor’s right to organize to 
the complete undermining of the democratic rights of the entire southern people. When an anti-
labor newsletter, misleadingly nameds the Militant Truth, kept appearing at sites in the process 
of unionization, the Southern Patriot devoted an entire special issue to investigating and 
unmasking the employers and factories owners who were secretly funding the newsletter. In 
another special edition, following its expose of Militant Truth, the Southern Patriot educated the 
southern public on what unionism is about. It praised unions for fighting against discrimination 
and promoting toleration, for their democratic system, and for tackling the root of many southern 
problems, low wages.196  
Outside of the pages of the Southern Patriot, the Southern Conference cooperated with 
the CIO’s ground campaign through its state committees. Most of the major drives the state 
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committees undertook to increase the minimum wage, register and educate voters had labor 
unions or labor leaders by their side. In anticipation of the CIO’s massive drive to unionize the 
South, known as “Operation Dixie,” the executive committee of the Southern Conference, 
meeting in September 1945, adopted a five-point action plan for the following year where four of 
the five points were dedicated to the education of the public on full employment, the benefits of 
unemployment compensation, the need for a 65 cent minimum wage law, and a permanent 
FEPC.197 But tying in to the success of labor in the South was the unanswered question of race. 
Henry Moon foresaw that the success or failure of the labor movement was limited to “the 
degree to which the working class can be liberated from the specious doctrine of white 
supremacy.”198 His experience with the SCHW had also taught Foreman that the “chief 
instrument of exploitation, and therefore the chief cause of poverty, is segregation.”199 Foreman 
believed, therefore, that labor could not ultimately make gains in the South unless it completely 
abolished segregation within its own ranks. The South could not move forward unless it did the 
same. The campaign to unionize to the South was thus paralleled by one to end segregation and 
raise the social status of African Americans. 
The Southern Conference did not begin as a race oriented organization. White organizers 
of the Birmingham conference had promised the African-American delegates that the conference 
would represent a new and vigorous outlook on the economic, educational, and political 
problems plaguing southern blacks, but nothing was said about segregation. The issue of 
segregation was forced on the Southern Conference by “Bull” O’Connor and his demand for a 
segregated auditorium. The Conference’s resolution never to meet in a segregated setting again 
was grossly misconstrued by both the black and white presses as a call for the end of segregation 
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itself. But this misunderstanding ultimately liberalized the Southern Conference at the cost of 
alienating its more cautious members. Conservative elements within the SCHW quickly fled the 
organization while moderates slowly drifted away over a period of four years.  The young 
SCHW, after its controversial resolution at Birmingham, did not openly challenge the race 
relationships in the South, even ignoring it at times. The early Southern Conference and the Civil 
Rights Committee tried hard to avoid turning repeal of the poll tax into a race issue in order to 
retain support of cautious liberals and moderates in the South and to prevent the southern 
conservatives from using race as a wedge issue.  
During the first four years of its life, the Conference was still searching for its identity. At 
the same time, the contentious battle to abolish the poll tax was occupying the Conference’s 
attention and taxing its meager resources. The Southern Conference was content for the time 
being not to hold a segregated meeting and the integrationist symbolism that it stood for. But it 
was difficult at times to live up to the simple spirit of its desegregated conference policy in the 
Jim Crow South. Although the official private and public meetings were completely 
desegregated, the Conference could not control the racial policies of the hotels and restaurants its 
members patronized once business was done. White and black members would have to stay at 
different hotels and dine separately. Virginia Durr and Mary Bethune took great pleasure in 
defying this southern convention and would dine and travel together whenever they could. The 
transformative power of World War II provided the Southern Conference with the impetus to 
make a stand against maltreatment of African Americans and the inherent injustice of Jim 
Crow.200  
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The postwar world’s outlook on race provided the Southern Conference with the 
opportunity to shed its early hesitation and  to advance its own racial agenda. America’s 
dilemmas, its racial problems, were no longer the exclusive province of the American press or 
the American people. After the horrors of the Holocaust, the developing world was scrutinizing 
Jim Crow with a critical eye. The Soviet Union took great delight in pointing out America’s 
racial flaws to the developing nations who were beginning to throw off the shackles of European 
imperialism. Americans, especially younger ones, were not oblivious to these charges and what a 
potent symbol it would be if the United States did away with Jim Crow. A survey, done before 
the end of the war, discovered that 71 percent of college students believed that giving African 
Americans full civil rights would strengthen democracy in the world. World peace required 
amity between the races, and the idea of separation of the races was the antithesis to this vision 
of peace.201  
Inside the Southern Conference, the feeling that the war had spelled the death of Jim 
Crow was amplified by the loud and insistent protest of its advanced white liberal members like 
the writer Lillian Smith. Smith challenged cautious liberals to abandon their own racial 
prejudices and accept the facts that economic security and political empowerment, under the 
guise of “separate but equal,” would never be true equality. Smith lamented that cautious liberals 
had for too long hidden behind the illusion that if the South tried hard, it could give its black 
population equivalent services. They had failed to see that separation of the races, as a 
philosophy, adhered to the notion that there were fundamental differences between the races that 
could never be reconciled. Blacks, in the minds of whites, were perpetually inferior and no 
matter how far they got in life, they had to be kept separate should they otherwise taint the purity 
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of the white race. Equality, Smith argued, was not something that could be purchased with 
economic improvements or equal services, but a mental mindset that must be nurtured without 
barriers separating the races. Only total inclusiveness, with no segregation whatsoever, Smith 
contended, would represent true equality. Smith also warned that if southern liberals failed to act, 
if they continued with their evasion, quiet pressure, and blaming African Americans for inciting 
riots with their demands for equality, then the responsibilities for the violence that would come 
from the failure to act would be theirs. Adding to the weight that was pushing the Southern 
Conference leftward was the growing militant tone and number of black members. Regardless of 
where they fell on the political spectrum, black members were of one mind when it came to 
segregation: it had to go.202 
African Americans, impressed by the SCHW’s no segregated meeting stance, filled the 
emptying ranks that conservative and moderates had left open. When Dombrowski took over the 
Conference in 1942, only 500 members had paid their dues. But by the mid-1945 that number 
had reached 1,224 with another 1,525 dues-paying associates outside of the South. A large part 
of the expansion of the Conference’s membership was due to a surge in African-American 
enrollment. The SCHW’s 1942 biennial conference in Nashville saw one third of delegates being 
African-American. African Americans eventually made up half of the attending delegates at the 
1946 conference at New Orleans. At the same conference, Walter White, the executive secretary 
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of the NAACP, and Mary McLeod Bethune, the director of the Negro Division of the National 
Youth Administration and a highly respected African-American leader, delivered two major 
galvanizing addresses calling for a new day for African Americans in America. The dramatic rise 
in black membership can be attributed to both the growing postwar demand of African 
Americans for social justice and their public activism, but also from active recruitment on the 
part of the Southern Conference and the leadership of Foreman. At its Nashville conference, the 
SCHW presented Frank Graham and Mary Bethune with the Thomas Jefferson Awards for their 
national service. The First Lady was there to present Bethune the award. The decision was made 
in part for big publicity to draw the attention of the black press and to increase the Southern 
Conference’s visibility within the African-American community. Furthermore, Foreman’s long 
record of working on behalf of the African-American community, at great cost to himself, 
reassured black members that the Southern Conference was serious in its commitment to civil 
rights, and Foreman did not disappoint. By the time of the Nashville Conference, the SCHW had 
virtually lost most of its conservative and moderate members. Without a counterbalance, the 
Southern Conference tilted heavily to the left. Starting in 1944, the Southern Conference began 
to shed its earlier hesitation and embrace an active role in promoting civil rights. Two short years 
later, at its New Orleans conference, the Southern Conference publicly condemned arbitrary 
segregation in every facet of American life and became one of the first prominent white-led 
organizations to come out openly against segregation.203  
The Southern Conference’s most famous involvement in protecting the civil rights of 
African Americans was in the Columbia Race Riot of 1946 in Tennessee. The riot was a 
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reflection of a larger postwar tension between African Americans, especially returning black 
veterans, who were no longer kowtowing to the racial mores, and outraged southern whites who 
demanded the maintenance of the traditional status quo. The incident began on February 25 with 
a dispute between James Stephenson, an African-American Navy veteran, his mother, and 
William Fleming, a white radio repair man and a veteran himself. Mrs. Stephenson’s younger 
son had left a radio for repair at Fleming’s shop, but due to a miscommunication, the radio was 
sold without the Stephensons’ permission. When the Stephensons demanded their property back, 
Fleming retrieved the radio and ordered them out of his shop. The Stephensons, on their way out, 
made a disparaging remark about the shop to an incoming customer and Fleming retaliated with 
his fist. A scuffle broke out between the three near the street door, and Fleming either fell or was 
shoved through the window and fell on to the street. The fight continued briefly before a police 
officer ended the scuffle by arresting the Stephensons. The fight might have ended there had if 
not been for Fleming’s large and extensive family and friends who lived along the rural areas 
surrounding Columbia. The news of the attack on Fleming quickly spread, and later in the 
afternoon groups of white men from rural sections descended on the Columbia courthouse with 
the thought of lynching the Stephensons. Fortunately, a local businessman had posted bail for the 
mother and son and helped them escape the approaching mob.204  
Lynching and race violence were not unheard of in Columbia. The city had had two 
lynchings within the previous twenty years and one failed attempt the year before. The relative 
prosperity of blacks in Columbia had angered many poor whites from the surrounding farming 
areas. Exacerbating the tension was the fact that many black veterans returning from the war 
refused to work at their old, poorly paid jobs as farm laborers. Some of them sought work in 
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Columbia and the veterans who could not find work received twenty dollars a week from their 
GI unemployment compensation. The severe shortage of laborers and the thought of unemployed 
blacks making more money than a poor white farmer angered many whites from the surrounding 
rural areas. The attack on Fleming became an excuse to strike back.205  
After the mob failed to find their intended victims, its members lingered around the 
courthouse aimlessly with bottles of beer in one hand and a rifle in the other. African Americans, 
with the memory of the previous lynchings still fresh in their minds, prepared for the worst. A 
group of African Americans gathered at the black business district known as Mink Slide, which 
was next to the courthouse, to discuss the impending threat. Some brought guns with them and 
expressed their intention to protect their homes and businesses if the white mob crossed the line 
into Mink Slide. Their number was boosted by the arrival of those from the surrounding black 
community who had heard of the lynching attempt. The sheriff tried to persuade them to go 
home and wait out the night, but black business owners were fearful of leaving their businesses 
completely at the mercy to the lingering mob. Taking defensive action, store owners turned off 
all the lights and waited in their buildings. Unfortunately, later that evening the chief of police 
and three other patrolmen entered the pitch black Mink Slide and were fired upon. The firing 
triggered an immediate invasion of Mink Slide from the state patrolmen who had been 
summoned by the governor and who had surrounded the business district. It was unclear who 
fired the first shot between the invading patrolmen and the hidden business owners, but after it 
happened the patrolmen unleashed volleys of bullets indiscriminately into the buildings. 
Terrified and grossly outgunned, the trapped African Americans immediately surrendered to the 
state patrolmen. Over a hundred were arrested on the spot. But even after surrendering, they were 
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beaten and clubbed by the patrolmen as they marched to jail and their weapons confiscated. After 
watching the spectacle, the unorganized whites, many of whom were drunk, descended on Mink 
Slide to loot and pillage without any resistance from the present state patrolmen. Almost every 
black business establishment was completely wrecked, its money stolen and furnishing and 
equipments destroyed or looted. The policemen, meanwhile, went door to door in the black 
residential district and confiscated firearms without warrants and arrested whomever they 
pleased. Adding to the disaster was the shooting of two black prisoners by the police officers two 
days later. One of the black prisoners was toying with a police weapon before he accidentally 
discharged it, hitting a deputy in the arm. Officers from the next room rushed in and fired 
immediately killing both of the prisoners. The shooting marked the end of violence relating to 
the riot, but the beginning of the Southern Conference’s work.206  
The Southern Conference, headquartered in Nashville after the 1942 conference, was 
only thirty eight miles away from Columbia. Dombrowski immediately sprang to action when 
word of the riot and looting got out. Within twenty-four hours of the incident, Dombrowski was 
able to get out a newsletter detailing the police assault of Mink Slide and the arrest of a hundred 
African Americans to all the people in the Southern Conference’s contact list in the state. The 
Conference filed a protest with the prosecuting attorney calling for the release of all prisoners 
who were not being charged with a crime. When Walter White and Thurgood Marshall of the 
NAACP arrived at Columbia to organize a defense team, Dombrowski immediately reached out 
to them about forming a national organization to defend the indicted African Americans. White, 
surprised that a white southern organization would extend its hand and publicly work with the 
NAACP, which was frequently vilified by the southern press as a dangerous radical fringe group, 
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accepted Dombrowski’s offer of help. The Southern Conference’s office in Nashville quickly 
became the informal headquarters for activities relating to the publicity of the Columbia Riot and 
the release of the unjustly imprisoned African Americans. The Conference’s publication, in 
collaboration with the NAACP, of a pamphlet, “Truth about Columbia,” detailing the story of 
Columbia with pictures of the victims ran to more than a hundred thousand copies. The 
Conference generated over twenty-thousand protest letters to Governor Jim McCord demanding 
justice for the black victims. The Conference organized an emergency conference with the 
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties, the International Union of Mine, Mill, and 
Smelter Workers, and CIO to form the United Committee Against Police Terror in Columbia, 
Tennessee. The committee worked to raise aid for the victims, provide legal defense for those 
imprisoned, and to demand an investigation from Attorney General Tom Clark for civil rights 
violation. The NAACP, the Southern Conference, and the Communist Party successfully 
mobilized public opinion enough to pressure the Attorney General, Thom Clark, to investigate 
the incident. Fundraising for the victims was a success, bringing in a surplus of $9,000 for the 
NAACP after the legal fees and expenses. The Southern Conference’s first public battle on 
behalf of African Americans would be a resounding victory.207  
Many of the arrested African Americans were eventually released. 31blacks and four 
whites were indicted for the Columbia Riot. Of those numbers, twenty five black defendants 
were tried and, to the surprise of many, twenty three were acquitted. The two who were found 
guilty of assaulting police troopers with a gun were given twenty one years, but their sentences 
were reduced upon appeal. Success had its limit however. The federal grand jury charged with 
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investigating any wrong doing of the Tennessean police force in its illegal search and seizure of 
weapons absolved the police force of any guilt. The grand jury even praised the governor of the 
Tennessee for his action in sending in the state troopers thus helping prevent a bloody race war. 
By November 1946, the bloody episode of the Columbia Riot was over. Black business owners 
were left to rebuild much of their destroyed properties with no compensation from the state.208  
The role the Southern Conference in this event had earned it both respect and ire. Its 
vigorous defense of the arrested African Americans and fierce condemnation of the abusive 
police force reflected the Conference’s permanent leftward shift in racial issues. Even as it was 
learning about the riot, the Conference was decisively on the side of the arrested African 
American. In its literature, the Conference placed most of the blame squarely on the aggression 
of the white mob and the police.209 The Southern Conference’s forceful defense of the people of 
Mink Slide earned it the displeasure of the Tennessean press and its politicians. When the 
Attorney General convened a federal grand jury to investigate police brutality, federal judge 
Elmer Davies charged the jury to “subpoena before you the officials of the Southern Conference 
for Human Welfare and question them as to the facts contained in this pamphlet [“The Truth 
about Columbia”].” And if the facts on the pamphlet were not valid, Davis went on, “then the 
circulators of this pamphlet should be exposed for deliberately agitating matters of this kind to 
cause difficulties between races which are trying to live together in peace and harmony.”210 
Dombrowski was called in to testify before the grand jury to determine if the Southern 
Conference had a roll in inciting the riot. The conservative Nashville Banner, never a friend of 
the Southern Conference, repeatedly brought up the charge of communism to discredit the efforts 
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of the organization. Threatening phone calls were made daily to Dombrowski’s home and office 
accusing him of being a traitor and a Red. The governor of Tennessee, suspecting Dombrowski 
was a Communist and the SCHW was just a Communist front, tapped the phone at the 
Conference’s office. When on the campaign trail, Tennessean politicians took turns blasting the 
Conference as a Communist outfit and the cause of tension between the races in the state. Even 
the moderate Guy Johnson of the Southern Regional Council was critical of the Southern 
Conference for glamorizing the event to fit its agenda. African Americans, on the other hand, 
were very grateful for all the work the Conference had done to support for the black community 
in Columbia. To repay the Southern Conference for its work in Columbia, Walter White agreed 
to attend the Southern Conference’s fourth biennial meeting in New Orleans in Thanksgiving 
1946. Mary McLeod Bethune embarked on a wildly popular speaking tour all across the South 
on behalf of the Conference to raise desperately needed funds during early 1946. By the end of 
her tour, Bethune had raised nearly $10,000 and recruited six thousand new paid members. The 
Conference’s close cooperation with the NAACP and its passionate defense of the black victims 
of the riot would help push the organization to take one giant step forward in its racial position at 
the New Orleans conference: its opposition to segregation in South.211 
The Southern Conference’s fourth biennial meeting was held in New Orleans from 
November 28 to 30 in 1946. Most of the 11-point program Southern Conference advertised for 
the meeting was not markedly different from those of eight years ago. It called for more funding 
for education, health care and modern housing for southern families, an end to discriminatory 
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freight rates to promote business, and the abolishment of the poll tax. But what was different was 
its call for the end of the “arbitrary restrictions…and discrimination based on race, creed, 
religion and nationality.”212 The New Orleans conference began on a gray and cheerless day. It 
looked as if the Conference’s luck would reflect the weather when, despite booking the event 
months before and making known that this would be an integrated meeting, the Municipal 
Auditorium Commission made a last-minute decision to enforce Jim Crow on the gathering. The 
only excuse given was to preserve the custom of the city of New Orleans. The conference 
organizers, refusing to buckle to the arbitrariness of the decision, decided to hold the meeting at 
the smaller Carpenter Union’s auditorium. Over 1200 people attended the meeting and many 
were turned away due to the lack of space. The Thomas Jefferson Award was given to the liberal 
governor of Georgia, Ellis Arnall. All of the major speakers extolled the need to do much more 
in the coming years:  Senator Claude Pepper made a passionate plea for the “breaking of the 
stronghold of monopoly on the South” and to usher in a new age of race relations; Dombrowski 
both praised and challenged the Conference to promote a platform where African Americans 
could air their grievances and work out solutions; Foreman went further than all of them when he 
made it clear to all the attendees that the Southern Conference was unalterably opposed to racial 
segregation. The New Orleans conference ended with a feeling of “triumph and of promise in the 
air.” Some of the magic of the Birmingham conference was recaptured at New Orleans. But the 
eight years between Birmingham and New Orleans had seen the maturity of Southern 
Conference. Its advanced racial position separated itself from the rest of the liberal South who 
were still timidly cautious over the thought of desegregation.213  
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The Southern Conference used the Southern Patriot to press the case vigorously for equal 
rights for African Americans and the abolishment of racial segregation. In one of its postwar 
pamphlets, “Look Him in the Eye,” the Conference challenged white Americans to look in the 
eyes of a black veteran and deny the sacrifices that he and his people had made to win the war. In 
another pamphlet, the Conference provided detailed information and statistical data on the high 
poverty and death rates southern blacks suffered. The Southern Patriot released a hundred 
thousand copies of its comic book, “There Are No Master Races,” to educate children on the 
shared brotherhood between the races and to dispel the outdated and racist notion that blacks 
were genetically inferior to whites. After New Orleans, the Southern Conference began publicly 
attacking Jim Crow’s most sacred cow: segregation. In a two-part special of the Southern 
Patriot, the Southern Conference laid out the disparity and inequality between white and black 
schools in the South. A white child received twice the resources that a black child received.  
Although black teachers’ salaries had doubled since 1930, white teachers’ salaries were still 40 
percent higher by 1945. With the exception of a few law schools in four southern states, there 
was a complete lack of graduate schools in the South for black students in all major disciplines. 
The only logical answer to end racial disparity, the Conference argued, was to end the 
segregation of public educational institutions.214 The Southern Conference concluded that 
segregation was “symbol of inferiority and served conveniently to remove some of the moral 
reproach of class exploitation,” and added that segregation had “no rational bases today.”215 
Even if physical parity could be achieved, Conference contended that true equality between 
white and black schools would never be reached. Degrees from different institutions could never 
be equal because their values depended on the community, alumni base, and tradition of the 
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particular universities. Regional graduate schools for black students, as proposed by many 
southern governors, were no real substitutes. They were simply segregationist tactics employed 
by politicians and not educators. The Southern Conference’s advocacy against segregation 
expanded beyond education to include hospitals, public housing, and all public places. Societal 
segregation, the organization argued, was neither economically nor ethically sounds. The 
Conference contended that the South continued to mire in poverty because it had to support two 
systems of everything in order to maintain the segregation. Segregation, simply put, was the 
“central evil of the South.”216  
At the end of 1947, the Southern Conference audaciously declared that “there has never 
been a more favorable time for the opponents of segregation to take the offensive….all injustice 
and inequality and discrimination will continue until segregation is ended. The time to ‘go slow’ 
is past.”217 On November 20, 1948, ten years after the first meeting of the Southern Conference 
for Human Welfare was held and six years before the landmark Brown decision, a group of fifty 
individuals from twelve southern states assembled at the home of Thomas Jefferson to formally 
adopt the Declaration of Civil Rights. The Declaration emulated the hallowed words of the great 
Monticello sage when it called for the abolishment of all segregating barriers to the pursuit of 
happiness. The Declaration did not represent a radical shift in policy, but a formal and official 
acknowledgment of the Conference’s advanced racial position since 1946. The Southern 
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Conference became the first white-led southern organizations to declare openly its opposition to 
segregation and one of its fiercest early critics and enemies.218  
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Chapter 4: The End of Progress 
 
Shortly after the creation of the Southern Conference, William Gee of the University of 
Virginia, in a letter to Howard Odum, predicted that the “[SCHW] will stir up a great deal of 
enthusiasm and do some good work over a period of years [but] then, as is true of so many 
organizations of that nature, it will likely dwindle and pass off the stage.”219 In 1946, Gee’s 
pessimistic prediction seemed like a failed prognostication. The Southern Conference ended the 
year with its highest revenue ever and its active members, which had peaked at 6,000, its highest 
number ever, had renewed its spirit of activism.220 But it was a false dawn. New Orleans proved 
to be the last hurrah of the Southern Conference. The seed of its destruction lay in its  pride in 
being an open organization that did not judge a member’s belief and kept its door open to those 
with radical ideologies. To its enemies that openness was a fatal flaw that they were eager to 
characterize as collusion with Communists. The number of Communists in the Southern 
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Conference was insignificant and they had no power base within the Southern Conference to 
direct its mission. But this did not matter as the nation entered a cold war with the Soviet Union. 
The distrust and hysteria that characterized the period had a profoundly negative impact on the 
credibility of the Southern Conference. The CIO, which the SCHW had long allied itself with 
and depended on for more than a third of its revenue, grew concerned over relationships, real or 
imaginary, with Communist-tainted organizations. In an effort to brand itself as a patriotic and 
respectable organization in the increasingly reactionary South before the commencement of its 
“Operation Dixie,” the CIO decided to cut all ties with the Southern Conference. The dramatic 
decrease of financial contributions from the unions sent the Conference into shock in 1947. The 
National Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax, which was also heavily subsidized by the unions, 
lost almost its entire budget. It was reabsorbed back to the Southern Conference in late 1946 
because it could no longer finance tself. While trying to cope with the near fatal blow delivered 
by the labor unions, the Conference suffered an internal civil war between Dombrowski and 
Foreman. Foreman, wanting to make the Conference prepared for political mobilization, did not 
think the cautious and deliberative Dombrowski had the political organizing skill to manage a 
mass political organization. The two, whose partnership had lifted the Conference to its highest 
point, were now dividing the Southern Conference into two bitter camps. The final blow came in 
1948 with Henry Wallace’s presidential campaign on the Progressive ticket. Wallace campaign 
was seen by many within the Conference, especially Clark Foreman and Virginia Durr, as the 
answer to the severely weakened advanced southern liberals. James Dombrowski and Aubrey 
Williams, however, saw Wallace as a critical threat to the reelection of Harry Truman, whose 
civil rights agenda represented the only realistic hope of reform. Unwilling to give up their long 
shot, Foreman and Durr left the dying Conference to work on the Wallace’s quixotic campaign. 
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Dombrowski and Williams abandoned what was left of the organization and retreated to the 
Conference’s offspring, the Southern Conference Education Fund, which was charged with 
educating the South. On November 21, 1948, one day after the ten year anniversary of its 
founding and its Declaration of Civil Rights, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare 
formally ceased to exist. The SCHW’s path from the vanguard of southern liberalism to its grave 
at Monticello was paved with uncompromised idealism. The Southern Conference would find 
out that its unwavering commitment to the highest progressive ideal of equality and fraternity 
would be its greatest flaw. In a country where divisions were increasingly drawn between black 
and white, and between red-white-and-blue patriots and red subversives, the Southern 
Conference’s hope for an open and just society was a dream too advanced for its time. 
The charge that the Southern Conference was controlled by communists haunted the 
organization ever since its inaugural meeting at Birmingham in 1938. Over six hundred “dyed-
in-the-wool Communists” had met in Birmingham, the antiunion and anti-New Deal Alabama 
squawked. The Alabama Woman’s Democratic Club (AWDC), a front for the industrialists in 
Birmingham, accused the Conference’s Birmingham meeting as a gathering of Communists and 
demanded the identity of those who financed, organized, and selected delegates for the 
conference. Adding fuel to the fire, Aubrey Williams, then acting administrator of the Work 
Progress Administration, injudiciously joked during the Birmingham conference that “Class 
warfare does a lot of good.” The poor joke was picked up by the national press the next day and 
it was seen by SCHW’s critics as definitive proof that the Southern Conference was Communist-
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controlled.  After Williams’ comment, the House on Un-American Activities (HUAC) 
immediately signaled its intention to investigate the activity of the Southern Conference.221  
In reality, however, out of the 1,200 delegates that showed up to the Birmingham 
conference, there were only six confirmed Communists. Nevertheless, it was six too many for 
those outside the Conference, and some inside. One of the prominent guests at the conference, 
Francis P. Miller, a Virginia lawyer and the founder of the Southern Policy Committee, who 
attended the meeting to investigate whether this SCHW would be a rival, began to have serious 
doubts when he saw the husband of someone who he thought was a Communist at the meeting. 
Writing to Congressman Brook Hays, an early endorser of the Conference, Miller expressed his 
fear that the Conference was controlled behind the scenes by some unknown element. Miller, 
who had been elected to one of the Conference’s vice president positions, refused to serve. 
Similarly, Howard Kester, a radical preacher and the general secretary of the Fellowship of 
Southern Churchmen, was also convinced that the Birmingham meeting was orchestrated by 
either Communists or fellow-travelers. Kester identified John P. Davis of the National Negro 
Congress, Howard Lee, Joseph Gelders, and Myles Horton of the Highlander School as fellow-
travelers. His evidence, however, was flimsy and based on unsubstantiated rumors.222 He 
fingered Myles Horton as a Red despite not having “positive proof, [but] I am inclined to believe 
from all I hear that Highlander is strong [with the Communist Party].” 223 Some of the anti-
Communist conferees maintained they would defend the rights of Communists to a limited 
degree, but they were not willing to work with them. Furthermore, these cautious individuals 
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worried that because of the insidious nature of Communists, those they spotted were only the tip 
of a larger red iceberg. 
The accusation was serious enough to worry Frank Graham. Graham, who initially had 
no intention of assuming the presidency of the Conference, changed his mind. In a letter to Mark 
Ethridge, Graham revealed he was too busy to assume the responsibility and would have turned 
down the position had it not been for the Communist charge against the Southern Conference. He 
accepted the position in order to defend the Conference against attacks from its conservative 
critics. Graham felt that the creation of the SCHW was a unique moment in southern history, the 
first time southern liberals met openly to discuss the fate of the South. Graham did not want to 
movement to die before it got the chance to grow. He wanted to confront each of the accused to 
inform them of the charges and to ask them to explain themselves.224 
  One’s name and credibility were everything in the South. Once tainted with disrepute, 
then one was nothing in southern society. Frank Graham saw three serious threats to the 
Southern Conference’s social standing: first, the conservative business leaders who publicly 
denounced the Southern Conference as Communist front; second, the cautious liberals who had 
withdrawn their support for political reasons, but could still red-bait the Conference; third,  the 
Communists themselves who operated in the shadows. Although these three threats could be 
mitigated by expelling all Communists, Graham had no intention of starting a witch hunt nor did 
he want to judge members for their beliefs. When Clark Foreman approached Graham with a 
proposal bar Communists from serving as officers, Graham rejected the idea. He believed that in 
order for the Southern Conference to be a just and liberal force in the South, it must to keep the 
moral high ground and be an example of openness and tolerance. Graham was fully committed to 
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the democratic ideals and he did not believe that excluding Communists because of their beliefs 
was justifiable in a democratic society. Graham would tolerate Communists, but he wanted all 
members to be open about their political affiliation. He was confident that under an open 
democratic meeting, he and the other progressive members could easily defeat any insidious 
attempt by the Communists.225 Furthermore, Graham was convinced that “the reason the 
Conference is criticized is not because it is one percent Red, but that it was fifty per cent 
Black.”226 Most of the earliest and harshest criticism came from the conservative press, 
politicians, and industrialists who used the charge of miscegenation interchangeably with 
communism. Giving in to them, Graham felt, would undermine the Southern Conference’s 
effectiveness and credibility among liberals.  
Not all shared Graham’s egalitarian principles. The Communist charge against the 
SCHW caused great concern among many cautious liberals who did not want to be associated 
with communism. In a letter to Howard Lee, Barry Bingham expressed his worry, “If we are to 
be effective at all we must touch the minds of many other Southerners who do not class 
themselves as liberals, conservatives, or anything else.” The red-baiting by reactionaries and 
cautious liberals threatened to undermine the Conference’s public standing and curtail its effort 
to expand beyond its liberal base.227 As reports from “reliable sources” mounted on the 
Communist infiltration, Graham asked H.C. Nixon to discover which members were 
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Communists. Graham did not want to expel them, but simply wanted them to come out in the 
open. The names of Howard Lee, who had been appointed executive secretary, Joseph Gelders, 
who were then the secretary of the Committee for Civil Rights, John B. Thompson, John P. 
Davis, Rob Hall, and Donald Burke came up with great frequency. The last two readily admitted 
their membership in the Communist Party. The first four, however, denied the allegation. It was 
shocking news, nevertheless, because three of the four were or would soon be leaders of the 
Southern Conference.228  
Joseph Gelders, Howard Lee, and John P. Thompson became the three highest officers 
charged with being Communists. Gelders’ politics had always been radically leftist. Rumors of 
him being a Communist traced back to his involvement with the National Defense of Political 
Prisoners. When he began to assemble supporters for the first conference at Birmingham, little 
was made of his radical politics. Many like Virginia Durr either did not believe he was a 
Communist, did not care, or had worked with him and trusted him. But Gelders did quietly join 
the Communist Party in 1936 before his brutal beating took place. Graham confronted Gelders in 
a letter in early 1940 asking Gelders bluntly whether he was involved with the Communist Party 
as a member or a fellow-traveler. Graham assured Gelders that he did not care about Gelders’ 
political allegiance, but he must know in order to answer the mounting inquiries made against 
Gelders. Graham never recalled receiving a reply from Gelders. Howard Lee’s affiliation in the 
Communist Party was a more disappointing revelation. Rumors of him being too closely 
associated with the Communist Party had circulated before he was chosen for the executive 
secretary position. His political position was heavily scrutinized and Lucy Mason had 
interviewed him to get a sense of his political compass. Lee told everyone that he was a socialist, 
but not a Communist. Mason thought Lee was not too close to the Communist Party and might 
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be an effective secretary. She convinced other board members to take the risk. John P. 
Thompson, who was the last choice to replace Graham, did not make known his affiliation with 
the controversial American Peace Mobilization (APM) until after he was given the chairmanship. 
Although there was no evidence indicating Thompson was a Communist, his tie with the APM 
proved to be an embarrassment. It seemingly vindicated the accusations made by the red-baiters 
in the Conference.229  
By 1940, many within the SCHW were apprehensive about Gelders’ leadership of the 
Civil Rights Committee. The executive committee diminished Gelders’ involvement in the poll 
tax issue and limited his role in the Conference. When World War II began, Gelders left the 
Conference for good to join the Army. Lee lost his position after the controversy involving his 
and Thompson’s endorsement of the American Peace Mobilization under the Conference’s 
letterhead. Thompson lost all power after the controversy and resigned his position a year after 
Lee. But the Conference’s Communist problem was not over. The temporary replacement for 
Lee, Alton Lawrence, who was on loan from the CIO, turned out to be another Communist 
suspect. Lawrence was Graham’s protégé at the University of North Carolina and was once 
bailed out of jail by Graham after being arrested in a textile strike. He had assured Graham that 
he was not a Communist, but this turned out to be another lie. Alton Lawrence soon left when 
Dombrowski was hired to be the permanent executive secretary.230  
 The fear of a Communist dominated Conference was grossly exaggerated. It was fueled 
by fanatics who were determined to cleanse the Conference. Gelders, Lee, and Lawrence had 
never sought to supplant the United States government. They became Communists because they 
were radicals who saw the promise of social justice and economic fairness in the Communist 
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Party. They felt alienated from the broken system that fostered economic oppression and racism 
and had brought about the Great Depression. For all their deceptions and half-truth, Gelders, Lee, 
and Lawrence did not try to convert the Southern Conference into a branch of the Communist 
Party or steer the organization’s policy toward those of Moscow. The single attempt by the few 
Communists in the Southern Conference to influence a public resolution at the Chattanooga 
conference would end in complete failure.231  
With much of Europe engaging in World War II, the Chattanooga conference in 1940 
could not escape the political climate of the day. The main theme of the meeting was 
“Democracy in the South,” but it was quickly sidetracked once W.T. Couch, the director of the 
University of North Carolina Press, introduced a resolution condemning the Soviet Union 
invasion of Finland during the opening session. Couch thought that since the Conference had 
condemned the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939, it should make a similar stand against the 
Soviet Union. The resolution opened the sour topic of international affairs. Although united on 
domestic policy, the Conference was evenly divided between isolationists and interventionists. 
The few Communists present, including Gelders, absolutely opposed Couch’s resolution, 
claiming that the resolution had nothing to do the conference’s domestic agenda. Aiding them 
were John L. Lewis and his labor unions, southern isolationists like John Thompson, and those 
like Clark Foreman who thought the Conference should focus its attention on the South. In the 
interventionist camp were Frank Graham, Virginia Durr, Mark Ethridge and Barry Bingham. 
Lewis considered the Allies’ overture to America a plot by the British imperialists and Wall 
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Street capitalists to draw America into another needless European conflict. Lewis fiercely 
opposed F.D.R.’s favorable foreign policy toward the Allies and went so far as to endorse the 
Republican Wendell Willkie for the presidency in 1940. Foreman, in a letter to Graham before 
the Chattanooga conference, expressed his amazement when he learned from Virginia Durr of 
Couch’s intention. Foreman strongly felt that the Southern Conference should stick to its original 
mission of bettering the South. He threatened to vote down any such resolution, even if he had to 
join with the Communists to do so. Foreman feared, however, that the defeat of Couch’s 
resolution would confirm the charge of communism in the eyes of the SCHW’s critics. 
Nevertheless, Foreman threatened he would quit the Southern Conference if such a resolution 
passed. The South, in Foreman’s mind, had to come first.232  
After Couch introduced his resolution, and not too subtly mocked the Communists for 
being against Fascists before they were for them after the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact 
in 1939, he was met with a violent reaction from some of the Communist delegates. Couch was 
knocked away from the microphone when he attempted to speak again. The proposal almost tore 
the conference apart. The Communists craftily maneuvered to prevent it from going to a vote by 
exploiting the pacifist and isolationist sentiments. They tried to divide the Conference into 
factions and control the debate through divisions. And there were enough divisions within the 
Conference for the Communists to exploit. The CIO, the mine workers union, and the socialists 
were willing to deplore Russian aggression, but would not budge on aiding the Allies. Virginia 
Durr and other interventionists wanted to pass a strong resolution supporting the Allies, but did 
not want to condemn Russia because they felt that Russia was only buying time before its 
inevitable war with the Nazi. John L. Lewis and his daughter Kathryn Lewis tried to overpower 
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the Couch resolution and pass their own isolationist resolution against the Allies. They tried to 
use the large numbers of miners they brought to the Chattanooga conference as delegates to push 
their resolution through. Graham, Ethridge, Durr, and Bingham skillfully used parliamentary 
tactics to delay the vote. Most of the miners eventually got bored and left the Conference to 
wander around Chattanooga.233  
Frank Graham took back control of the meeting and steered the Couch resolution to the 
Resolutions Committee for a compromise. In the middle of the night, Graham received a call 
from William Mitch of the Resolutions Committee who said that some members of the 
Committee were demanding that all the adjectives be removed from the final resolution. Graham 
quickly guessed that their goal was to remove the adjective “Communist.” The Communists’ 
attempt failed. The new resolution simply stated that the Southern Conference oppose the 
oppression of civil liberties, aggression against minorities and weak nations by all Fascist, Nazi, 
Communist, and imperialist powers. Satisfied with the carefully worded resolution, the non-
Communist liberals caucused to shut down debate and got the resolution to a vote. It passed by 
an overwhelming margin. The final vote demonstrated that the Communists never had the 
numbers to influence the policy of the Southern Conference. Even the attempt to name a 
Communist member to the executive committee as a youth representative over Graham’s 
candidate failed. The battle of Chattanooga was more between John Lewis and the interventionist 
camp, with the Communists benefitting from the division. The overwhelming support for the 
new resolution did not heal the bitter division and hurt feelings at Chattanooga. Graham, who 
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initially wanted to use the conference to pick out his successor, had to delay his resignation for a 
few months.234  
The most persistent red-baiters in the Southern Conference were the socialists led by 
Frank McCallister of the Southern Workers Defense League. The socialists’ number in the 
Conference was never more than 300, but they were the loudest in questioning the political 
integrity of the organization’s staff and board members. McCallister began to suspect 
Communist infiltration when the executive board passed over him to select John P. Davis, Paul 
Christopher of the Labor Defense League, and John Thompson as board members. Feeling 
snubbed, McCallister took it upon himself to purge the Conference of all Communists. He 
actively recruited members to his inquisition. Those who turned down his overture were treated 
by him as Communist sympathizers. “If you didn’t go along with them, then they’d red-bait 
you,” Durr recounted her experience of McCallister, “McCallister red-baited me to a fare-thee-
well from then on out [after I refused his offer].”235 McCallister reportedly accused Frank 
Graham and Mary Bethune as being “communist stooges” when they did not want to be a part of 
his witch hunt. In a letter to Frank Graham, McCallister proposed a resolution adopted by the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to ban Communists, fascists, and other totalitarians 
from serving on the staff or boards of the Conference. Graham promised to let the executive 
committee examine the proposal, but it never took place, partially because of the Chattanooga 
controversy. Undeterred, McCallister tried again at the Nashville Conference two years later.236  
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The gathering at Nashville was supposed to be about rallying the South in support of the 
war, but it was once again split between different factions. The Communists urged the 
Conference to appeal to the President to open a second front in Europe. Foreman rebuked the 
attempt, pointing out that it was not the Conference’s place to choose military strategy for the 
President. Despite the United States being an ally to the Soviet Union, McCallister attacked the 
Communists and introduced a resolution barring Communists from the organization. Foreman 
and Dombrowski opposed the McCallister resolution. They urged other conferees to defend 
freedom of expression. Without any real support from the rest of the organization, McCallister 
lost his chance again.237 But in a small act of appeasement, the conferees adopted a new bylaw 
declaring that SCHW was open to all except any individual “who either advocates the overthrow 
of the government of the United States by force of violence or who is a member of an 
organization which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States.”238 The 
resolution was mostly a patriotic gesture for the press. There was never an expulsion resulted 
from the resolution.  
In spite of the modest resolution, the Conference faced an even more vigorous witch-hunt 
from McCallister. On the final day of the Nashville conference, the members were treated to a 
performance by the famous black bass Paul Robeson. After his performance to a sell-out 
audience, Robeson unexpectedly began to advocate for the release of Earl Browder, the secretary 
of the American Communist Party, who had been imprisoned for passport violation. The plea by 
Robeson breathed new life into McCallister’s anti-Communist crusade. McCallister was 
determined to root out Communists. “When these red-baiters get out to mow you down and 
destroy you,” Durr reflected with amusement, “a lot of them may be dumb, but they really make 
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a concerted effort.”239 McCallister eventually found a receptive ear in Roger Baldwin of the 
ACLU. Baldwin, a trustee of the Robert Marshall Fund, had helped secure a thousand dollars 
donation for the Nashville conference. Baldwin had promised more financial aid to the 
Conference before McCallister’s accusation gave him second thoughts. In a letter to Clark 
Foreman on May 19, 1942, Baldwin wrote that the trustees of the Marshall Fund did not want to 
contribute money to any organization under Communist or Fascist control and they had “noted 
that certain secretaries of the Conference in the past had been either members of the Communist 
Party or fellow-travelers….” Baldwin brought up Thompson’s association with the APM and 
Paul Robeson’ speech at Nashville as further evidence of guilt. Baldwin warned the executive 
committee that they “do not appreciate the risks they run in collaboration closely with 
[Communists]…and prefer to shut their eyes to those risks rather than make an issue of 
excluding political intruders.”240 The attack against Thompson and Robeson did not elicit much 
of a response, however, McCallister and Baldwin had to find other targets.  
McCallister and Baldwin found their new targets in John P. Davis and James 
Dombrowski. John P. Davis was the most controversial figure accused by Baldwin of being a 
Communist. Davis’s National Negro Congress, after all, was founded through the Communist 
Party and he was responsible for Robeson’s concert. Fearing that Baldwin’s accusation might do 
serious harm to the Conference’s reputation among northern foundations, Davis offered his 
resignation. He was convinced by William Mitch to withdraw his resignation and wait until the 
accusation was investigated. Dombrowski who had joined the Conference a year ago had initially 
earned the trust of Roger Baldwin. One of the conditions Baldwin placed on the original 
thousand dollar grant was that James Dombrowski be kept as executive secretary. Dombrowski 
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fell from Baldwin’s grace when he defended members against Baldwin’s baseless Communist 
charge. Baldwin saw this as a betrayal and suspected Dombrowski was a fellow-traveler or a 
Communist.241 
Unlike Lee and Thompson before them, Davis and Dombrowski were not responsible for 
the charge placed against them. Furthermore, many members of the executive committee rallied 
behind Davis and Dombrowski. Foreman, who did not care for Davis’s politics, saw him as a 
valuable ally who shared similar view on economic reforms. Furthermore, Davis had never tried 
to steer the Conference’s policy in anyway except toward the improvement of the South. Lucy 
Mason railed against Baldwin for his hypocritical stance of claiming to defend civil liberties on 
one hand while using the other to take them away. Mason reminded Baldwin that he and the 
ACLU were widely branded as Communists in the South. When Baldwin tried to convince Mrs. 
Roosevelt to take his side, Mason immediately fired a letter to Mrs. Roosevelt, defending the 
Southern Conference against Baldwin and McCallister’s baseless assault. She refuted their claim 
that the entire organization was compromised of Communists because they suspected the 
leadership to be Communist. The McCallister-Baldwin attack finally diminished when one of the 
Marshal Trust Fund trustees, Gardner Jackson, came out supporting the Southern Conference. 
Although Jackson had serious reservations about Davis and his politics, he questioned Baldwin’s 
tactic of burning a forest to kill a tree. Jackson was convinced that the Conference was 
overwhelmingly controlled by non-Communist members and was carrying out legitimate work. 
By September of 1942, Jackson had managed to convince Baldwin to stop red-baiting the 
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SCHW, arguing that it was an enterprise that would bear little fruit and breed hostility between 
the two organizations.242   
The internal and external red-baiting took a toll on the Southern Conference. Many 
prominent members left the organization, fearing their reputation would suffer because of the 
Conference’s Communist-taint. When John P. Thompson did not step down from his 
chairmanship of the APM, the Conference’s two prominent journalists and publishers, Mark 
Ethridge and Barry Bingham, resigned their positions. Dombrowski suspected that Homer P. 
Rainey, president of the University Texas and the newly elected president of the SCHW, 
resigned because of the McCallister-Baldwin accusation. Despite having the Nashville 
conference to rally the base, 1942 saw the Conference’s membership plunged to 500, its lowest 
number up until then. The worst loss of all was the patron saint of the Southern Conference, 
Eleanor Roosevelt.243  
Despite the intense criticism from both inside and outside critics, Mrs. Roosevelt had 
always stood by the Southern Conference. But the McCallister-Baldwin attack had shaken her 
faith in the organization. The First Lady’s experience with the American Youth Congress two 
years earlier changed her attitude about Communist-tainted organizations. The American Youth 
Congress (AYC) was founded in 1934 by Violet Ilma to be a coordinating agency for youth 
organization. Since its creation, the AYC was dominated by the Communist Party. Eleanor. 
Roosevelt, however, supported the mission of the AYC and actively defended its reputation 
against conservative Democrats and Republicans alike. Her devotion to the AYC stemmed from 
her concern about the path the nation’s youth was on. Dissatisfied with what the country had to 
offer them, American youth were often bitter and disillusioned. Mrs. Roosevelt worked closely 
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with the AYC leadership and even allowed them to name one of their fellowships after her. 
Despite her advisors cautioning her against the Communists in the organization, Mrs. Roosevelt 
believed that since the AYC was comprised of many other agencies and organizations, the 
Communists could not dominate the organization. After F.D.R. authorized loans to help the 
Finnish government to resist Soviet aggression, the AYC protested before the White House 
condemning the loan and praising the USSR. At the behest of the First Lady, the President spoke 
to the AYC in February 1940. Instead of giving a speech that tried to find common ground, the 
President delivered a harsh chiding to the group. F.D.R. gave them a “word of warning” not to 
expect “Utopia overnight,” and called their reasoning on the situation in Finland “unadulterated 
twaddle” and “90 percent ignorance.” The group, initially stunned by the tongue lashing, began 
to boo and hiss the President. Mrs. Roosevelt was dismayed and felt betrayed by their 
disrespectful reaction. Her originally warm relationship with the group cooled dramatically. The 
First Lady began to understand that the numerous charges against of AYC had validity after 
all.244  
The AYC experience eroded much of Eleanor Roosevelt’s faith in Communist-tainted 
organizations. McCallister and Baldwin’s Communist charge against Dombrowski had stuck 
with the First Lady. She wrote to Foreman in 1942 and again in 1945 asking him if it was not 
wise to gradually eliminate the Communists within the Southern Conference, especially James 
Dombrowski. The First Lady initially had doubts about Dombrowski, but trusted Foreman’s 
judgment of Dombrowski to be a socialist and not a Communist. But Dombrowski’s willingness 
to work openly with Communists without ever questioning their intention raised serious doubts 
in Mrs. Roosevelt’s mind. By 1945, Mrs. Roosevelt was convinced that Dombrowski was either 
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a fellow-traveler or a covert Communist. At the risk of losing Mrs. Roosevelt’s support, Foreman 
defended Dombrowski and refused to expel him from the SCHW on the flimsy charge of 
McCallister and Baldwin. He implored the First Lady to ignore the silly charges by those who 
saw Communists where there were none. Dombrowski, too, wrote a long letter asking Mrs. 
Roosevelt to return to the Conference and vigorously defended himself and Foreman against all 
the fictitious charges of communism, but it was to no avail. Mrs. Roosevelt did not make a public 
break with the Conference, but she gradually drifted away from the organization. She did not 
attend the 1946 New Orleans conference and refused to help the organization secure a 
desperately needed $25,000 grant from the Rosenwald Fund, even at the request of Frank 
Graham. The Southern Conference thus maintained their ideal of an open organization at the 
extremely high cost of losing their patron saint, Mrs. Roosevelt.245  
 In spite of the urging of Mrs. Roosevelt, the Southern Conference did not systematically 
purge any suspected Communist. Those who were suspected of being a Communist either left of 
their own accord or stayed with the Conference until the end. Foreman and Dombrowski 
believed that it was more destructive to judge people arbitrarily on their affiliation rather than 
their actions. The Southern Conference was founded on the ethos of openness. It was a rare 
organization that put its goals of bettering the South and her people above doing what was 
politically expedient. “I believe in the Bill of Rights and am devoted to it for everybody.” 
Foreman declared, “The Bill of Rights is there as the basis of American democracy and it's for 
everybody. Communists and socialists, black and white, everybody. And as soon as you start 
drawing lines and saying everybody but….Everybody except. Then the whole thing is 
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destroyed.”246 But as the country slipped into a long Cold War with the Soviet Union, the idea of 
openness to all regardless of creed became increasingly dangerous. The postwar years brought 
prosperity, but it also heightened racial tension and violence, paranoia toward Communist 
infiltration, and the increasingly dangerous threat of nuclear Armageddon. Communism became 
everything that was not American. The charge of communism, although internally contained, had 
permanently tainted the Conference’s reputation in the South. Under this atmosphere of fear and 
suspicion, the Conference would lose its greatest supporters, the labor unions, to the postwar 
anti-Communist hysteria. 
The postwar United States was a different world than the one the Southern Conference 
had hoped for. World War II had brought unprecedented prosperity and industry to the South, 
but it did not provide a solution to the region’s complicated race relationships. The Southern 
Conference erroneously thought that the ephemeral spirit of progressivism experienced after the 
war was the long awaited awakening of the “Silent South.” Unfortunately, race relationships in 
the South grew more contentious and violence. For all their pride of being experts on blacks, 
southern whites were woefully unprepared to meet their neighbor’s growing expectations. 
Instead of adapting and compromising, southern whites retreated back to their dying traditions 
for answer: the use of force to suppress dissent. The event of Columbia Race Riot in 1946 was a 
sign of the boiling tension that was reaching a critical level. 1946 saw the infamous lynching of 
two black couples who were killed because one of the husbands had struck his white employer. 
In another incident during the same summer, Isaac Woodward, a recently released black veteran, 
was blinded by the chief of police of Aiken, South Carolina after he was kicked out of a bus for 
“creating disturbances.” The chief of police was acquitted of all wrong doing and the bus 
company easily won a civil lawsuit filed by Woodward against it. The barbaric killing and 
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beating spawned protests from outraged African Americans. Truman, shocked by the killings, 
decided to go ahead with the decision to set up a President’s Committee on Civil Rights to 
investigate race violence and discrimination. The Southern Conference’s ability to tackle these 
enormous challenges was severely compromised by a far more powerful wave of anti-
communism than what it had experienced before. The Conference, unable to shake off its 
reputation as a Communist front, would become a liability for organizations that were trying to 
avoid being red-baited.247  
As the United States and Soviet Union entered into the Cold War, the charge of 
communism became a popular tool by conservatives to undermine liberal forces around the 
country. Nowhere else was this method employed more frequently than in the South. 
Communists, never popular in the U.S. to begin with, now became synonymous with deception, 
subversive action, and treason. Anti-Communist sentiments were common everywhere in the 
country, but only in the South did they merge with anti-liberalism, anti-civil rights, anti-labor, 
and anti-integration. “Integration,” one of the red-baiters put it bluntly, “is the Southern version 
of communism.” The southern ruling elite and the conservative press used the charge of 
communism to discredit civil rights organizations, labor unions, and even the federal 
government, if they tried to challenge the South’s social customs. Industrialists and conservative 
Democrats vigorously promoted the idea that communism was the guiding force behind blacks’ 
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determination to obtain equality.248 “I deplore the fact that throughout the South today,” Martin 
Dies of the House on Un-American Activities proclaimed indignantly, “subversive elements are 
attempting to convince the negro that he should be placed on social equality with white people, 
that now is the time for him to assert his rights.”249 Despite supporting Truman in his 
containment policy against the Soviet Union, conservative Democrats contradictory accused the 
federal government of authoritarian communism when Truman tried to get his civil rights bill 
passed. Conservative Democrats rebuked the civil rights bill as an attempt by Communists who 
had infiltrated the federal government to destroy the South. Strom Thurmond, then governor of 
South Carolina and the leader of the Dixiecrats, adopted the words of Mark Ethridge when he 
defiantly declared that “There are not enough troops in the army to force the South to give up 
segregation and admit the Negro race into our schools, our theatres, our swimming pools and our 
homes.”250 At a southern governor conference in March 1948, Thurmond, along with six other 
southern governors, pledged to oppose Truman’s reelection and urged their constituents to 
oppose any candidate for office who were against lynching, poll tax,  employment 
discrimination, and racial segregation. The fear of the rapidly changing status of African 
Americans and the high price of speaking up deterred many moderates and educated whites from 
challenging the position of the conservatives. Fear of communism had enveloped the white 
South. It forced southern whites to retreat back to their baser tradition.251   
As one of the most visible and largest southern interracial organizations, the Southern 
Conference was forced to feel the conservative Democrats’ wrath. Conservative politicians were 
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familiar with the Southern Conference from their advocacy of the anti-poll-tax bill and the 
organization’s flaunting opposition to Jim Crow. In a late 1945 letter to Dombrowski, Senator 
Theodore Bilbo called the Southern Conference an “Un-American, negro social equality, 
communistic, mongrel outfit.” The senator from Mississippi continued his rant wishing that 
“there was some filibuster that I could inaugurate that would immediately and finally and forever 
dissolve the so-called Southern Conference for Human Welfare....”252 The National Committee 
for the Abolishment of Poll Tax was constantly monitored by the FBI. Virginia Durr recounted 
times when many young men from the “post office” would show up on their days off, wanting to 
volunteer for the NCAPT. Their identity as FBI agents quickly became apparent when the post 
office denied having any of them on its staff and the volunteers adamantly insisted on copying 
the mailing lists of donors. Durr, nevertheless, welcomed their help and made good use of their 
offered labor. Virginia Durr was not afraid of what the FBI could find because she believed she 
and the NCAPT had nothing to hide. Some state committees faced similar if not more dangerous 
harassments and scrutiny. Volunteers of the state committees were often scared off by local 
reactionaries who made it their mission to disrupt the committees’ business.253  
The most serious frontal attack against the Conference came from the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities (HUAC) in June 1947. After learning that the Southern Conference 
was planning to launch the former Vice President Henry Wallace on speaking tour, it hastily put 
together a report titled “Report on the Southern Conference for Human Welfare.” The HUAC 
report was a fantastical exercise of connecting the dots, no matter how remote and unlikely those 
dots were. And if no connection could reasonably be found, then HUAC would manufacture its 
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own connection.  The HUAC’s tactic was simply a series of guilt-by-association.254 Walter 
Gellhorn, in a piercing analysis of the committee’s report, identified its method of accusation: 
This device involves, first, seeking to establish a tie, however tenuous, between an 
unpopular individual or organization and some person connected with the 
Southern Conference; second, ascribing to that person all the undesirable qualities 
of the individual or organization with whom he has been momentarily linked; and 
finally, attributing to the Southern Conference the qualities which have been 
acquired by infection, as it were, by these intermediate persons. Of course, the 
process is an endless one, for any individual who becomes associated with the 
Southern Conference will in turn acquire that organization's derivative taint and 
will transmit it to all other organizations he may later support.255 
 
At the beginning of its report, the committee lost no time in accusing the Southern Conference of 
being the “most deviously camouflaged Communist-front organization.”256 The report first 
claimed that the origin of the Southern Conference was mysterious and yet it was absolutely 
convinced that the organization was spearheaded by Communists who were using the honest 
liberals as “convenient guinea pigs.” The report’s evidence purporting Communist manipulation 
of the SCHW was ludicrously outrageous. In one example, the report accused twenty-two 
members of being Communists because there was no record of them objecting to the activities of 
five known Communists during the Birmingham conference and because they supported a 
resolution demanding the release of the Scottsboro boys, a resolution that was universally 
popular among liberals. In another tortuous instance, the report pointed to an anonymous 
“conference spokesperson” who was quoted in the Southern Patriot saying he did not want to 
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gang up on Russia and would prefer to live in peace with her as a clear evidence of an insidious 
Communist operating behind the Conference. Gellhorn in his own investigation identified the 
anonymous speaker as Senator Claude Pepper who made the remark from the Senate floor. In a 
subtler tactic, Gellhorn revealed that HUAC only used the Daily Worker as a reference to the 
Southern Conference’s activities, thus giving the false impression that the Daily Worker was 
somehow the official organ of the organization. The report virtually ignored the numerous 
references to the Conference’s work in other news outlets including the organization’s own 
paper, the Southern Patriot. But through its insidiously bumbling attempt to find a credible link 
between the Conference and the Communist Party, the HUAC report found a kernel of truth in a 
resolution passed at the Chattanooga conference calling for an end to the lending of money and 
war materials to all belligerent sides at the expense of the American people. HUAC, however, 
predictably made a mountain out of a mole hill and contended that the Southern Conference had 
followed a “strict and unvarying conformance” to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. This 
conclusion ignored the fact that the SCHW consciously avoided venturing into foreign policy 
debate and it played down Graham’s resolution condemning fascists and Communists alike. 
When HUAC could not find anything, it would exaggerate with its vivid imagination. HUAC 
was never above altering quotes, taking testimonies and writing grossly out of context, and 
embellishing its sources to support their argument.257Predictably, HUAC concluded that the 
SCHW had closely adhered to the foreign policy of Moscow and it had consistently displayed 
anti-American and pro-Soviet sentiments.258  
After meticulously examining the individual charges made by HUAC against the 
Southern Conference, Walter Gellhorn concluded that the accusation against the organization 
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was “insincere” and had no credible evidence to support it. Rather than proving the guilt of the 
Southern Conference, the committee resorted to attacking the reputations of those who disagreed 
with it. In its report on SCHW, HUAC had refused to let anyone from the Southern Conference 
testify and defend the organization’s reputation. Rather than revealing any Communist 
corruption, the report actually demonstrated that the Committee had “either been intolerably 
incompetent or designedly intent upon publicizing misinformation.”259 HUAC report was 
denounced then and now by commentators as weak and farfetched document. HUAC’s intention, 
however, was not to provide a dispassionate examination of the SCHW, but to serve as an attack 
piece. In this objective, HUAC would find success. 
Dombrowski and Foreman dismissed the HUAC report as regurgitated lies and  
denounced HUAC for being the “un-American.” And for a short time, HUAC, because of its 
complete ineptitude, provided positive publicity for the Southern Conference. Wallace’s speech 
was a success. Aubrey Williams used the publicity generated by the HUAC report to solicit 
donations from Conference’s supporters and northern liberals. Donations, however, were not 
forthcoming. The exchange between Bilbo and Dombrowski might amuse friends of the 
Conference and liberal northern donors. The HUAC report might be looked down as nothing 
more than a pathetic diatribe.  But the attacks took a toll. Conservatives successfully branded the 
SCHW as a Communist rabble-rouser in the mind of the southern public. In spite of being 
ludicrous slander, the HUAC report would frequently be cited by SCHW’s critics and enemies as 
definitive proof of the Southern Conference’s red guilt. But it was not HUAC that ultimately 
doomed the liberal organization. It was the retreat of organized labor in the face of conservative 
onslaught that undercut the Conference at its foundation. Organized unions, flushed by successes 
during the war, suffered losses as postwar politics indiscriminately mixed labor unions and 
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communism together. As organized unions sought to reorganize themselves, their association 
with the controversial Southern Conference became a liability they did not want to have. 260 
Unions and their members had come out of the war in the best position they had ever 
been in. During the war, the unions experienced an exceptionally pro-labor War Labor Board 
who consistently ruled in their favor against management. Thanks to the favorable rulings, labor 
spent most of its war years consolidating its power and membership rather than exerting its 
energy on costly and disruptive strikes. Industrial workers saw their average weekly wages 
increased by 65 percent from December 1941 to April 1945, while the cost of living had risen by 
only 30 percent. The CIO’s dues-paying members increased from 1,838,000 in 1939 to 
3,937,000 in 1945. In the South, the CIO had expanded its membership base from 150,000 at the 
eve of World War II to 225,000 at the end of the conflict. More importantly, organized labor 
gained legitimacy within the American society. Flushed with confidence, the CIO sought to 
expand its influence by forming the CIO Political Action Committee (CIO-PAC) to campaign 
against conservative politicians. The CIO-PAC would combine sophisticated organizing 
techniques and grassroots mobilization to challenge the voting pattern of the South. Conservative 
southern politicians detested and feared the efforts of the CIO-PAC.261 “[The CIO-PAC] will 
seek to purge us and every other self respecting and honest man who runs for office,” North 
Carolina Senator Josiah Bailey fumed.262  
But for all their gains, labor unions’ position in the postwar South was becoming 
increasingly precarious as the conservatives’ iron grip on southern politics strengthened. With 
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F.D.R. gone and the New Deal coalition lacking a strong leader, labor unions were hard pressed 
to defend their hard-won gains. After the defeat of Japan in the summer of 1945, the CIO 
experienced a string of defeats in its attempts to maintain price controls and purchasing power. 
The wave of strikes during the winter of 1945-1946 by the CIO unions was defensively designed 
to preserve the buying power of their wages rather than to increase their earning. The most 
devastating blow came in the summer of 1947 when Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act over 
the veto of President Truman. The Act required officers of labor unions to sign affidavits 
affirming that they were not members of the Communist Party or were not affiliated with any 
organization that believed in or advocated the violent or illegal overthrow of the government of 
the United States. Those who refused to sign would not be certified as bargaining agents with the 
National Labor Relations Board and they could not file unfair labor practices complaints against 
employers before the NLRB. The CIO, with its leftist unions and radical members, became 
endangered in the anti-Communist climate of postwar America.263 
As the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union cooled, the national 
press began to closely scrutinize the CIO’s political affiliation. Even among northern liberals, 
communism in labor was becoming unacceptable. The historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in a 
1946 Life magazine article, identified the CIO and its leadership as being deeply infiltrated by 
Communists. Schlesinger charged Lee Pressman, the general counsel of the CIO and a close 
advisor to the Philip Murray, with being a fellow-traveler and twelve of the fourteen Washington 
legislative representatives as being Communists.264 The American Federation of Labor, a rival of 
the CIO since its conception, warned southern industrialists that they could either “grow and 
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cooperate with us or fight for your life against communist forces [of the CIO].”265 Under a 
barrage of charges of communism from the left and the right, the CIO was forced to come up 
with a bold plan to rejuvenate its unions.  
In 1938, one labor leader told the southern journalist Jonathan Daniels, “The real threat to 
the American standard of living does not come from the coolie and the Jap but from the poor 
white South. They are terribly poor and terribly productive.”266 A low-wage and unorganized 
South had always been seen as the biggest threat to organized labor in the North. But after World 
War II, the South was different from the heavily agricultural region that labor had tried to tame 
during the early twentieth century. By 1945 the North had lost a quarter of a million textile 
workers while the South simultaneously gained 100,000 textile workers. But the southern textile 
industry was only 20 percent organized. As industry continued to migrate to the region for its 
cheap, plentiful, and un-unionized labor force, the South became the CIO’s most sought after 
prize. In 1946, the CIO launched its biggest unionization campaign in the South called Operation 
Dixie. Operation Dixie was an ambitious investment on the future of the CIO. The union 
federation budgeted $1,000,000 with the objective of recruiting 1,000,000 new members to the 
CIO unions. But to succeed Operation Dixie had to alter the damaging perception of the CIO as a 
Communist-infiltrated organization.267 
Unlike previous drives, Operation Dixie was a stark departure from the confrontational 
and often violent strikes in the South. Despite its military-style name, the operation would be the 
least militant of any CIO drive. Operation Dixie was both a campaign to unionize the South and 
to improve the public image of the CIO in the region. Leading the Southern Organizing 
Committee (SOC), which was charged with running Operation Dixie, was Van Bittner, a veteran 
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of the United Mine Workers. Bittner made it a top priority to present the CIO as a respectable, 
100 percent American, and uncontroversial organization. Instead of amassing those who were 
ready to match muscle with the company goons, the CIO brought with it a “visiting trade 
delegation” of economists, business analysts, and technical experts. To make themselves even 
more presentable, 95 percent of the organizers were war veterans and 85 percent were native 
southerners. “When trouble [from management and reactionaries] comes, and it will come,” 
Bittner told a reporter, “It seems to us that it will be pretty hard to convince people that men who 
risked their lives to save the country now want to destroy it.”268 In order to preserve the 
respectability of Operation Dixie among average white southerners, Bittner distanced the drive 
from all political activity and controversial racial issues. Avoiding the race issue was especially 
important for Operation Dixie. The postwar racial violence had shown the CIO how low 
southerners’ toleration was to any challenge to their racial traditions. Furthermore, as racial 
liberalism was increasingly associated with communism in the South, the CIO felt it had to avoid 
race if it wanted to avoid the Communist charge. Although never barring blacks from 
participating or joining the unions, Bittner left it up to the local branches to decide how they 
would handle the sensitive situation of race. Although black workers would be included in the 
drive, they were rarely mentioned in the promotional literature and did not figure prominently 
into the planning of the SOC. As far as the CIO and Bittner were concerned, “there was no 
Negro problem in the South.”269  
Intensifying his effort to make unions more presentable to the South, Bittner expelled all 
leftist and radical elements from Operation Dixie. Bittner’s action was one of the prime 
examples of the growing conservatism within the labor unions. Under the hostile climate of the 
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Cold War, moderate unions within the CIO grew more influential and became outspoken in their 
demand to exclude left-leaning unions and radical leaders from their fold. Philip Murray and 
Sidney Hillman, the liberal leadership of the CIO, initially rejected the institution of any 
exclusionary policy to root out communism. They eventually relented, however, as the reality of 
the Cold War dawned on them. In 1948, Murray capitulated to conservative pressure and 
condemned left wingers in the unions. Ignoring past contributions of leftists unions and liberal 
organizations like the Southern Conference, Bittner feared that these corrupting agents would 
taint the CIO’s “Holy Crusade.”270 The Southern Conference’s controversial history with 
communism made it one of the prime targets for exclusion. “No crowd, whether Communists, 
Socialists or anybody else, is going to mix up this organizing drive,” Bittner publicly declared in 
the spring of 1946, “That goes for the Southern Conference for Human Welfare and any other 
organization living off the CIO.”271 Bittner’s announcement took the Conference by a complete 
surprise. Foreman bitterly resented Bittner’s remark and questioned Bittner’s ability to head 
Operation Dixie. Bittner later apologized for his remark, but the damage was done. And with 
Bittner’s divisive statement, the fruitful and close relationship between the CIO and the Southern 
Conference was broken.272 
The Southern Conference, which had thought that it would be a conduit for the CIO in 
Operation Dixie, was left out of the operation entirely. Aside from being suspect of Communist-
taint, the SCHW was also a huge drain on the CIO’s financial resources. Supporting the SCHW 
was a luxury that the CIO could not afford. The one million dollars planned by the CIO for 
Operation Dixie looked impressive on newspaper headlines, but considering the vast 
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geographical layout of the South and the scale of its operation, the CIO needed every dollar. 
With the crushing defeat of liberal Democrats and the resurgence of the Republicans during the 
1946 midterm election, the conservative southern Democrats came out strongest and most 
unified. Operation Dixie could not afford to antagonize them while operating in their backyard 
by using the Southern Conference in its work. By the end of 1946, the Southern Conference was 
taken off the CIO’s approved list of organizations for association, thus permanently ending their 
partnership.273 
The Southern Conference, which had sustained itself through most of its existence with 
the aid of labor unions, found itself in the direst crisis it had ever faced. The financial impact of 
the loss of union support was immediate and hard. The second half of 1946 saw a 50 percent 
decline in union contributions. By the end of 1946, donations from the unions had dropped by 
$10,000. After 1946, the donation from the CIO ceased altogether. The loss of support from the 
CIO created a domino effect as other unions began to abandon the Southern Conference. The 
United Steelworkers, which gave $4,000 in 1945 and 1946, gave nothing afterward. 
Contributions from the United Automobile Workers declined from $5000 in 1945 and $10,000 in 
1946, to nothing in 1947. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers gave $4000 in 1945 and in 1946, 
but only $1,000 in 1947, and then nothing after. So it went, union after union, donations dried up 
and pledges went unfulfilled. The Conference ended the first quarter of 1947 nearly forty 
thousand dollars in the red despite vigorous efforts at fundraising in New York, Washington, 
Hollywood, and Boston. The Southern Conference did not have a substantial financial base in the 
South from which to draw support in order to cope with the dramatic drop in contributions. Only 
106 membership dues were received from the southern states while 204 were collected from 
those outside. Dombrowski and Foreman worked furiously in 1947 to raise the badly needed 
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funds. Unfortunately, despite pledging to raise $16,650 by July 1, 1947 or have Dombrowski 
stepped down as administrator of the Southern Conference and Foreman work without pay, they 
could only manage to raise $10,744.64 by the time of the deadline\.274 
The CIO’s retreat from liberalism extended to the National Committee to Abolish the 
Poll Tax. The NCAPT, although comprised of sixty-five organization, was heavily depended on 
the unions, especially the CIO, for funding. The hostile relationship between the AFL and CIO, 
worsened by their competing drives to unionize the South, spread to the Anti-Poll Tax 
Committee. The AFL left the NCAPT and refused to contribute men and money as long as the 
CIO remained in it. The NACPT’s open door policy regarding Communist membership made the 
CIO unsure of its association with the Committee. When the CIO began to split into different 
factions, the NCAPT was caught in the middle of a labor civil war. John Lewis pulled out his 
miners when the Anti-Poll Tax Committee refused to take his side in Lewis’s feud with Philip 
Murray. The Murray faction, in its turn, demanded that the NCAPT expel all leftwing or radical 
unions from its coalition and implement an anti-Communist provision. Durr, however, refused to 
comply with their request and the NCAPT stood by its open door principles. Philip Murray 
immediately ended the CIO participation and ceased its financial contribution. Despite the wide 
range of support and the hard work of its devoted members, the NCAPT’s was financially 
crippled by the splintering of the CIO. A ray of hope glimmered when Durr was contacted by the 
Anti-Defamation League and representatives from other Jewish organizations who were 
interested in supporting the NCAPT’s fight against the poll tax. Unfortunately, like the CIO, they 
demanded the Anti-Poll Tax Committee to purge all members whose names showed up on the 
Attorney General’s list of suspected Communists. Durr angrily refused their offer and stormed 
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out of the meeting.275  “We stood by our principles, you see,” Durr recounted, “but the thing was 
that people didn't stand by us.” 276 The NCAPT was absorbed back into the Southern Conference 
and continued to struggle to survive until the summer of 1948 when the Southern Conference’s 
financial difficulty forced it to end the work of the NCAPT.  
As the Conference frantically trying to salvage itself, an unexpected dispute between 
Clark Foreman and James Dombrowski over Dombrowski’s position as executive secretary 
sapped the Conference of its remaining strength. A day after the New Orleans conference, the 
executive committee held a meeting to discuss the challenges facing the Conference in the 
upcoming year. Despite the high spirits of the event, attendance at the New Orleans conference 
was noticeably down compared to previous conferences. Fewer labor delegates made their way 
to New Orleans, and most of those who did belonged to radical unions. There were no significant 
representatives from the national administration. Mrs. Roosevelt and Frank Graham, regular 
fixtures of the conferences, were no longer present. Only black members remained unwavering 
in their commitment to the Southern Conference. During the board meeting, Dombrowski was 
asked to leave the room while his reappointment as the executive secretary of the SCHW was 
discussed. After Dombrowski left the room, Foreman pushed for the removal of Dombrowski as 
the dual executive secretary of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare and the Southern 
Conference Education Fund (SCEF), an offspring of the SCHW focusing on the improvement of 
education standards in the South, and had him appointed as administrator of the SCEF instead. 
Branson Price, an experienced fundraiser and the secretary of the New York Committee, was 
chosen as the new executive secretary. Foreman’s public reason for removing Dombrowski from 
the SCHW was that no man could possibly manage two organizations and do an effective job, 
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ignoring the obvious contradiction that Foreman himself was holding the dual presidency of the 
two organizations. Privately, however, Foreman wanted to focus the Southern Conference’s 
attention on political actions and Dombrowski did not fit into his plan. While he was a skilled 
administrator, Dombrowski was not an experienced political organizer. Foreman thought he was 
better suited at the Education Fund where the pace was slower. When Dombrowski returned, he 
was notified that by a unanimous decision that he was moved to the Education Fund. 
Dombrowski took the news with a calm face, but he was inwardly devastated by the lack of faith 
from many of his long time friends on the board. Defying Foreman’s expectation, Dombrowski 
would plot his return to the executive secretary of the Southern Conference.277   
After taking five days off to plan his next move, Dombrowski wrote a letter to the board 
“accepting the action of Board,” but he questioned the legality of the board’s action since his 
reassignment was made without a quorum. Furthermore, the Education Fund, although an 
offspring of the Southern Conference, was a separate entity and the Southern Conference 
technically had no legal jurisdiction to shift personnel from one organization to another without 
convening the Education Fund board members. Dombrowski’s letter took everyone by surprise 
and sparked a furious exchange of letters. Many board members who were absent during the 
ousting of Dombrowski had thought he had left on his own free will. Many now demanded 
reconsideration. Lucy Mason, who had originally voted with Foreman, was assured by Foreman 
that it was Dombrowski’s idea to transfer. When she learned of Dombrowski’s opposition to the 
transfer, she wrote to every single board member reminding them of Dombrowski’s selfless 
dedication to the Conference and his skillful administration of the Conference through some of 
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its most difficult times. Mason successfully applied sufficient pressure to force a reluctant 
Foreman to grant a second hearing for Dombrowski.278 
The Conference was embroiled in a heated and divisive debate over Dombrowski. Board 
members who either thought Dombrowski was wronged by Foreman or disliked Foreman’s 
brazen attempt to consolidate power sided with Dombrowski. Those who felt that the Southern 
Conference needed strong and centralized leadership to weather the crisis sided with Foreman. 
Aubrey Williams, sensing a serious rift in the Conference, advised Dombrowski to accept his 
new assignment for the sake of harmony in the Conference. But Dombrowski responded coolly 
that if he did so, Foreman would acquire almost dictatorial power over the Conference. He 
further warned that if he were removed from his current post, he would resign from the Southern 
Conference. The subsequent meeting on January 5 was the most contentious and divisive the 
Southern Conference had ever experienced. Foreman made his case against Dombrowski by 
contending that the responsibility of being the administrator for two organizations was too much 
to ask of Dombrowski and he should be allowed to focus on his educational work. Dombrowski 
shot back that the reason for the creation of the SCEF was so that the Southern Conference could 
do its political work and still receive tax-deductible funding. The separation of the Southern 
Conference and the Education Fund was only a legal division; their work very much remained 
the same as before. The meeting lasted for almost eight hours. The niceties at the beginning of 
the meeting disappeared as the participants grew more partisan and less polite with each passing 
hour. Foreman abandoned the early pretense of alleviating Dombrowski’s workload and charged 
Dombrowski with being overpaid and for making clerical errors; Lucy Mason snapped back, 
reminding Dombrowski had gone two months without salary and was still owed $1,500 in back 
pay. As the meeting descended into incivility, Aubrey Williams proposed a return to the status 
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quo with Dombrowski as administrator and Foreman as president of both the SCEF and the 
SCHW. A tired and frustrated board unanimously approved of Williams’ proposal, thus ending, 
on the surface, the Dombrowski-Foreman conflict.279 
The clash between Foreman and Dombrowski was intensified by their diametrically 
opposed personalities and ambitions. James Dombrowski was a deeply religious man who was 
devoted to the ideal of Christian Socialism. “[Dombrowski’s] honesty and integrity is so Simon 
pure that it gets to be a bore at times,” Aubrey Williams once commented.280 Meticulous almost 
to a fault, he kept track of every cent spent and scrutinized every decision made by the 
Conference. Expenses had to justified, kept track of, and then checked and rechecked to ensure 
that no precious resources were wasted. Dombrowski had no sense of spontaneity. All important 
undertakings had to be carefully thought out to a fine degree before they got enacted. To 
Dombrowski, everything had to have its order and had to go through its proper channels. 
Dombrowski had no political ambition whatsoever. He was perfectly content with his work. 
While Foreman, as president of the Southern Conference, made a modest annual salary of 
$8,000, Dombrowski’s annual salary was a paltry $2,500. But Dombrowski never brought up the 
gross discrepancy between their salaries. He had no desire to compete with Foreman.281  
Clark Foreman’s impetuous personality and explosive temper were in sharp contrast to 
Dombrowski’s cool and cautious demeanor. Foreman was an agnostic who did not share 
Dombrowski’s deep faith in Christianity. His bible was the “Bill of Rights.” Foreman’s 
willingness to act regardless of the consequences or what others might think was his greatest 
virtue when confronting with injustices, but it was his greatest flaw when dealing with people 
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who did not agree with him. On one occasion, Guy Johnson of the Southern Regional Council 
remembered Foreman violently stormed into his office demanding he retract the name of the 
Regional Council’s new publication, the New South, because Foreman had wanted that name for 
the Southern Conference’s upcoming newsletter, which would later become the Southern 
Patriot. Johnson refused to comply and Foreman almost came to blows with the sociologist. The 
brash and hotheaded Foreman had little patience with Dombrowski’s circumspect behavior. 
Whenever he had a bright idea, Foreman would immediately spring into action and demand 
Dombrowski give him his full support and resources. Dombrowski, however, would not budge 
until Foreman supplied him with the detailed information he needed to evaluate Foreman’s idea. 
Foreman’s dictatorial decision making style constantly clashed with Dombrowski cautious 
administration. To bypass Dombrowski, Foreman often made important executive decisions 
without consulting any of the board members. Few would know of his plans until the executive 
committee had to meet, by which time it was difficult to go against whatever Foreman was 
planning. Virginia Durr was amazed at how resourceful Foreman was at getting the money he 
needed for his plans. Foreman’s need for control did not end with the central office, but extended 
to the state committees. He regularly clashed with Margaret Fisher, the head of the Georgia 
Committee, who was equally headstrong, over the control of Fisher’s committee. Foreman 
wanted to centralize the control of all the state committees in his hands in order to coordinate 
their activities and increase their effectiveness. Dombrowski’s biographer, Frank Adams, 
claimed that Foreman had bigger ambitions for the Southern Conference than just fighting 
against segregation and playing second fiddle to the labor unions. Because Foreman did not have 
the political connections with the Truman administration he once did with Roosevelt, he wanted 
to use the Southern Conference, especially the state committees, as a vehicle to the gain political 
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power to reshape the South. Dombrowski was simply too slow and cautious for the ambitious 
Foreman. Foreman admitted that he was ruthless and aggressive, but it was to keep the 
Conference alive during its tenuous existence.282 “You can't be too namby-pamby and keep a big 
organization together,” said Foreman. Foreman’s attempted coup against Dombrowski was 
nothing personal; it was simply a politically expedient move to make.283 
 The Dombrowski-Foreman feud eroded much of the trust and friendship between 
different board members. The strained relationships of the staff prevented them from working 
together effectively to rescue the drowning Conference. The leadership of the SCHW was an 
especially close knit social circle. Many of them had worked closely together in the New Deal, 
on the poll tax, and labor. They were ideological kin—men and women whose progressive 
outlook on race and social issues and whose unwavering tolerance of differences separated them 
from their fellow southerners.  The Dombrowski-Foreman feud severely weakened the bond 
shared by the Conference’s leadership at a time when unity was most crucial.  
The financial crisis stymied the Conference’s ability to operate. The Southern Patriot 
temporarily ceased operation in May 1947 because the Conference had run out of money for 
publication. Despite drastic cuts to staff salary by almost 50 percent, some even volunteering to 
forgo their pays, the state committees could not halt their decline. They could neither pay the 
meager wages of their staff nor afford to give volunteers the travel expenses needed to get them 
to their field work. One state committee after another ceased its operation. By September 1947, 
only the committees in Washington and North Carolina remained in effective operation. The 
HUAC report, in spite of its numerous outlandish and unsubstantiated claims, scared donors 
away and renewed the attack from reactionaries. The New Orleans’s Young Men’s Business 
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Club, along with the Knight of Columbus, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and the American 
Legion, resolved to drive the Conference from its New Orleans headquarter through constant 
harassment. Because of the relentless vilification from newspapers and the volume of hate 
letters, many volunteers quit showing up at the Conference’s office.284 The situation was so dire 
that Foreman and Dombrowski temporarily buried their mutual animosity to work together to 
rescue the Conference from a complete collapse. But it was to no avail. When the two failed to 
meet their fundraising goal by July 1947, the demoralized pair lost all hope of salvaging the 
Southern Conference. Their contentious battle had drained both men of any desire to work 
together or to continue trying to save the Conference. The final schism came with the Henry 
Wallace 1948 Presidential Campaign with the Progressive Party. The Conference split between 
the Foreman faction, which wanted to put whatever was left of the Southern Conference behind 
the election of Henry Wallace, and the Dombrowski faction, which sought to concentrate the last 
remnant of the Conference on building up the Southern Conference Education Fund. 
 On December 29, 1947, former Vice President and Secretary of Commerce Henry 
Wallace called for a “Gideon’s Army…small in number, but powerful in conviction, and ready 
for action” to join him in ushering in a “century of the common man” where peace and 
prosperity would reign over war and wants.285 Over 1,000 members of the Southern Conference 
heeded Wallace’s trumpet and joined his quixotic quest for the presidency. Before Wallace 
declared his candidacy, Foreman had already enthusiastically endorsed Wallace. To get Wallace 
warmed up for the southern leg of the campaign, Foreman set up in the summer of 1947 a 
SCHW sponsored speaking tour through eight cities in four southern states. Dombrowski and 
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Foreman worked together again to ensure a successful tour for Wallace and for the Conference 
financially. Despite the release of the HUAC report at the beginning of the tour, they managed to 
raise $10,000 in pledges and donations. Although the money was not enough to save the dying 
Southern Conference, it gave Foreman hope that there might be a hidden and deep well of 
support for Wallace in the South. Furthermore, Wallace’s racially liberal position and genuine 
desire to reshape the South politically matched the Southern Conference own outlook and 
ambition.286  
Many advanced liberals like Clark Foreman saw Henry Wallace as the natural heir and 
designated successor to Roosevelt. Wallace would have been president in 1945 if the 
conservative Democrats had not forced Harry Truman on F.D.R.. Wallace represented the 
reform-minded idealist that advanced liberals, who were equally idealistic, wanted in their 
president. Wallace was staunchly against segregation and wanted to continue and expand the 
programs of the New Deal. Many advanced liberals were frustrated by Truman’s constant delay 
of his promised reforms. Many did not believe he was genuine in his appeal to liberals. In 
contrast to Truman, “Henry Wallace had supported us all along.”287 For the advanced liberals of 
the Southern Conference, Wallace represented a promise of renewal. “We are not coming south 
just to add a few dollars to the SCHW treasury,” Lewis Frank, Wallace’s manager, said to 
Foreman during the Wallace speaking tour “We want to help you build… and we want [the 
people attending our gatherings] to have relationship to political organization and to reflect the 
ferment in the South.”288 Wallace thus reflected the desire for action and political mobilization 
that many within the Southern Conference found so attractive. Foreman was convinced that 
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Wallace was the last hope for liberalism in America and in the South, and the last chance for the 
Southern Conference to be relevant again.  Joining the Wallace campaign “was the only thing 
that we could do at that time logically,” Foreman concluded.289 Others in the Conference did not 
think so. 
 Foreman’s push for the SCHW to endorse the Wallace presidential campaign created 
further divisions within the Southern Conference that were beyond repair. A week after Wallace 
declared his campaign for the presidency Clark Foreman sent an ultimatum to the Southern 
Conference executive committee asking them to decide on whom it would endorse in the 1948 
presidential election. Foreman bluntly expressed his support for Wallace and his commitment to 
campaign for him. The executive committee debated the matter for a month, but no consensus 
was reached between the Wallace and Truman camps within the Conference. Finally, it decided 
on January 31 to let the state committees decide for themselves their political allegiance.290  
Foreman quickly resigned his presidency of the Southern Conference and the Education 
Fund to devote all his time to campaign for Wallace. His resignation was rejected, but he left for 
Wallace anyway to become the treasurer of the Progressive Party. Board members Palmer 
Weber, C.B. Baldwin, and Virginia Durr followed him. The Conference’s decision to let the state 
committees decide for themselves did not stem the loss of members. Mary Price, the head of the 
Committee for North Carolina, resigned her position to work for Wallace. The North Carolina 
Committee, had already been hit hard by financial difficulty, breathed its last gasp when Mary 
Price left it leaderless. In May 1948, the Committee for Virginia became the first and only state 
committee to endorse Henry Wallace. After the vote, all the anti-Wallace members in the 
committee board resigned from the organization. Those who stayed away from the Wallace 
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campaign included Lucy Mason, Aubrey Williams, Clifford Durr, and James Dombrowski. They 
saw Wallace’s campaign as the death knell for the legacy of the F.D.R. and the New Deal. Some 
estimates had Wallace drawing seven to ten millions votes. Wallace thought he would draw 
between three and five million votes. By taking votes from Truman, it was feared that Wallace 
would deliver the presidency to the Republicans and strengthen the conservative Democrats. 
Aubrey Williams and many New Dealers begged Wallace to reconsider his decision, and warned 
him that if he ran, they would oppose him tooth-and-nail. They were equally dismayed by the 
decision of their friends and colleagues in the Southern Conference to embark on a foolish quest 
at the cost of everything that they had worked so hard for. Many anti-Wallace members left the 
Southern Conference altogether because of Foreman’s fervent support of Wallace.291 
 Henry Wallace’s presidential campaign had a remarkably divisive effect on southern 
liberals. Even among Wallace’s close friends and advisors, his decision to run was extremely 
unpopular. Harold Young, a Texan who had devoted seven years to look after Wallace’s political 
interest, watched in disbelief as Wallace walked down a path that might destroy the F.D.R.’s 
New Deal. “Mr. Henry Wallace is one of the country’s few great men,” Young said reverently, 
“[but] the Progressive Party venture was a terrible mistake.” Young would cast a ballot for 
Truman in the fall of 1948.292 Virginia Durr’s bluest-of-the-blue blooded family was in disbelief 
when she decided to support Wallace and to run for the Senate in Virginia on the Progressive 
Party ticket. Durr’s brother in law, Justice Hugo Black, called her an “absolute idiot” for 
abandoning the Democratic Party for Wallace’s hopeless campaign. Durr did not think Wallace 
had a realistic shot of winning the election, but she believed in what he stood for and admired his 
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courage for campaigning in integrated meeting in the most hostile places in the South. Her 
decision was one of principle over convenience. Aubrey Williams experienced a similar division 
in his own family and business. His oldest son, Aubrey Williams, Jr., and his co-editor of the 
Southern Farmer, Gould Beech, both came out in support of the Wallace campaign. Beech’s 
harsh criticism of President Truman for not delivering on his civil rights promises and Beech’s 
support for Wallace made an already tense working environment, stemming from previous 
disagreements, even more difficult. Williams eventually forced Beech from the paper.293 
 Wallace’s quest for the presidency was one of the most trying presidential campaigns in 
modern history. It faced constant attacks from both sides of the political spectrum. Although his 
campaign was red-baited by both liberals and conservatives alike, the red-baiting done by 
liberals was more intense, more desperate. They were determined to sink Wallace to save 
Truman. Liberal newspapers and columnists mounted an unorganized campaign to associate the 
Wallace campaign with everything red. “The Communist Party—let’s tell the truth—initiated the 
movement for Wallace,” railed Dorothy Thompson, a prominent newspaper columnist, “No other 
group called for it.”294 Alfred Friendly of the Washington Post headlined his article with “Reds 
Picked Wallace To Run, May Quit Him.” In it he drew a connection from the Communist 
opposition to the Marshall Plan to the Communist creation of a third party with Wallace at its 
helm.295  Wallace tried desperately to separate himself from the Communist Party to little avail. 
He called on the presidential candidates to pledge not to work with anyone who advocated the 
violent overthrow of the United States government (i.e. Communists) or who supported the 
suppression of another human being. Little attention was paid to Wallace’s pledge by the two 
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mainstream candidates. It was seen by the press as nothing more than a cheap ploy.296 But the 
abuse from the liberal press paled in comparison to the harassment and attacks on Wallace and 
his supporters throughout the country. At a campaign rally in Evansville, Indiana, a mob of 2,500 
surrounded the speaking venue and protested Wallace’s presence. Some of the crowd stormed 
through the speaking event and slugged several Southern Conference members and Wallace’s 
aides before the police clubbed their way through the mob and cleared the area. Things were 
worst in the South. At a rally in Norfolk, Virginia, the police, instead of controlling the crowd, 
were threatening to break up the integrated meeting with violence if the participants did not 
segregate immediately. In Alabama, a Wallace campaign worker was arrested and sentenced for 
six months for distributing pro-Wallace “Communist literature.” Another encounter turned 
deadly when a twenty-eight-year-old Wallace supporter was murdered by a drunken union 
member. During the trial, instead of prosecuting the murderer, the deceased victim was charged 
by the defense of being guilty of causing his own death by supporting Wallace. The perpetrator 
received a light three-year sentence for his crime.297 When Wallace embarked on his southern 
campaign, he was heckled and egged by angry southerners who resented him for holding 
integrated rallies. In one occasion, Wallace snapped after a young child threw an egg at him. He 
grasped a bystander and shouted, “Are you an American? Am I in America?” The man shoved 
Wallace away.298 
Wallace’s claim that he was the only tried-and-true liberal in the race was compromised 
by Truman’s unexpected and aggressive push for civil rights. Truman had remained relatively 
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quiet on the issue of civil rights through the early campaign as he was trying to hold to the 
Democratic coalition that was incredibly divided between urban liberals and African Americans 
of the North and the conservative Democrats of the South. In mid-August 1948, the White House 
Counsel Clark Clifford presented to Truman a memo calling on the President to stake out an 
aggressive liberal position on key domestic social and economic issues and ignore the criticism 
of his foreign policy. The goal was to win a large plurality of African Americans in the North to 
offset inevitable loss in the South. Truman followed Clifford’s advice by delivering a major 
address in Harlem emphasizing his civil rights record and praising his Civil Rights Committee’s 
report. In Congress Truman pushed for a forty-dollar tax cut for every taxpayer, an increase in 
corporate taxes, a higher minimum wage, the implementation of the many recommendations 
made by his Civil Rights Committee, national health insurance, and price and rent controls. It did 
not matter if the proposed bills had a shot of passage or not, it was more important for the record. 
The strategy was a success. Truman’s plurality of black votes in California, Illinois, and Ohio 
proved decisive in his triumph over Thomas Dewey Henry Wallace, and Strom Thurmond who 
ran as a Dixiecrat. The loss of the black votes especially was crushing for Durr and Foreman. 
Both of them had worked hard at the risk of physical danger to stage integrated campaign rallies 
throughout the South in order to raise black support for Wallace. But Wallace did not just lose 
the black vote. As much as one third of the people who said they would support Wallace in 
October shifted their allegiance back to Truman by November. In the end, Truman’s civil rights 
overture and electability won out over Wallace’s idealism.299 The defeat of Wallace was a 
serious blow to the advanced liberals who supported him. They saw in him a hope for a 
reenergized advanced southern liberalism. Like them, Wallace spoke through his actions and his 
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courage. He stood for the New Deal at a time when the idea of New Deal seemed to have passed 
away with F.D.R.. His position against segregation inspired advanced liberals to rally around 
him. His defeat showed advanced liberals how far away their dreams were. 
  “The Southern Conference went down in '48 on the shoals of Wallace,” Foreman 
reminisced, “It went all out in the Wallace campaign and when that was such a fiasco there was 
nothing for us to do but to fold up.”300 When Foreman left the Southern Conference, it was 
fourteen thousand dollars in debt. Income from the past six months totaled $8,588, with only 
$771 coming from membership dues. Many of its board members and state committee leaders 
had left for the Wallace campaign thus depleting it of vital leadership. The Southern Conference 
for Human Welfare existed as nothing more than a corporate ghost through most of 1948.301 The 
funeral finally came on November 21, 1948, exactly ten years after its conception. At the 
Richmond meeting a final resolution stated that the Wallace campaign had “largely absorbed the 
political energies of the members of the SCHW and make its continuation unnecessary and a 
duplication of effort.” 302 The Southern Conference’s legacy would persist in the form the 
Southern Conference Education Fund.  
 The Education Fund was established on January 26, 1946 in Durham, North Carolina as a 
way to expand the SCHW’s educational work with tax exempt status after the Southern 
Conference’s increased political activities caused the IRS to revoke its tax exemption. Clark 
Foreman would be the president of both organizations, Dombrowski would be their 
administrator, and they would have the same board. There were few distinctions in leadership 
and structure between the SCHW and the SCEF. Although originally created to exploit the tax-
exemption loophole, the Education Fund’s significance grew in 1947 when SCHW was in danger 
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of collapsing. After resigning from the Conference, James Dombrowski became a full time 
administrator of the Education Fund and Aubrey Williams became the president. As a condition 
of his resignation, Dombrowski got to transfer the Southern Patriot from the SCHW to the 
Education Fund. Dombrowski worked hard to disassociate the Education Fund from the dying 
Southern Conference. He did not want the sickness that killed the Conference to spread to the 
Education Fund. Lucy Mason provided the blue print to rebuild a new and leaner southern liberal 
organization. Mason, disillusioned with the Southern Conference’s aggressive and costly 
political model, proposed a more South-focused and decentralized organization that would work 
on a few specific issues in the region, but would handle those issues well. Mason contended that 
the Southern Conference’s ambition was generating too much expectation from its members and 
donors. Failure to live up to those grandiose expectations hurt the organization’s standing among 
members and donors. The new organization should not plan outrageous budget and fundraising 
drives, but should live within the means provided by its supporters within the South.303 The new 
Southern Conference should be “a small, militant, standard-bearing organization in the South,” 
Mason proclaimed.304 Dombrowski had had enough of the fruitless political battles that divided 
more often than they united. The Education Fund would be a tamer and quieter version of the 
Southern Conference.  
 The Education Fund carried on the Southern Conference’s firm commitment to end white 
supremacy and segregation, but it had little appetite for political mobilization. Aubrey Williams 
steered the SCEF clear of any involvement with the Wallace campaign. This decision prevented 
the SCEF from imploding along with the Wallace’s coalition after the failed 1948 election. The 
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Education Fund, heeding Mason’s words, avoided making grandiose schemes and held no mass 
membership drive. Adopting the spirit of its administrator, James Dombrowski, the Education 
Fund was content with working hard on a limited number of concrete issues like desegregation, 
education, and health services. The Southern Patriot became the Education Fund’s primary tool 
to reach its audience and advocate for its policies. The SCEF managed to lure back some of the 
former disaffected members of the Southern Conference who left during the contentious times 
between 1947 and 1948. By the mid-fifties, the SCEF had established itself as one of the most 
outspoken proponents of desegregation in the South. The SCEF would go on to survive for three 
decades, lasting well into the mid-seventies.305 But, as one historian of the South wrote, the 
SCEF was “a small and harmless anti-segregation agency.”306 Although it did not make a big 
splash like the Southern Conference, the Education Fund continued to work tirelessly for social 
justice and racial equality in the South. Throughout the decades of the Civil Rights Movement, 
the SCEF played an active part in the movement. It would hold workshops for activists, set up 
legal aid fund and bail, arranging for economic relief funds from north black communities to 
help poor southern blacks who were resisting the power of white planters. Its impact, however, 
was small when compared to the monumental achievements of organizations like the NAACP 
and the SCLC. Furthermore, the ghost of communism that lingered from the Southern 
Conference continued to haunt the Education Fund. Mainstream civil rights organizations, 
wanting to avoid controversy, preferred to steer away from the SCEF, thus limiting the 
Education Fund’s effectiveness.307  
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Many in the South continued to believe that the Education Fund was a Communist front. 
SCEF’s advanced racial position put the organization permanently at odds with the southern 
establishment. “Time will reveal the [Education Fund] to have Communists influential in its 
policies,” the Atlanta Constitution editorialized in 1950, “[its] real purpose, we believe is to stir 
up trouble, to agitate the race question and to ‘bait’ the South.”308 Senator James Eastland 
showed he had not forgotten about the Education Fund when he summoned Aubrey Williams, 
James Dombrowski, Myles Horton, Clifford and Virginia Durr to an inquiry before the Senate 
Internal Security subcommittee task force at New Orleans on March 18, 1954. When they arrived 
at New Orleans they were greeted by a “task force” of one, James Eastland. Eastland’s 
investigation into the SCEF echoed the HUAC report with his mind stretching connections of 
guilt-by-association. The guilt of those summoned was already presumed long before the first 
hearing began. Richard Arens, the counsel of the committee, had promised reporters he would 
deliver “four or five Fifth Amendment Communists” by the end of the hearings. Eastland’s 
attempt to red-bait the SCEF members in a series of hearings failed to produce any substantial 
evidence that linked the SCEF to the “Communist conspiracy.” Nevertheless, he reestablished 
the fictitious connection between the advanced liberalism of the SCEF and Communists in the 
minds of many southerners.309  
 The charge of communism, which had dominated the Southern Conference since its 
conception, was not what ultimately destroyed it. It was the Southern Conference’s strict 
adherence to its ideal of an open and free organization that welcomed those who wanted to help 
regardless of their beliefs that proved fatal. Its refusal to red-bait was seen by its critics as an 
admission of guilt rather than a courageous stand against fear and oppression. The end of the 
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Southern Conference for Human Welfare was the end of one of the few times in southern history 
where men and women of goodwill stood up against injustice not because they directly suffered 
it, not because it was in their economic interest to do so, but because it was the morally right 
thing to do. Unlike so many idealistic movements before and after, the Southern Conference did 
not compromise under pressure to conform. When liberals from all across the country retreated 
behind the safety of anti-Communist sentiment, the Conference refused to arbitrarily expel its 
members because of their creeds. But by refusing to compromise, the Southern Conference set 
itself on an all-or-nothing path. The condition of the time was not favorable to this 
uncompromising stance. By leaving itself no other choice, when the option of all died with 
Henry Wallace, the Southern Conference was left with almost nothing.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
“[The South] is a land with a unity despite its diversity, with a people having common 
joys and common sorrows, and, above all, as to the white folk a people with a common resolve 
indomitably maintained—that it shall be and remain a white man’s country,”310 wrote the 
southern historian Ulrich Philips in 1928, ten years before the founding of the Southern 
Conference for Human Welfare in Birmingham, Alabama. Through most of the region’s history, 
the notion that the South was and would always remain a white man’s country was universally 
held by almost every person. Millions of poor southerners were disenfranchised, countless men 
and women were lynched, and innumerable acts of discrimination, both petty and infamous, were 
committed in order to keep the region in the hands of whites. It is rare, then, to find a vigorous 
voice speaking out against the region’s numerous short comings at the cost of its own well being. 
White liberals of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare were born during a time 
when Jim Crow ruled the South with an iron grip. They had witnessed the worst of their beloved 
region: its abject generational poverty, its unrepentant violent nature, and its irrational refusal to 
change. What motivated each one of them to act was the belief that there was goodness in 
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southerners. Advanced southern liberals believed that the southerners did not freely choose to be 
poor and racist. It was those at top of southern society who were responsible for the South’s 
plight—the industrialists who wanted to keep the region’s wages unconscionably low and the 
never challenged incumbent politicians who nostalgically dreamed of a purer Antebellum South. 
Advanced liberals, unlike their cautious counterparts, sought outside forces that had the power to 
help it shake the South out of its self-destructive path. “The progressive forces of the South must 
have the support, financial and moral, of the progressive forces of the rest of the country,” Clark 
Foreman declared.311 Advanced liberals looked to the New Deal as the golden opportunity to 
remake the South 
The Southern Conference for Human Welfare was founded as an extension of F.D.R.’ 
New Deal. The Conference, unlike anything that preceded it, was unabashedly progressive. In a 
letter to Brook Hays four months before the Birmingham conference, H.C. Nixon emphasized 
that the conference was “frankly intended to foster a progressive movement in the South, with no 
reactionaries needing to apply. We are not going in for a balanced discussion program; [we] do 
not want to let in any Trojan horses to wreck the job.”312 The Conference hoped that through the 
power of the federal government, poverty could be combated, lynching could be abated, and 
disenfranchisement ceased. But the federal government had its limits. By the early 1940s, 
conservative Democrats allying with Republicans stopped the New Deal from going any farther. 
Legislation like the anti-poll-tax and the anti-lynching bills were delayed and killed by 
conservatives in Congress. The Conference, seeing that the South could not be cajoled from the 
outside alone, sought to create change from within.  
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“[Cautious] liberalism has aristocratic traditions,” Gunnar Myrdal observed, “As a 
movement it is as yet almost entirely within the upper classes. Its main weakness lies in its lack 
of mass support.”313 Many cautious liberals were a part of the southern ruling elite. They 
believed that they could resolve the South’s problem without having to consult the lower class. 
Advanced liberals, however, rejected this elitist notion and sought to empower all southerners. 
Under the leadership of James Dombrowski and Clark Foreman, the SCHW embarked on a 
campaign to register traditionally disenfranchised voters. The organization believed that once 
empowered, these voters would be in a position to demand economic fairness and civil rights. 
Although the SCHW campaign never got to a level that posed a serious threat to the southern 
political establishment, it was the first attempt made by a liberal, middle-class organization to 
challenge the status quo with more than just words and private indignation. Ultimately, Morton 
Sosna concluded, “though it tried, [SCHW] uncovered no massive Silent South to support its 
goals.”314 Although it failed to find a hidden progressive voice in the region, the SCHW’s 
political activity helped register tens of thousands of voters, aided in the repeal of Georgia’s poll 
tax, and combated anti-union and anti-voter legislation.  
One of the Southern Conference’s often overlooked accomplishments is its early stance 
against racial inequality and segregation in the South. The Conference did not come to its 
advanced racial position overnight. In its early years, the Conference tried to avoid exciting the 
South with its stances on race while it focused its energy on repealing the poll tax. After the 
Second World War, the Conference faced the decision of supporting either African Americans 
who were beginning to assert their rights or cautious liberals who urgings moderation and 
patience. The men and women of the Southern Conference emphatically chose the former.  
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There were four reasons for this leftward shift. First, many cautious liberal members like 
Mark Ethridge had left the Southern Conference by 1942 over issue of Communist membership. 
Their exit left behind a more ideologically committed liberal core in the Southern Conference. 
Second, the increase in African-American membership made the Conference more sensitive to 
plight of southern blacks. Third, the vocal and active involvement of advanced liberals like 
Lillian Smith who wanted to do away with Jim Crow pushed the issue to the forefront of the 
Conference’s agenda. And finally, James Dombrowski and Clark Foreman, both committed to 
ending segregation, became leaders of the Conference during the pivotal years of World War II 
when the Conference was mapping out its strategy for the postwar years. The Southern 
Conference is rarely remembered for its advanced opposition to segregation because it never 
took to the street to protest or encouraged civil disobedience against Jim Crow. Its legacy does 
not leave behind indelible images of children being hosed down by “Bull” Connor or the deadly 
attack during the Selma to Montgomery marches. Furthermore, the Southern Conference was in 
decline when it made its stand against segregation at the end of 1946. The Conference spent most 
of its time in 1947 trying to salvage itself from the fatal blow delivered by the labor unions. It 
was limited to making attacks against segregation in the Southern Patriot. When the 
infrastructure of the SCHW was transferred to the SCEF, the anti-Jim Crow spirit was 
transferred along with it, however, reforms instituted by Dombrowski to emphasize the Fund’s 
role as an educational organization diminished the Fund’s spirit of activism. The SCHW’s short 
legacy against Jim Crow may not have the dramatic and stirring moments of the Civil Rights 
Movement, but it was no less courageous for taking positions that were almost universally 
unpopular among white southerners. 
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What ultimately distinguished the SCHW and its members was that, unlike any other 
southern interracial organizations preceding it, the Southern Conference was “an organization for 
action.”315 In contrast to the cautious liberals who advocated slow and steady evolutionary 
changes, the advanced liberals of the Southern Conference sought to act on their beliefs and 
create changes in the present. Their movement against the poll tax, their long shot political 
campaign against conservative Democrats, and their unprecedented stand against segregation at a 
time when cautious liberals were abandoning the issue reflected the Southern Conference’s 
willingness to take action to bring reforms to the South. Individually, the advanced liberals of the 
SCHW tried to implement small changes in their own private lives. In 1948, appalled by living 
condition of blacks in Alabama and the relative inaction of the Federal Housing Authority to 
construct affordable housing for them, Aubrey Williams mortgaged his own house for five 
thousand dollars and borrowed another fifteen thousand dollars from friends to start the 
American Family Homes. With his own life investment and the saving of others, Williams 
proceeded to build fifty-nine housing units in Birmingham, Alabama and sold all but two of them 
at low cost to black families. Also in 1948, Clark Foreman, seeing that there was no theatre in 
Washington D.C. serving the black population, bought and desegregated the DuPont theatre 
where he was working as a manager during the Henry Wallace presidential campaign. The 
Southern Conference’s need to act was complimented by its unwavering commitment to not 
compromise on its beliefs.316  
The immediate cause of the Southern Conference’s demise in 1948 was its loss of 
funding from labor unions, which were afraid of Communist-taint. The indirect cause was the 
Conference’s refusal to exclude members based on their personal beliefs. The Conference never 
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supported a Communist agenda, but its idealism prevented it from barring Communists for no 
other reason than them being a Communist. It did not want to be guilty of the same intolerance 
and discrimination that its opponents were committing. The Conference strived to live up to 
Frank Porter Graham’s belief that Communists must be faced in the open and defeated with the 
force of reason and integrity rather than  expelled behind veils of gossip and accusations. The 
Conference and its members paid a high price for their idealism.  
The end of the Southern Conference did not end the harassment of its former members. 
James Dombrowski, Aubrey Williams, Clifford and Virginia Durr were put through a sham 
hearing at New Orleans in 1954 conducted by James Eastland. Clifford Durr experienced a 
minor heart attack while defending his and his wife’s honors against the fallacious accusation 
made by professional-informers. After the Eastland hearing, some prominent members like 
Doctor Benjamin Mays of Morehouse College resigned their memberships from the SCEF. It 
was now too controversial to be associated with the Fund. The eminent Frank Graham was not 
spared by race-baiting conservatives when he defended his Senate seat in 1950. His challenger, 
Willis Smith, ran ad after ad attacking Graham’s suspicious association with dubious 
organizations like the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, which Smith trumpeted as a 
Communist-led organization. Graham was eventually defeated by a campaign of vicious race-
baiting and red-baiting attacks from Smith and a young Jesse Helms, serving as Smith’s 
campaign strategist. Aubrey Williams lost both of his newsletters, the Southern Farmer and the 
Southern Farm and Home Almanac, and his printing business because of his staunch position 
against segregation. The Farmer folded in 1948 because William’s opposition to segregation 
alienated most of his readers. The demise of the Home Almanac and the printing business were 
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due to the severe decline in business after the Eastland hearing.317 The venerable advanced 
liberal Will Alexander who came out against segregation in 1944 in his Harper’s article, “Our 
Conflicting Racial Policy,” did not escape attack from reactionaries in his retirement. Alexander 
was forced to resign his trusteeship of the University of North Carolina after harassments by a 
fellow trustee. University officials and faculty members, who had once enjoyed visiting his 
nearby New Hope farm, ceased to pay public homage to the legendary southern liberal. His 
biographers concluded that despite his rigorous and busy schedule, “there remained a certain 
loneliness in his last years.”318 Although most advanced liberals in the Southern Conference, 
with the exception of Joseph Gelders, never got beaten or murdered while fighting for their 
beliefs like some of the civil rights activists that followed them, they paid a high personal price 
for their idealism. But in the face of fierce opposition, they had a defiant courage that would not 
let them give up on their beliefs. While her husband was waiting to be transported to the hospital 
after his heart attack at the Eastland hearing, Virginia Durr told the doctor to wait for her while 
she confronted Eastland, “I just want them to see me walking in there with my own two feet to 
let them know that they haven’t gotten me down.”319 
Advanced southern liberals were exceptional within southern liberalism. They defied 
traditional southern liberalism by embracing interracial cooperation and worked with black 
members on an equal basis. Instead of just debating issues and waiting for gradual changes, they 
organized campaigns to empower southerners of both races. They rejected the notion that the 
South was a white man’s country and advocated a racially united society. Where cautious 
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liberals believed it was the poor, illiterate white southerners who were the cause of the region 
violence and racism, advanced liberals saw the common people as victims of oppression from 
above. When their beliefs were challenged, they did not surrender them for expediency; they 
stayed true even when it cost them dearly. Advanced liberals were also quintessential 
southerners. They continued to love the South and dwell in it even as it rejected them. Ralph 
McGill described cautious liberals’ hate-love relationship with the South as that of loving parents 
of a crippled child who mourned their child’s deformity, but loved her more fiercely and 
defensively because of it. Advanced liberals, however, refused to give up on the child and accept 
her deformity as permanent. They were the parents who loved their child even more deeply and 
fought with everything they had in order to do the painfully impossible: to teach her how to 
walk.320 
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Appendix 1 
The Plight of Cautious Liberals 
While the Southern Conference was engaging in its political campaign and forging new 
grounds with its advanced position on integration, southern cautious liberals were aghast by the 
assertiveness of African Americans and their demand for the end of Jim Crow. Cautious liberals 
feared that if black anger was not restrained, then racial war was inevitable and African 
Americans would suffer the worst of it. World War II and the postwar years, instead of being a 
time of progress, marked a long retreat for cautious liberals. They switched from advocating for 
black rights to counseling the African-American community to be cautious and conservative in 
their plea for change, to be patient in their wait, but most importantly, to accept that segregation 
would continue to exist for decades, if not a century more.321 
Leading the cautious liberals’ retreat were the southern journalists. In a region where the 
radio did not reach a majority of its population well until the 1940s and where only one in 
twenty-five farms had electricity, newspapers were the only means of mass communication for 
the southern public. Southern journalists had substantial clout over public debate and could 
influence public policy in their immediate region or state. And for over two decades before 
World War II, the liberal southern press used their pens as an instrument for social progress. The 
KKK was demonized as ignorant terrorists whose actions ran counter to the gentile tradition of 
the South. Lynching mobs were severely chastised for their disregard for the law and human 
lives. And the demagogues were excoriated for their corruptions and incompetence. 
Occasionally, liberal journalists even mildly urged their readers to reexamine their racial policy 
and called for better education, housing, and economic security for African Americans. To them, 
the economic and physical oppressions of southern blacks were not only an embarrassment to the 
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region, but were dragging the region down as a whole. Cautious liberals pointed out to 
southerners that whites could not hold blacks down in the mud without being down there with 
them.322   
The journalists’ acerbic criticism of the South’s short comings and occasional calls for 
reexamination of race relationships steered clear serious and critical examination of race 
relations in the South. It was easier to blame the demagogues, whose fortune could shift with 
public opinion, the nocturnal terror of the hooded KKK, or the lynching mob whose ephemeral 
existence ended once the honor and purity of white womanhood was restored, than to examine 
segregation critically. Nevertheless, liberal southern journalists saw themselves as the voice of 
the downtrodden southern blacks. Cautious liberal journalists often felt that only sympathetic 
white leaders like them who had the ears of the leaders from both side could bridge the two 
worlds of blacks and whites. They believed that without the support of white leaders, black 
leaders would not able to elicit improvements for their race from the white populace. But for 
their support, cautious liberals demanded loyalty from southern blacks. Cautious liberals wanted 
southern blacks to condemn their militant cousins up North for stirring trouble against the South. 
Cautious liberals often pitted conservative southern black leaders against the “radical” and fringe 
northern black organizations like the NAACP and black newspapers like the Chicago Defender 
to claim that both races of the South were working together  to solve the region’s problems and 
did not need any interference from outsiders. It was not surprising, then, that these liberal 
cautious liberals did not foresee that formerly voiceless blacks would grow to become a mighty 
chorus of discord. Not knowing how to handle this new, more militant wave of protest, the 
cautious journalists turned their pen against those who pushed the racial agenda beyond South’s 
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intolerably low comfort level. The gadfly had become the guard dog of southern customs and 
traditions.323  
The editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, Mark Ethridge, while the chairman of the 
FEPC, caused a sensation when he publicly declared that all-or-nothing black leaders must 
recognize that “there is no power in the world—not even in all the mechanized armies of the 
earth, Allied and Axis—which would now force the Southern white people to the abandonment 
of the principle of segregation.”324 The black press, universally incensed by Ethridge’s remark, 
mercilessly condemned him and demanded his immediate resignation. Ethridge, a former 
member of the Southern Conference and a highly respected southern liberal, was supposed to 
look out for blacks’ interest as the head of the FEPC; instead, Ethridge announced that the FEPC 
would never try to break the pattern of segregation in the South.325 Virginius Dabney, in an 
equally controversial article in the Atlantic Monthly, titled “Nearer and Nearer the Precipice,” 
came to the defense of Mark Ethridge and his remark. Dabney warned that a small group of 
black agitators from the North and another group of white rabble-rousers from the South were 
pushing the country to the brink of interracial explosion and unless counsels of the moderates 
prevailed, “we may have the worst internal clashes since the Reconstruction.”326 Dabney 
compared “Extremist Negro leaders” with rabid racists like Georgia Governor Eugene Talmadge 
and Governor Frank Dixon of Alabama as being equally guilty of arousing racial animosity. 
Dabney feared that radical blacks would alienate southern white leaders who had “been 
responsible for much of the steady progress of the Negro in the past, and who can bring about a 
                                                 
323See John Kneebone, Southern Liberal Journalists and the Issue of Race, 1920-1944 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1985), for the most in-depth study and analysis of southern liberal journalists from the period 
between World War I and World War II.  
324 “Ask Ethridge Ouster; Called ‘Pussyfooter,’” CD, Jul 25, 1942; 
325 Kneebone, Southern Liberal Journalists, 198. 
326 Virginius Dabney, “Nearer and Nearer the Precipice,” Atlantic Monthly, January 1943, 94. 
174 
 
great deal more such progress in the future…”327 While Dabney conceded that the maintenance 
of segregation meant that whites had an obligation to provide equal facilities for the two races, 
something they had failed to do, he cautioned his black readers that sustainable reform cannot be 
won by executive fiat, but only by gradual evolutionary development.328 
Following Ethridge’s and Dabney’s drumbeat of retreat were the cautious liberal 
journalists Jonathan Daniels of the Chattanooga News, John Temple Graves of the Birmingham 
Age-Herald, Hodding Carter of the Greenville Delta Democrat-Times , and Ralph McGill of the 
Atlanta Constitution. The journalists feared that the country was sitting on top of a volcano 
waiting to go off. But instead of searching for the culprits of this potential racial Apocalypse 
among the South’s endless number of race-baiting demagogues, murderous members of the 
KKK, or the intolerable policy of Jim Crow, they aimed their pens at the black press. The black 
press, with its popular “Double-V” campaign and fierce stance against snail-pace gradualism, 
became the primary threat to southern peace in the eye of the journalists. They saw the black 
press’s willingness to use the war to win concessions from the country was nothing less than 
extortion.329 In “Nearer and Nearer the Precipice”, Dabney feared that the tone of the black press 
was “so extreme that riots probably would break out if they were widely read by the whites.”330 
Southern whites, Dabney wrote, would never accept the abolishment of segregation within this 
century. Any attempt to force them to accept desegregation would inevitably lead to bloodshed 
and violence. Dabney further cautioned the black press that, although southern liberals like him 
conceded that African Americans had suffered countless injustices from the hands of whites, 
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they could not, however, be anything but extremely alarmed by the speed with which the black 
press was pushing things to their potentially fatal climax.331 
The cautious liberal journalists did not foresee the rise of black protest in the years before 
World War II. They had expected African Americans to close ranks and support the war as they 
did in the First World War. Thus, once African Americans protested instead of playing their part, 
cautious liberals did not know how to properly respond. They did not know to fit black protest 
into their vision of the South’s future. On some days they condemned black militancy and the 
dangerous consequences it would bring; on other days they extolled the sacrifices and patriotism 
of African Americans. At other times, cautious journalists loudly condemned atrocities 
committed by southern whites while reminding African Americans that they were all that stood 
between southern blacks and the region’s legions of racist and ignorant whites. 332 In their 
criticism of militant blacks and outspoken black newspapers, cautious liberals were often guilty 
of excessive bias and lack of common sense. In their evaluation that militant blacks were as 
dangerous as the KKK, cautious journalists blatantly ignored the fact that there had never been a 
black-led riot or lynching prior to the 1960s. All major racial incidents involving massive 
destruction of properties and lives had been instigated by white Americans. Furthermore, the 
cautious liberals’ fear that the black press was arousing the animosity of the white community 
was more paranoia than fact. With the exception of white newspaper editors and a few other 
southern liberals, black newspapers had virtually no readership and no influence in any white 
community in the South. Black newspapers were incapable of arousing any feeling from 
southern whites on a daily basis unless their editorials were reprinted in white newspapers. Most 
white Americans were completely oblivious to what was written about them in the black press.  
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Cautious liberal journalists often claimed that they wanted to find a rational middle 
ground where the “more level-headed members of both groups” could convene and prevent the 
South from plunging in to civil strife.333 They could not, however, heal black wounds with one 
hand while aggravating their pain with the other. Their quest for the elusive rational middle 
ground was ultimately futile. Cautious liberals simply did not understand why African 
Americans were so angry and why they could not wait a “century” before Jim Crow would pass 
away.334 White cautious liberals failed to sympathize with the reality that African Americans 
wanted more than just economic and personal security. They wanted to be treated like human 
beings. This was a lesson that the Southern Conference had learned, but most cautious liberals 
refused to accept. Instead, cautious liberals built up black protest into a dark portent of racial 
violence and destruction.  
To understand why cautious liberals directed most of their criticism at the militant black 
press and black leaders instead of white industrialists and race-baiting politicians, one must first 
examine their view of black-white relationships at the lowest class. Most cautious liberals had a 
pragmatic view of race relationships rather than a abstract devotion to liberal principles. Their 
desire for better race relations stemmed from their desire to advance the South. The source of 
racial tension, according to many cautious liberals, was the poor and ignorant whites who had to 
compete economically with similarly poor and ignorant blacks. Although southern whites had 
removed blacks as a threat at the poll, they could not do so on the cotton fields or the factory 
floors. Economic competitions between the dirt poor of the two classes inevitably led to violence 
clashes.335 “Those who work in the South, who work for the South, know that all these things, 
racial lynchings, chasing off after promises, all this cruelty, spring from the same soil, economic 
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fear,” Ralph McGill wrote, “The poor whites and poor Negroes resent one another, both wanting 
the same jobs and food.”336 Many cautious liberals had seen firsthand poor whites’ capacity for 
violence and they were terrified of it. But for cautious liberals like Howard Odum, W.T. Couch, 
and Virginius Dabney, poor whites’ violence tendency did not mean the South’s racial system 
was broken; instead, it was an unfortunate result of underdevelopment and poverty, things 
fixable by economic security. They believed that the destitution of the South began with 
agriculture and the solution lay with the reformation and improvement of the rural South. 
Cautious liberals were confident that economic improvements alone would be sufficient to 
ameliorate racial tension and time would eventually erase former prejudices. Cautious liberals 
would act as the leaders in the mean time to regulate tension between the two races and advocate 
for better economic security and social services for blacks in exchange for peace and quiet from 
southern blacks.337  
The unexpected rise in racial tensions during and after World War II threatened cautious 
liberals’ idealistic, if not simplistic, view of race management. Cautious liberals feared that vocal 
black demands were disrupting the delicate balance between poor blacks and white southerners. 
If blacks continued to push for redress, then poor whites would lash out at them for being too 
“uppity.” The example of the Columbia Riot in 1946 was looked to as confirmation of their 
worst fear. Cautious liberals like Mark Ethridge and Virginius Dabney frantically tried to regain 
control of the debate by warning blacks to slow down and think through the consequences of 
their action. They were afraid that racial war would tear the regions to pieces and negate 
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whatever social and economic gains it had made. Cautious liberals thus changed their tune from 
that of advancing the South forward, to that of defending gains made and preserving the status 
quo. Cautious liberals hoped that if they could assuage blacks, then they could restore balance of 
progress like before. But the unmanageable rising demands of social equality from African 
Americans and the racial clashes resulting from it proved that cautious liberals’ dreams of 
gradualistic improvements through careful planning were becoming increasingly unrealistic in 
the postwar South.338  
Cautious liberals, by abandoning their progressive post early in the war, found it harder to 
regain the trust of southern blacks. Even conservative southern blacks who aligned themselves 
with moderate interracial organizations like the Southern Regional Council were getting 
impatient with their cautious colleagues. The sociologist Guy Johnson, the first executive 
secretary of the SRC, recounted his experience trying to propose economic initiatives in the 
executive committee only to be interrupted by black members dismissing the proposal as “not 
relevant to [southern blacks’] problems.” What were relevant were the issues of Jim Crow.339 
Cautious liberals had hoped that the Southern Regional Council, founded from the decaying 
remains of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, would breathe new life to managed race 
relationships and economic planning.340 But try as they might, they could not escape the issue of 
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segregation, not even among their black conservative members. Ultimately, those cautious 
liberals who founded the Southern Regional Council left the organization one by one, frustrated 
by blacks who would not leave the issue of segregation alone. When the organization finally 
made up its mind in 1951 and declared itself against segregation, it lost half of its membership 
within three years. The southern cautious liberals’ model of managed race relationships was no 
longer acceptable to southern blacks of any political leaning and was no longer a viable 
instrument of keeping the peace.341  
Not all cautious liberals were calculating in their view of race and black protest. Some 
cautious liberals genuinely and earnestly wanted to elevate African American in southern society 
and give them a fair and equal shot at life. They honestly desired to work with southern black to 
come up with solutions that were fair and just. They insisted that many southern whites from all 
classes felt keenly about the suffering of their black neighbors and wanted to do their part in 
helping blacks move up. 342 Some of them were highly conscious of their and their region’s 
shortcomings. “We wrote our laws to say that while the races were to be separated, we would 
provide ‘separate but equal’ educational, travel, recreational and other qualities,” Ralph McGill 
lamented, “This we have not done.”343 And the “plain truth is that national public opinion is 
against us,” McGill continued, “We have allowed enough evil to make the rest of the nation look 
upon us without sympathy….[we] have allowed local pride to cover up [our] most ghastly 
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crimes.”344 The events of World War II introduced into the cautious liberal journalists’ writings 
“themes once banned as unrealistic and ultimately dangerous.” These were themes of liberty, of 
the moral imperative, and of war idealism.345 The question of “what were we fighting for?” 
perplexed cautious liberal journalists. It forced some journalists like Ralph McGill and Hodding 
Carter to look for a higher purpose to the war. McGill and Carter would eventually recant their 
previous anti-integration position, but the majority of other cautious liberal journalists like 
Virginus Dabney and John Temple Graves retreated further to the right as black protest 
increased.346 Although they understood that segregation could not go forever, they continued to 
believe in the pervasive power of the southern “folkways”—the irrational need to cling on to 
traditions at the price of everything else—which would ultimately prevent serious changes from 
coming for generations and generations. Cautious liberals preferred to leave the difficulty job of 
desegregation to future generations, just as the generation of Washington and Jefferson left 
behind the issue of slavery for the generation of Lincoln and Davis to sort out. In the end, for all 
their sympathy and reflection, most of cautious liberals refused to cross the Rubicon of 
segregation until the issue overtook them like a roaring flood.347 
According to the historian John Kneebone, the rightward march of cautious liberals like 
Mark Ethridge, John Temple Graves, and Virginius Dabney was the “domestic equivalent of 
                                                 
344Ralph McGill, AC, March 4, 1948; see also Ralph McGill, “The Criticism Coming Down South,” in Ralph 
McGill, The Best of Ralph McGill, ed. Michael Strickland, Harry Davis, and Jeff Strickland (Atlanta: Cherokee 
Publishing Company, 1980), 97-98. 
345 Kneebone, Southern Liberal Journalists, 189. 
346 By the late 1940s, McGill was warming up to the idea of more active federal government to help African 
Americans. McGill continued to believe that the repeal of the poll tax, the FEPC, and the anti-lynching bill might be 
unconstitutional, but he felt they should be adopted and see what the result would be. See Ralph McGill, “Civil 
Rights for the Negro,” Atlantic Monthly, November 1949, 64-66.  
347 Gilmore, Defying Dixie, 281; Howard Odum, Race and Rumors of Race: The American South in the Early 
Forties (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997, copyrighted 1943), 48; Dabney, Across 
the Years, 120. 
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appeasement.” 348 By shifting their position from defending black rights to condemning African 
Americans for wanting their rights without delay, cautious liberals seriously damaged the 
reputation of southern liberalism as a whole in the eyes of many black leaders and journalists. 
“Some of these southern liberals used to want to accelerate Negro progress,” wrote one black 
professor, “Now it seems that all they want to do is put on the brakes.”349Black leaders saw from 
their dealing with cautious liberals that, for all their idealism and rhetoric, they needed to be 
pushed and cajoled to get their action caught up with their words. Black leaders learned that they 
could not rely on cautious liberals for sustainable support. Advanced southern liberals were as 
equally as amazed, if not disgusted, by the retreat of cautious liberals. The white liberal 
journalist, Thomas Sancton, in his reply to Dabney’s and Ethridge’s complaints of black protest, 
told them to stop worrying about outside agitators and instead focus on educating their fellow 
white southerners “for concessions on the race issue which the war demands—even though they 
don’t want to be educated,” because it was these journalists’ editorial responsibility and duty to 
do so.350 Lillian Smith concurred with Sancton’s sentiment and charged these cautious 
journalists with “concocting little recipes for sweetening the old segregation,” instead of 
preparing their readers for the inevitable end of Jim Crow.351 The Southern Patriot, in an 
uncharacteristic but reflective article, criticized both Virginius Dabney and cautious liberals fo
their retreat, “Mr. Dabney presents a composite picture of the strength and weakness of 
[cautious] Southern liberals: they see the evils; they are against them, as they are against sin; bu
when it comes to action, they fight a retreating battle.”
r 
t 
                                                
352 The retreat of cautious liberals had 
 
348 Kneebone, Southern Liberal Journalists, 199. 
349 Sterling A. Brown, “Out of Their Mouths,” in Clayborne and others, eds., Reporting Civil Rights: Part One,.27-
28. 
350 Thomas Sancton, “Trouble in Dixie: The Returning Tragic Era,” New Republic, January 4, 1943, 11-14 
351 Lillian Smith, “Are We Not Confused,” 33. 
352 “Liberal Editors of the South,” SP 2, no. 9 (September 1944): 1.  
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profound negative impact on the legacy of southern liberalism. They would be remembered, if at 
all, as appeasers to their region’s baser elements.353 
                                                 
353 Ralph McGill offered a defense of cautious liberals’ staunch defense of the South and its traditions by likened 
them to the parents of a crippled child. As parents, they were both fiercely devoted to the well being of the child, but 
also mourned the debilitating curse inflicted on their child, “They love her the more fiercely and defensively because 
they hate that which crippled the child and which had, therefore, made her weaker and less capable of full 
participation in life than other children.” See Ralph McGill, The South and the Southerner (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1964, copyright 1959), 24. 
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